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1. Introduction
"If men deﬁne situations as real, they are real in their consequences." This result
known in sociology as the Thomas Theorem stresses the fact that a situation is
determined by the actions undertaken by agents which are however based on the
subjective perceptions about this situation, implying that expectations can become
self - fulﬁlling. Since this should be true for any social interaction, it should in
particular hold for economic interactions and indeed a classical example for a so
called self - fulﬁlling prophecy given by the sociologist Robert Merton describes the
bankruptcy of a bank caused by the expectations about this event which led the
costumers to withdraw their money.
However, although the eﬀect of uncertainty on economic outcomes has been the
subject of extensive research throughout economic history, it was not until the early
1980's that economists also considered the eﬀect of uncertainty entering the anal-
ysis solely through agents' expectations, but not aﬀecting any fundamentals of the
economy.
Azariadis (1981), who was the ﬁrst to introduce the concept of so called extraneous
or extrinsic uncertainty to a simple macroeconomic model, motivated his analysis
by historic examples for speculative bubbles, such as the Dutch tulip mania, occur-
ring in the ﬁrst half of the 17th century. During this event, prices for tulip bulbs
exploded without any objective reason. Examples like that led Azariadis to the
hypothesis that the dependence of a rational expectations equilibrium on the evo-
lution of some extrinsic variable, which has no eﬀect on the fundamentals of the
economy, is possible if expectations which are conditioned on this variable become
self - fulﬁling. Azariadis (1981) refers to such equilibria as "replicating equilibria"
since due to the self - fulﬁlling aspect of expectations it becomes indeed rational for
future generations to have these expectations themselves. Moreover, he shows that
in a simple overlapping generations model up to one half of all rational expectations
equilibria are inﬂuenced by self - fulﬁlling beliefs.
Another pioneering contribution to the literature on extrinsic uncertainty is given by
Cass and Shell (1983), who also coined the term "sunspot equilibrium" for a rational
expectations equilibrium in which extrinsic uncertainty matters. They identify the
natural restrictions on market participation in economies with agents who can only
live for a ﬁnite time, i.e. the fact that people can only participate in markets while
they are alive, as one cause for the existence of these equilibria. However, Cass and
Shell base their analysis mainly on microeconomic considerations, such as the anal-
ysis of so called contingent claim markets and unlike Azariadis they do not consider
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a dynamic model and are thus not able to take the replicating or self - perpetuating
aspect of expectation formation into account. Therefore, the focus of this thesis will
be on the strand of literature based on Azariadis (1981) and the subsequent contri-
butions by Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982) and (1986), who developed more rigorous
conditions for the existence of sunspot equilibria in a simple overlapping generations
model. However, the analysis of Cass and Shell (1983) shows that extrinsic variables
can aﬀect an economy even if there exist markets for insuring against the risk as-
sociated with the extrinsic uncertainty. This argument was also used by Woodford
(1987) to explain the relevance of the concept of sunspot equilibria.
Although the result that extrinsic uncertainty can aﬀect a rational expectations
equilibrium might at ﬁrst glance seem to be a satisfying explanation for speculative
bubbles, this is not necessarily true: As there will in each case also exist rational
expectations equilibria for which extrinsic uncertainty does not matter, it is not
clear if agents can actually coordinate on a sunspot equilibrium. This problem can
be solved by assuming that agents use an adaptive learning process in order to form
their expectations about the economic variables of interest. Ideally, only one ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium can be attained asymptotically by such a learning rule,
at least when it is taken into account that agents might initially misspecify the law
of motion for the relevant economic variable.
Since the assumption of rational expectations relies in general on great insight of
the agents into the economic relationships, such as on the knowledge of all relevant
parameter values of the model, it is at least in the short run rather unplausible to
assume that agents posses the ability to form rational expectations. Therefore, the
implications of adaptive learning behaviour for the outcome of various linear expec-
tations models has been widely studied. In particular this analysis is based on a
mathematical technique known as stochastic approximation, as discussed by Ljung
(1977) and as further developed by Evans and Honkapohja (1998a).
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the ex-
istence of sunspot equilibria under the assumption of rational expectations in a
simple overlapping generations model. Therefore, I will ﬁrst describe the perfect
foresight dynamics of this model, before discussing the concept of extrinsic uncer-
tainty more rigorously. After that, a link between the perfect foresight dynamics
and the existence of sunspot equilibria will be established.
Section 3 will then provide an introduction to the analysis of so called stochas-
tic recursive algorithms which are frequently used in economic models to describe
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adaptive learning processes. Therefore, I will ﬁrst introduce diﬀerent speciﬁcations
for the learning behaviour of agents. After that, I will describe a mathematical
technique known as stochastic approximation which is frequently used in order to
analyse the qualitative behaviour of such learning algorithms. After illustrating
this technique within the well known Cobweb model, I will proceed to describe a
simpler stability concept for rational expectations equilibria under agents' learning
behaviour due to Evans (1989) and discuss the robustness of the stability results
obtained for more general univariate expectations models than the Cobweb model
with respect to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the learning rule, as done for example by
Evans and Honkapohja (1992).
Section 4 will then introduce two plausible speciﬁcations of the learning behaviour
of agents in the overlapping generations model already discussed in section 2 and
will use the results given in section 3 in order to analyse whether sunspot equilibria
can actually be regarded as realistic outcomes. In order to answer this question, I
will concentrate on the results obtained by Woodford (1990), who was the ﬁrst to
discuss the stability of sunspot equilibria under adaptive learning processes. How-
ever, additionally I will also discuss results for a speciﬁc parametric class of utility
functions obtained by other authors.
Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
2. Sunspot Equilibria
2.1. Perfect Foresight Equilibria in an OLG Model
Before introducing the concept of extrinsic uncertainty within the framework of a
basic overlapping generations model, I will ﬁrst discuss the nature of perfect foresight
equilibria in this model. This analysis will later on serve as a benchmark case
for the existence of sunspot equilibria. For this purpose, I am going to introduce
the Samuelson overlapping generations model with money, as done for example in
Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) or Woodford (1990).
Therefore, it is assumed that time is discrete and extends to inﬁnity. In every period
a constant number of agents is born and lives for two periods. Hence, there is no
population growth in the economy under consideration. Furthermore, all agents in
one generation are assumed to be identical, which implies that it is only necessary to
consider one representative agent of each generation in order to analyse the model.
A member of the ﬁrst generation born in period zero is endowed with one unit of
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ﬁat money1, which is used as the unique store of value.2 It is assumed that this
money supply is stationary and that the nominal interest rate is zero.
For all agents not born in period zero the following applies: An agent born in period
t is young in this period and is endowed with a certain amount of time nˆ which can
either be consumed as leisure or can be used as an input in a constant returns to
scale technology in order to produce a single consumption good3 denoted as yt. In
other words, production of the consumption good yt is a linear function of nt, the
labour supply of an agent born in period t. Hence, by choosing measurement units
for yt appropriately, it can be assumed without loss of generality that the production
function is given by yt = nt .
Moreover, it is assumed that agents cannot consume when they are young and that
they cannot transfer any production directly into their old age. Hence, agents who
are young in period t must sell their entire production to those who are old in this
period (i.e. those who were born in period t−1) at the market price pt. Therefore, at
the end of period t each member of the generation born in this period holds ptyt units
of ﬁat money which he can spend in his old age on consumption. Furthermore, it is
assumed that all agents take prices as exogenously given and that both the money
and the goods market are perfectly competitive.4 Therefore, prices adjust in such a
way that markets clear, meaning that for all periods t it holds that ptnt = ptct = 1,
where ct denotes the consumption in period t of an agent born in period t−1. Since
the money supply of an old agent is constant at one, this condition requires that
each period the stock of money is used entirely in transactions between old agents
(consumers) and young agents (producers) and that the price level is such that the
optimal labour supply choice of young agents and the optimal consumption choice
of old agents coincide.
Agents are furthermore assumed to have intertemporal preferences over leisure and
consumption which can be represented by an additively separable utility function5
1The term ﬁat money refers to some medium of exchange, the value of which is only institutionally
regulated and accepted, but not intrinsically given.
2The use of ﬁat money as the store of value is not crucial to the following analysis. As Azariadis
(1981) shows all results of the model, especially the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria,
would remain unchanged if a durable commodity (e.g. land) was used instead of ﬁat money.
3This consumption good can be interpreted as a consumer basket, where its price corresponds to
the respective consumer price index. Guesnerie (1986) considers the more realistic situation in
which there is a ﬁnite number of consumption goods. However, this extension does not change
the results on the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria given here much.
4Note that this can be justiﬁed by thinking of each generation as a continuum of identical indi-
viduals.
5The assumption of an additively separable utility function is not crucial, but made in order to
keep the notation as simple as possible. For a more general speciﬁcation of agents' utility see
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u (ct+1) − v (nt), where v (nt) denotes the disutility associated with working. It is
assumed that u (·) and v (·) are strictly increasing, twice continuously diﬀerentiable
and that u′′ (·) < 0, whereas v′′ (·) > 0 on R+ and [0, nˆ], respectively. This implies
that the utility function is strictly concave in both arguments ct+1 and nt.
For future reference, the following assumptions on the limiting behaviour of the
utility function are made:
Assumption: The utility function u (c)− v (n) satisﬁes:
(i) limc→0 u′ (c) =∞
(ii) limn→nˆ v′ (n) =∞
Note that these assumptions made by Woodford (1990) together with the assump-
tion of strict concavity guarantee that utility maximization yields a maximum with
positive amounts of leisure and consumption, respectively and that thus the ﬁrst
order condition of the maximization problem is both necessary and suﬃcient for a
global maximum.
Furthermore, it is assumed that preferences are such that both leisure and consump-
tion are normal goods, i.e. such that an increase in the income of an agent results
in an increased demand for both goods.
As already noted above, money market clearing imposes that demand and supply
for the consumption good in period t satisfy ptct = ptnt = 1 and thus ct = nt = 1pt .
Therefore, a perfect foresight equilibrium in this model can be deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition: A perfect foresight equilibrium corresponds to a sequence of non-
negative prices (p1, p2, . . .), which is such that in each period all markets clear and
for which nt = 1pt , i.e. the labour supply in any period t, is chosen optimally.
More precisely, an agent born in period t chooses his labour supply and his old - age
consumption such that it maximizes his lifetime utility given that his intertemporal
budget restriction is not violated.
Hence, an agent born in period t tries to solve the following problem:
max
nt,ct+1
u (ct+1)− v (nt)
s.t. ptnt ≥ pt+1ct+1
for example Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986)
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where the constraint requires that not more than the income earned through pro-
duction in period t is spent on consumption in period t+ 1. Since utility is strictly
increasing in ct+1 (i.e. preferences are locally non - satiated), this constraint must be
binding. If this were not the case, it would be possible to increase consumption in
period t+1 without increasing nt which under the assumptions made on preferences
would increase utility.
Substituting the constraint into the objective function shows that the supply of
labour in period t, and therefore also the supply of the consumption good in this
period, is given by a function s (Rt) which fulﬁls:
s (Rt) = argmax
nt
u (Rtnt)− v (nt)
where since the nominal interest rate is zero, Rt :=
pt
pt+1
denotes the real return on
money holdings from period t to period t+1. Note that since pt corresponds to the
nominal wage earned by an agent born in period t and pt+1 corresponds to the price
of consumption such an individual will face, Rt can also be interpreted as the real
wage of an agent born in period t.
Goods market clearing in period t implies that the excess demand for the con-
sumption good in this period is zero. Using the money market clearing condition to
express demand for consumption in period t through pt, this implies that equilibrium
prices must fulﬁl the following condition:6
D (pt, pt+1) =
1
pt
− s
(
pt
pt+1
)
= 0 (1)
which corresponds to an implicit ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation that can be used in
order to determine the equilibrium price level sequence given any initial value.
However, since the economy described by this model is stationary, it is natural
to analyse the existence of perfect foresight equilibria for which the price level is
constant over time ﬁrst.7
In order to do this, note that since u (·)− v (·) is strictly concave, s (Rt) is a single
valued function, meaning that given the real wage only one level of labour supply
maximizes lifetime utility. Therefore, in particular the equation 1
p
= s (1) must have
6Note that this condition can also be described by noting that the equilibrium prices are deter-
mined as the intersection of the supply curve s (·) and the demand curve.
7Note that stationary equilibria are not the only form of equilibria which can occur in this model.
As Azariadis (1981) illustrates, there is also the possibility of cycles.
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a unique solution p∗. Since 1
pt
also has the interpretation of the commodity price of
money, i.e. of how much consumption has to be given up in order to buy one unit
of money, it can therefore be concluded that pt = p∗ for all t is the only stationary
equilibrium in which money has a positive value. Hence, this equilibrium is often
referred to as the monetary steady state.
However, the sequence p∗ := (p∗, p∗, . . .) does not have to be the unique stationary
perfect foresight equilibrium. In order to see this, note that optimal labour supply
s
(
pt
pt+1
)
has to fulﬁl the ﬁrst order condition:
pt
pt+1
u′
(
pt
pt+1
s
(
pt
pt+1
))
− v′
(
s
(
pt
pt+1
))
= 0
Using the goods market clearing condition (1) this can be rewritten as:
U
(
1
pt+1
)
= V
(
1
pt
)
where U (y) and V (y) are deﬁned as yu′ (y) and yv′ (y), respectively.
Since by the assumptions made on the utility function V
(
1
pt
)
converges to zero as
pt goes to inﬁnity, it follows that if U
(
1
pt+1
)
also converges to zero as pt+1 goes
to inﬁnity, pt = ∞ ∀t also constitutes a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium.
However, in this stationary equilibrium the commodity price of money is zero in all
periods and thus money does not have any value. Such a situation is often referred
to as an autarchy equilibrium. (Azariadis, 1981)
However, since any economy is subject to small random shocks, an equilibrium
can only be regarded as a realistic outcome if small perturbations from the equilib-
rium result in an adjustment process of the economic variables leading back to the
equilibrium. Therefore, in any dynamic model it is also necessary to undertake an
analysis of the stability of equilibria with respect to such small shocks.
A useful tool for this stability analysis of perfect foresight equilibria in this model is
the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage, which can be obtained
by diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order condition used to determine the labour supply func-
tion s (Rt) with respect to Rt:
∂
∂Rt
[Rtu
′ (Rts (Rt))− v′ (s (Rt))] = 0
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u′ (Rts (Rt)) +Rt
[
s (Rt)u
′′ (Rts (Rt)) +Rt
ds
dRt
u′′ (Rts (Rt))
]
− ds
dRt
v′′ (s (Rt)) = 0
⇒ ds (Rt)
dRt
=
u′ (Rts (Rt)) +Rts (Rt)u′′ (Rts (Rt))
−R2tu′′ (Rts (Rt)) + v′′ (s (Rt))
⇒ ds (Rt)
dRt
|Rt=1 =
u′ (s (1)) + s (1)u′′ (s (1))
−u′′ (s (1)) + v′′ (s (1))
Therefore, the elasticity of labour supply evaluated at the monetary steady state is
given by:
ε (1) =
ds (Rt)
dRt
Rt
s (Rt)
|Rt=1 (2)
ε (1) =
[
u′ (s (1)) + s (1)u′′ (s (1))
−u′′ (s (1)) + v′′ (s (1))
]
1
s (1)
(3)
Note that the sign of this expression is not determined by the assumptions made so
far. Since the denominator is by assumption strictly positive, it only depends on the
sign of the numerator u′ (s (1)) + s (1)u′′ (s (1)) = U ′ (s (1)), where U (·) is deﬁned
as above.
In general, an increase in the real wage has two opposing eﬀects on labour supply:
On the one hand, given the labour supply choice it increases income, and since
leisure and consumption are both assumed to be normal goods, this should result in
an increase in the demand for leisure and old - age consumption, respectively.
On the other hand, an increase in the real wage implies that leisure has become
relatively more expensive compared to old - age consumption and that thus agents
will substitute leisure by old - age consumption and increase their labour supply.
If the income eﬀect is dominating at the monetary steady state, leisure and con-
sumption are locally gross complements and the elasticity of labour supply at the
monetary steady state is negative.
If however the substitution eﬀect is dominating at the monetary steady state, leisure
and consumption are locally gross substitutes and the elasticity of labour supply is
positive.
If the elasticity of labour supply is zero, the income and the substitution eﬀect ex-
actly oﬀset each other.
However, the assumptions made so far imply the following property of ε (1):
Lemma 1 If leisure and consumption are locally at the monetary steady state gross
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complements, the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage is such that
|ε (1)| < 1.
Proof: Since it is assumed that −u′′ (·) > 0, u′ (·) > 0, v′′ (·) > 0 and since s (1) is
a positive constant, the following holds:
−s (1)u′′ (s (1))− u′ (s (1)) < −s (1)u′′ (s (1)) + s (1) v′′ (s (1))
Moreover, since under the assumption of leisure and consumption being locally gross
complements it holds that |ε (1)| = −ε (1), it follows from (3) that:
|ε (1)| = −s (1)u
′′ (s (1))− u′ (s (1))
−s (1)u′′ (s (1)) + s (1) v′′ (s (1)) < 1.
With this technical background it is possible to establish the following result on the
local stability of the monetary steady state:
Theorem 1 The monetary steady state is locally asymptotically stable under the
dynamics of the implicit ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation (1) if ε (1) < −1
2
.
Proof: Following Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), consider the ﬁrst order Taylor
expansion of equation (1), i.e. the excess demand, about the monetary steady sate:
D (pt, pt+1) ≈ 1
p∗
− s (1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
(
− 1
p∗2
− 1
p∗
s′ (1)
p∗
p∗2
s′ (1)
)(
pt − p∗
pt+1 − p∗
)
Denoting deviations of actual prices from their monetary steady state levels as xt
and xt+1, respectively and using that in an equilibrium excess demand must be zero
leads to the following ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation:(
− 1
p∗2
− 1
p∗
s′ (1)
)
xt +
p∗
p∗2
s′ (1) xt+1 = 0
−xt − p∗s′ (1) xt + p∗s′ (1) xt+1 = 0
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Using the money market clearing condition at the monetary steady state (i.e. that
p∗ = 1
s(1)
) and the deﬁnition of ε (1), i.e. equation (2), then yields:
(−1− ε (1))xt + ε (1) xt+1 = 0
xt+1 =
1 + ε (1)
ε (1)
xt
Since this diﬀerence equation is the linearisation of the implicit diﬀerence equation
(1) about the monetary steady state, it can be concluded that the monetary steady
state is locally asymptotically stable if
∣∣∣1+ε(1)ε(1) ∣∣∣ < 1
Case 1: Leisure and consumption are locally at the monetary steady state gross
complements (ε (1) < 0)
(a) 1+ε(1)
ε(1)
≥ 0⇔ ε (1) ≤ −1, in which case it always holds that 1+ε(1)
ε(1)
< 1
(b) 1+ε(1)
ε(1)
< 0 ⇔ ε (1) > −1, in which case it has to hold that −1+ε(1)
ε(1)
< 1 ⇔
1 + ε (1) < −ε (1)⇔ ε (1) < −1
2
To summarize: if leisure and consumption are locally at the monetary steady state
gross complements, it has to hold that ε (1) < −1
2
for the monetary steady state to
be locally asymptotically stable.
Case 2: Leisure and consumption are locally at the monetary steady state gross sub-
stitutes (ε (1) > 0)
In this case it can never hold that 1+ε(1)
ε(1)
< 1.
Note that this also implies that the monetary steady state can only be locally stable
if the negative income eﬀect of an increase in the real wage on labour supply out-
weighs the positive substitution eﬀect at the monetary steady state by a suﬃcient
margin and that conversely the monetary steady state is unstable if leisure and con-
sumption are gross substitutes at the monetary steady state.
Azariadis (1981) and Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982) provide an intuitive argument
for this latter result:
Suppose that the current price level is higher than the monetary steady state price
level. Then, since demand for consumption is lower than in the monetary steady
state, goods market clearing requires that labour supply is also lower than in the
monetary steady state. Since leisure and consumption are assumed to be gross sub-
stitutes, this is only possible if the real wage is lower than in the monetary steady
state (i.e. lower than 1), which implies that the price level in the next period must
be higher than in the current period. This however implies that the price level di-
14
verges further away from its monetary steady state level. An analogous argument
holds if the current price level is lower than the monetary steady state price level.
If the monetary steady state is however locally asymptotically stable, it is always
indeterminate, meaning that there are inﬁnitely many price sequences all converging
to the monetary steady state regardless of their initial value. As Woodford (1990)
points out and as will be seen later, this feature is essential for the existence of
sunspot equilibria.
2.2. Extrinsic Uncertainty in an OLG Model
By departing from the perfect foresight assumption made so far, it is necessary
to specify how agents form their expectations about future prices. Therefore, it is
assumed that the appearance of the world agents live in changes over time according
to some stochastic process, meaning that agents do not know with certainty how
their environment will be like in the next period. However, it is still assumed that the
fundamentals of the economy, i.e. the endowments, preferences and the production
technology, are stationary over time, meaning that they are not subject to the purely
extrinsic uncertainty.
For the moment it is also assumed that agents expect a perfect correlation between
the price level and the state of nature8, meaning that they expect prices to be the
same in two periods if in these periods the world around them is the same, whereas
they expect prices to be diﬀerent if the world around them is diﬀerent.
Loosely speaking, a sunspot equilibrium is then deﬁned as a situation in which these
particular expectations are self - fulﬁlling and hence become rational, in the sense
that given the available information and the expectations of the other agents the
expectations of a single agent are chosen optimally, meaning that they correspond
to the objective mathematical expectations.9
For simplicity, it is assumed that the appearance of the world or state of nature can
be captured by a Markov chain (St)t≥0, which can take on values in the state space
I = {a, b}.10 This extrinsic stochastic process is usually referred to as a "sunspot
8This assumption will be relaxed when learning dynamics are taken into account. However, it will
be shown that even then there are situations in which the state of nature matters asymptotically
for the economic outcomes.
9Here it is again implicitly assumed that there exists a continuum of identical individuals since
it has to hold that the expectations of a single agent cannot aﬀect economic outcomes for the
optimal expectations of this agent corresponding to the mathematical expectations.
10In a later section it will also be taken into account that the world is more complex and can have
more than two states.
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process". This terminology was coined by Cass and Shell (1983) and is based on the
English economist William Jevons, who used the occurrence of sunspots to explain
business cycle ﬂuctuations. Although Jevons assumed that sunspots have a real
eﬀect on agricultural production possibilities, the occurrence of sunspots is still a
valid example for extrinsic uncertainty if this possibility is not taken into account
since it cannot be assumed that it aﬀects any other fundamentals of an economy in
any way.11 State a of the Markov chain could then represent a situation in which
sunspots occur, whereas state b could correspond to a situation in which sunspots
do not occur.
The transition probability matrix of this process is assumed to be stationary over
time and is given by:
Π =
(
piaa 1− piaa
1− pibb pibb
)
where piaa denotes the probability that given the current state of nature is a, the
state of nature in the next period will also be a, whereas 1 − piaa =: piab denotes
the probability that given the current state of nature is a, the state of nature in the
following period will be b.
It is furthermore assumed that it is common knowledge that the state of nature
evolves according to a Markov process with transition probability matrix Π, so that
all agents can update their price expectations for period t+1 based on the observed
state of nature in period t.
A young agent in period t then chooses his labour supply and his old - age con-
sumption such that they maximize his expected lifetime utility given the informa-
tion available in period t and given that his intertemporal budget restriction is not
violated. In other words, a rational agent born in period t tries to solve the following
problem:
max
nt,ct+1
E [u (ct+1) |Ωt]− v (nt)
s.t. ptnt = pt+1ct+1
where E [·] denotes the mathematical expectations operator and where Ωt captures
the information available in period t which in particular includes the state of nature
11Woodford (1990) also discusses the possibility that the sunspot process describes the evolution
of a variable which has an eﬀect on the fundamentals of the economy. In this case, he argues,
is the observed eﬀect of this variable on economic outcomes greater than would simply follow
from the direct eﬀect on fundamentals, since there is also the eﬀect via expectations described
here.
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in period t and the transition probability matrix Π.
Substituting the intertemporal budget constraint into the objective function yields
then the following simpliﬁed problem:
max
nt
E
[
u
(
pt
pt+1
nt
)
|Ωt
]
− v (nt) (4)
Since in a sunspot equilibrium the expectations about a perfect correlation between
the price level and the state of nature are self - fulﬁlling, it is rational to conclude
from observing any particular state i ∈ I in the current period that prices in the next
period will be pi with probability piii and pj with the complementary probability,
meaning that in equilibrium these probabilities are not just subjective perceptions,
but indeed the objective mathematical probabilities for these two events. Therefore,
given that in period t state i ∈ I is observed, this maximization problem can be
simpliﬁed further by explicitly calculating the mathematical or rational expectations
about utility in order to obtain the following maximization problem:
max
nt
piiiu
(
pi
pi
nt
)
+ (1− piii)u
(
pi
pj
nt
)
− v (nt)
where it can be seen that with probability piii agents expect prices to be equal to the
characteristic prices associated with state i since the state of nature does not change
from period t to period t+1 with this probability. In other words, agents expect to
receive a real wage of one with probability piii. However, with the complementary
probability 1− piii agents expect a real wage of pipj since the state of nature changes
with this probability from i to j.
Denoting pi
pj
as Rt, the optimal labour supply of an agent born in period t in which
state i ∈ I is observed can be expressed as the following function depending on the
real wage this agent would face if states were to change during his lifetime and the
probability of the state of nature remaining unchanged from period t to period t+1:
z (Rt, piii) = argmax
nt
[piiiu (nt) + (1− piii)u (Rtnt)− v (nt)]
As in the case of perfect foresight, it must also hold under extrinsic uncertainty that
in an equilibrium the goods and the money market clear. Before using the market
clearing conditions in order to deﬁne a sunspot equilibrium formally, I will however
brieﬂy state some links between the optimal labour supply function under extrinsic
uncertainty and under perfect foresight, which will be of use in the next section
where suﬃcient conditions for the existence of sunspot equilibria are developed.
17
First note that if the probability of remaining in the current state is zero, the maxi-
mization problem under extrinsic uncertainty coincides with the problem considered
under perfect foresight and thus z (Rt, 0) must coincide with s (Rt).
If however agents expect prices to be equal in all states of nature, i.e. if Rt is equal
to one, the situation under extrinsic uncertainty is not diﬀerent from the situation
under perfect foresight with stationary prices. Therefore it must hold that z (1, piii)
is constant at s (1), i.e. the optimal labour supply at the monetary steady state,
regardless of piii.
Moreover, since the objective function under extrinsic uncertainty is a convex com-
bination of u (nt) − v (nt) and u (Rtnt) − v (nt), it has to hold that z (Rt, piii) lies
between s (1) (the argument, which maximizes the ﬁrst function) and s (Rt) (the
argument, which maximizes the second function).
With these properties of the optimal labour supply function under extrinsic uncer-
tainty established, I will now proceed to deﬁne the concept of a sunspot equilibrium.
As already noted before, the optimal labour supply choice z (Rt, piii) can only be part
of a sunspot equilibrium if the prices deﬁning Rt are such that the goods and money
market clear. Analogously to condition (1), this requires that in any period t in
which state a is observed it holds that:
D (pt, pt+1|St = a) := 1
pa
− z
(
pa
pb
, piaa
)
= 0 (5)
Whereas, in any period t′ in which state b is observed it imposes:
D (pt′ , pt′+1|St′ = b) := 1
pb
− z
(
pb
pa
, pibb
)
= 0 (6)
A stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium is then formally deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition: A stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium is given by prices pa and
pb, each corresponding to a diﬀerent realization of St, which constitute a solution to
(5) - (6) for transition probabilities piaa and pibb, that lie strictly between 0 and 1,
and for which it holds that pa 6= pb.
Note that the sunspot equilibrium concept described here is stationary since prices
associated with a certain state are not supposed to change over time which would
be the case if agents expected that the sunspot process and the evolution of prices
were only weakly correlated.
Also note that (5) and (6) require that labour supply maximizes expected lifetime
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utility given that the allocation lies within the budget set and that both the goods
market and the money market clear in period t.
Moreover, it is imposed by this deﬁnition that prices associated with realizations of
the sunspot process are indeed diﬀerent from each other. If this were not the case,
this would imply that the extrinsic uncertainty did not matter for the equilibrium
allocation. Clearly, the monetary steady state found under perfect foresight, which
can now be expressed as (pa pb) = (p∗ p∗) =: p∗, is such an equilibrium since by
a previous remark on the optimal labour supply it holds that z (1, piii) = s (1) which
implies that equations (5) and (6) are equivalent to equation (1) evaluated at the
monetary steady state. Hence, even under extrinsic uncertainty it is still rational
for agents to believe that prices are the same in all periods.
However, the question of interest here is under which circumstances equilibria exist
for which the extrinsic uncertainty matters. This will be analysed in the next section.
Another restriction, which is imposed by this deﬁnition of Azariadis and Gues-
nerie (1986), is that transition probabilities must lie strictly between zero and one
in order to implement a sunspot equilibrium.
A possible motivation for this is the following: If for example the diagonal elements
of the transition probability matrix Π approach zero, uncertainty vanishes since then
the state of nature necessarily changes from one period to the next. Therefore, also
price levels must alternate which results in an equilibrium price sequence that is
periodic of order 2. Hence, agents can perfectly foresee prices in the next period
which implies that their behaviour is not subject to any uncertainty.12
Extrinsic uncertainty also vanishes from the economy if piaa and pibb approach one.
If there nevertheless exist distinct solutions for pa and pb to equations (5) and (6),
it follows that also the perfect foresight system allows for multiple steady states13,
in which case true sunspot equilibria (according to the deﬁnition given above) can
be obtained as randomizations of these multiple perfect foresight equilibria.
If however for example only pibb is one, whereas piaa lies strictly between zero and one,
extrinsic uncertainty is indeed governing the behaviour of agents as long as the state
of nature is a and would only vanish when state b is reached for the ﬁrst time which
with probability one occurs in ﬁnite time. This would, according to the deﬁnition
given above, not be enough to implement a sunspot equilibrium. However, as will be
12Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) however point out that such a deterministic cycle can be inter-
preted as the limit of a sunspot equilibrium as the diagonal elements of the transition probability
matrix approach zero.
13Recall that by a previous remark on optimal labour supply it holds that z (Rt, 1) = s (Rt)
19
seen later, stationary sunspot equilibria cannot exist for such transition probability
matrices in the simple model under consideration if leisure and consumption are
gross complements.
Therefore, Guesnerie (1986) notes that requiring that transition probabilities to lie
strictly between zero and one is merely a matter of taste. Moreover, it should also
be noted that there are authors who allow for the transition probabilities to be zero
or one (see for example Azariadis (1981)).
2.3. The Existence of Sunspot Equilibria
Before analysing the existence of sunspot equilibria, it is convenient to establish the
following relationship between the elasticity of labour supply in the case of extrinsic
uncertainty and in the case of perfect foresight, as done in Azariadis and Guesnerie
(1986):
Lemma 2 η (1, piii), the elasticity of labour supply under extrinsic uncertainty with
respect to Rt, evaluated at the monetary steady state, fulﬁls:
η (1, piii) = (1− piii) ε (1)
Proof: This can be seen by diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order condition used to obtain
the optimal labour supply under extrinsic uncertainty z (Rt, piii) with respect to Rt:
∂
∂Rt
[piiiu
′ (z) + (1− piii)Rtu′ (Rtz)− v′ (z)] = 0
piii
∂z
∂Rt
u′′ (z)+(1− piii)
[
u′ (Rtz) +Rt
[
zu′′ (Rtz) +Rt
∂z
∂Rt
u′′ (Rtz)
]]
− ∂z
∂Rt
v′′ (z) = 0
⇒ ∂z (Rt, piii)
∂Rt
=
(1− piii)Rtzu′′ (Rtz) + (1− piii)u′ (Rtz)
−piiiu′′ (z)− (1− piii)R2tu′′ (Rtz) + v′′ (z)
⇒ ∂z (Rt, piii)
∂Rt
|Rt=1 =
(1− piii) z (1, piii)u′′ (z (1, piii)) + (1− piii)u′ (z (1, piii))
−piiiu′′ (z (1, piii))− (1− piii)u′′ (z (1, piii)) + v′′ (z (1, piii))
Since by a previous remark z (1, piii) = s (1), it follows that:
∂z (Rt, piii)
∂Rt
|Rt=1 = (1− piii)
s (1)u′′ (s (1)) + u′ (s (1))
−u′′ (s (1)) + v′′ (s (1))
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and that thus the elasticity of labour supply under extrinsic uncertainty, evaluated
at the monetary steady state, is given by.
η (1, piii) =
∂z (Rt, piii)
∂Rt
Rt
z (Rt, pi)
|Rt=1 (7)
η (1, piii) = (1− piii) s (1)u
′′ (s (1)) + u′ (s (1))
−u′′ (s (1)) + v′′ (s (1))
1
s (1)
(8)
Comparing (3) and (8) shows that:
η (1, piii) = (1− piii) ε (1) (9)
This Lemma essentially states that the elasticity of labour supply under extrinsic
uncertainty, evaluated at the monetary steady state, is proportional to the corre-
sponding elasticity under perfect foresight and that it is in absolute terms always
smaller than the perfect foresight elasticity.
Moreover, this Lemma shows that if the probability of remaining in the current
state approaches one, η (1, piii) approaches zero. This is intuitive since then states
would never change and therefore the price level is always expected to be constant
by rational agents. Hence, they know that their real wage will always be one and
thus, changes in pi
pj
, the ﬁctitious real wage earned if states of nature changed, do
not induce any changes in their optimal behaviour.
Furthermore, it can be seen from this result that the smaller the probability of re-
maining in the current state, the higher is η (1, piii) in absolute terms. This is the
case since an increase in the probability of states of nature changing from one pe-
riod to the next results in agents regarding it more likely that prices will change and
that therefore the real wage they will face will actually be given by pi
pj
. Thus, for
transition probabilities piij high enough, changes in this ratio have similar eﬀects on
optimal behaviour as changes of the real wage under perfect foresight.
With this relationship between the elasticity of labour supply under extrinsic uncer-
tainty and under perfect foresight it is now ﬁnally possible to establish a connection
between the local stability or more precisely the indeterminacy of the monetary
steady state and the existence of sunspot equilibria, which can also be found in
Azariadis (1981).
However, in order to make the analysis as easy as possible it is convenient to reduce
the two dimensional problem considered so far to a one dimensional problem by
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introducing the variable w = pa
pb
, as done by Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986).
In order to state the goods market clearing conditions (5) and (6) in terms of this
new variable, it is necessary to rewrite these conditions as 1
pa
= z (w, piaa) and
1
pb
= z
(
1
w
, pibb
)
, respectively. Then the ﬁrst equation can be divided by the second
equation in order to obtain:
1
w
=
z (w, piaa)
z
(
1
w
, pibb
)
By rearranging this condition, it can be seen that the equilibrium prices pa and pb,
which are such that the goods and money market clear, correspond to values of w
which are roots of the following function:
G (w, piaa, pibb) = wz (w, piaa)− z
(
1
w
, pibb
)
Since in a sunspot equilibrium prices associated with diﬀerent states of nature must
be diﬀerent from each other, a stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium exists if,
and only if, G has a root w which is positive and diﬀerent from 1.
Moreover, note here that w = 1 implies that pa and pb are equal. Therefore, this
case corresponds to a situation in which agents know with certainty that prices will
always be equal14. However, it has been shown in section 2.1 that then the only
equilibrium in which money has a positive value is the monetary steady state. Hence,
w = 1 corresponds to this equilibrium and must always constitute a root of G since
at the monetary steady state markets clear and the labour supply maximizes the
expected lifetime utility of agents.
In order to analyse whether G (w, piaa, pibb) has also roots diﬀerent from w = 1,
Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) establish the following properties of this function
for w > 0:
Lemma 3 The following properties of G (w, piaa, pibb) hold for every w > 0 and for
all piaa, pibb ∈ (0, 1):
(i) G (w, piaa, pibb) is continuous for all (w, piaa, pibb)
(ii) G (1, piaa, pibb) = 0
(iii) G (w, piaa, pibb)→∞ for w →∞
(iv) G (w, piaa, pibb) < 0 for w small enough
14Note that possible shocks which would cause the actual price to deviate unsystematically from
the rational expectations about this price are not part of the model.
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(v) If wˆ is a root of G (w, piaa, pibb), then
1
wˆ
is a root of G (w, pibb, piaa)
This Lemma is stated without proof. However, note that property (i) follows from
the fact that optimal labour supply must be a continuous function as the maximand
of a function which is continuous in w, piaa and pibb. The content of property (ii) has
already been explained above, where it has been argued that the monetary steady
state always corresponds to a root of G. Properties (iii) and (iv) essentially require
that optimal labour supply is bounded, and property (v) can be proved by setting
G (w, piaa, pibb) to zero and rearranging the resulting equation.
The boundary properties of G (w, piaa, pibb) (namely properties (iii) and (iv)) and
the fact that the monetary steady state corresponds to a root of G (property (ii))
imply that G having a negative slope at the monetary steady state is suﬃcient for
the existence of at least two other distinct roots of G, as can easily be seen from
Figure 1. If this condition holds for transition probabilities which lie strictly be-
tween zero and one, these roots satisfy all requirements stated in the deﬁnition of
a stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium given in the previous section since, as
has been argued above, roots of G satisfy the market clearing conditions (5) and (6)
by construction and since moreover w 6= 1 implies that pa 6= pb.
Figure 1: Stationary Rational Expectations Equilibria
Thus, the following theorem, established by Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), holds:
Theorem 2 If preferences are such that Lemma 3 holds, suﬃcient conditions for
the existence of stationary two - state sunspot equilibria are:
ε (1) < 0 and piaa + pibb < 2− 1|ε (1)|
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Proof: The partial derivative of G with respect to w is given by:
∂G (w, piaa, pibb)
∂w
= z (w, piaa) + wz1 (w, piaa) +
1
w2
z1
(
1
w
, pibb
)
∂G (w, piaa, pibb)
∂w
|w=1 = z (1, piaa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=s(1)
1 + z1 (1, piaa) 1z (1, piaa) + z1 (1, pibb) 1z (1, piaa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=z(1,pibb)

= s (1) [1 + η (1, piaa) + η (1, pibb)]
= s (1) [1 + (1− piaa) ε (1) + (1− pibb) ε (1)]
where z1 (·, ·) denotes the partial derivative of z with respect to its ﬁrst argument.
Since s (1), the optimal labour supply at the monetary steady state, is strictly
positive, the slope of G with respect to w is negative at the monetary steady state
if, and only if:
1 + (1− piaa) ε (1) + (1− pibb) ε (1) < 0
(2− piaa − pibb) ε (1) < −1
Since by the deﬁnition given in the previous section both piaa and pibb must be strictly
smaller than 1 in order to implement a stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium,
ε (1) must be negative for this inequality to be fulﬁlled. Therefore, this expression
can be rearranged to yield:
− (2− piaa − pibb) < − 1|ε (1)|
piaa + pibb < 2− 1|ε (1)|
Note that this condition can be interpreted in two ways:
On the one hand, given certain preferences, this relationship identiﬁes a set of transi-
tion probability matrices for which stationary two - state sunspot equilibria necessar-
ily exist. This is depicted in Figure 2, where stationary sunspot equilibria necessarily
exist for pairs of transition probabilities (piaa, pibb) lying within the shaded area.
However, since the condition piaa+pibb < 2− 1|ε(1)| is only suﬃcient, but not necessary
for the existence of sunspot equilibria, it is possible that actually the shaded area
only constitutes a subset of the total set of transition probability matrices for which
stationary sunspot equilibria exist. This point was made by Guesnerie (1986) and
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Figure 2: Set of Two - State Sunspot Equilibria
will be discussed in greater detail in a later section.
On the other hand, given a stochastic process that models the state of nature, pref-
erences which fulﬁl this condition allow for the existence of stationary two - state
sunspot equilibria.
In order to describe these two ways of thinking more precisely, note that since accord-
ing to Lemma 1 1|ε(1)| > 1 for ε (1) < 0, and that since according to the deﬁnition of a
stationary sunspot equilibrium used here all transition probabilities must be strictly
positive in order to implement a sunspot equilibrium, the suﬃcient condition for the
existence of stationary two - state sunspot equilibria stated in Theorem 2 can also
be expressed as:
0 < piaa + pibb < 2− 1|ε (1)| < 1
Therefore, if on the one hand the monetary steady state is locally asymptotically sta-
ble or indeterminate and thus the negative income eﬀect of a change in the real wage
outweighs the positive substitution eﬀect by a suﬃcient margin (i.e. if 0 < 2− 1|ε(1)|),
it is possible to construct transition probabilities for which stationary two - state
sunspot equilibria necessarily exist for the given preferences and which are such that
piaa + pibb < 1.
Whereas, if on the other hand the extrinsic uncertainty can be captured by a
Markov process with transition probabilities satisfying piaa + pibb < 1, it is possi-
ble to ﬁnd preferences for which stationary sunspot equilibria exist (i.e. which fulﬁl
piaa + pibb < 2 − 1|ε(1)|). The utility function representing these preferences must be
such that leisure and consumption are locally at the monetary steady state gross
complements and such that the monetary steady state is locally asymptotically sta-
ble or indeterminate under the perfect foresight dynamics.
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So far, I have only been concerned with suﬃcient conditions for the existence of sta-
tionary sunspot equilibria. Thus, it has for example been shown that piaa + pibb < 1
necessarily implies the existence of stationary two - state sunspot equilibria for ap-
propriately chosen preferences. However, Azariadis (1981) shows that if leisure and
consumption are gross complements, this condition is even necessary for the exis-
tence of sunspot equilibria in the simple model considered here.
In order to see this, note that the optimal labour supply functions under extrinsic
uncertainty are given by:
z
(
pa
pb
, piaa
)
= argmax
nt
piaau (nt) + (1− piaa)u
(
pa
pb
nt
)
− v (nt)
and
z
(
pb
pa
, pibb
)
= argmax
nt
pibbu (nt) + (1− pibb)u
(
pb
pa
nt
)
− v (nt) .
Therefore, labour supply in a stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium must fulﬁl
the following ﬁrst order conditions:
piaau
′
(
z
(
pa
pb
, piaa
))
+ (1− piaa) pa
pb
u′
(
pa
pb
z
(
pa
pb
, piaa
))
− v′
(
z
(
pa
pb
, piaa
))
= 0
pibbu
′
(
z
(
pb
pa
, pibb
))
+ (1− pibb) pb
pa
u′
(
pb
pa
z
(
pb
pa
, pibb
))
− v′
(
z
(
pb
pa
, pibb
))
= 0
Using the goods and money market clearing conditions (i.e. equations (5) and (6))
to express the equilibrium labour supplies through the market clearing prices pa and
pb, these ﬁrst order conditions can be written as:
piaaU
(
1
pa
)
+ (1− piaa)U
(
1
pb
)
= V
(
1
pa
)
(10)
pibbU
(
1
pb
)
+ (1− pibb)U
(
1
pa
)
= V
(
1
pb
)
(11)
where U (·) and V (·) are deﬁned as above.
Now, ﬁrst consider the case piaa+pibb > 1, i.e. the case piaa > piba, which corresponds
to a situation in which the states of nature in two consecutive periods are positively
correlated.
The ﬁrst order conditions (10) and (11) can then be rewritten to yield:
piaa
[
U
(
1
pa
)
− U
(
1
pb
)]
= V
(
1
pa
)
− U
(
1
pb
)
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piba
[
U
(
1
pa
)
− U
(
1
pb
)]
= V
(
1
pb
)
− U
(
1
pb
)
Without loss of generality it can be assumed that a solution to this system of equa-
tions corresponding to a stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium satisﬁes pa > pb
(if this were not the case, the states of nature could be relabelled). Since leisure and
consumption are assumed to be gross complements, U (·)must be strictly decreasing,
as has been discussed in section 2.1. Therefore, it must hold that U
(
1
pa
)
− U
(
1
pb
)
is positive, and hence if piaa > piab, it follows from the rewritten ﬁrst order conditions
stated above that V
(
1
pa
)
> V
(
1
pb
)
. Since V (·) is by assumption a strictly increas-
ing function, this would require that pa < pb which however yields a contradiction.
Therefore, the only solution satisfying the ﬁrst order conditions must be such that
prices are always constant, i.e. pa = pb.
Next, consider the case piaa + pibb = 1, i.e. the case piaa = piba. This implies that the
state of nature in the next period does not depend on the current state since the
probability of reaching state a in the following period is the same regardless of the
current state being a or b. Therefore, agents cannot obtain any new information on
prices in the next period by observing the state of nature in the current period.
In this case the left hand sides of the ﬁrst order conditions (10) and (11) are iden-
tical and thus V
(
1
pa
)
must equal V
(
1
pb
)
in order for the system of equations to be
consistent. However, since V (·) is a strictly increasing function, this can only be
the case if pa = pb.
Therefore, in the model considered here a negative correlation between the states
of nature in two consecutive periods is indeed necessary and not only suﬃcient for
stationary two - state sunspot equilibria to exist.
It is however also important to note that this latter result strongly depends on
the simple model considered here and not at all on the non-informativeness of the
extrinsic stochastic process concerning future economic outcomes. Guesnerie (1986)
shows that it is indeed possible that stationary sunspot equilibria exist even if the
states of nature in two consecutive periods are independent.
In order to show this, he introduces the concept of backward looking equilibria:
For any price pt+1, a backward looking equilibrium determines a price pt which is
such that markets clear and for which the labour supply choice of individuals is op-
timal. A suﬃcient condition for the existence of several backward looking equilibria
associated with a perfect foresight steady state is then derived as follows:
Fix pt+1 at the monetary steady state level p∗, and consider excess demand as a func-
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tion only depending on pt. As pointed out above, it must hold that D (p∗, p∗) = 0.
Moreover, it can be shown that there exists an interval
[
p, p
]
, which contains p∗ and
which is such that for pt = p excess demand is positive, whereas it is negative for
pt = p. Hence, if the excess demand function D (pt, p∗) is upward sloping at pt = p∗
(i.e. if ∂D(pt,p
∗)
∂pt
|pt=p∗ > 0) there necessarily exist two other roots of D (pt, p∗) in(
p, p
)
, meaning that the monetary steady state is associated with several backward
looking equilibria.15
Guesnerie (1986) then demonstrates that if there either exist several stationary
steady states which are all associated with a unique backward looking equilibrium
under perfect foresight dynamics or if there exists a unique stationary steady state
under perfect foresight dynamics which fulﬁls the suﬃcient condition for the ex-
istence of several backward looking equilibria stated above, sunspot equilibria for
transition probabilities satisfying piaa+pibb = 1 necessarily exist.16 Guesnerie (1986)
refers to this class of equilibria as "non-informative" sunspot equilibria.
In the model considered here the monetary steady state is however the only perfect
foresight equilibrium for which the partial derivative of excess demand with respect
to the current price level is diﬀerent from zero and thus also the only perfect foresight
equilibrium at which the argument above, i.e. the Poincaré - Hopf index theorem,
can be applied. However, at the monetary steady state it is the case that:
∂D (pt, p
∗)
∂pt
|pt=p∗ = −
1
p∗2
− 1
p∗
s′ (1)
= − 1
p∗2
[1 + p∗s′ (1)]
= − 1
p∗2
[1 + ε (1)]
which is negative since by Lemma 1 ε (1) is strictly greater than −1. In other words,
this implies tha the suﬃcient condition for the existence of several backward looking
equilibria is not fulﬁlled at the monetary steady state.
A model in which "non-informative" sunspot equilibria might however occur is an
15Guesnerie (1986) extends this condition to cases in which the excess demand under perfect
foresight is a vector valued function (which is the case if there are more than one consump-
tion good). In order to do this, he uses the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem to show that a
suﬃcient condition for the existence of more than one backward looking equilibrium is that
det
[
∂D(pt,p
∗)
∂pt
|pt=p∗
]
has the same sign as (−1)n+1, where n denotes the number of components
of D (·, p∗). This mathematical technique is frequently used in order to derive suﬃcient con-
ditions for the existence of sunspot equilibria and will be described in greater detail further
below.
16Guesnerie shows this by using an argument based on the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem.
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overlapping generations model with more than one commodity as it has been anal-
ysed by Guesnerie (1986). But since the suﬃcient condition for the existence of
"non-informative" sunspot equilibria only depends on the perfect foresight dynami-
cal system, changes in the number of possible states of nature can have no eﬀect on
the existence of "non-informative" sunspot equilibria since, contrary to changes in
the number of commodities, this change has no eﬀect under perfect foresight.
However, also note that although the necessary condition piaa + pibb < 1 does not
automatically translate into a more complex model, also in an overlapping genera-
tions model with more than one commodity piaa+pibb must be smaller than a certain
constant for stationary two - state sunspot equilibria to necessarily exist. In other
words, also in more complex models it is still suﬃcient for the existence of sunspot
equilibria that the probability of the state of nature changing from one period to
the next is high enough.
In more complex models it might however not be possible to restrict the analysis to
a one dimensional problem, as done above. Therefore, I will now brieﬂy discuss an
alternative technique which is frequently used in order to obtain suﬃcient conditions
for the existence of sunspot equilibria:
An early discussion of this technique is given by Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982),
who ﬁrst show that there exists a compact set for prices pa and pb which is such
that at its boundary all trajectories of prices point inwards (e.g. if pa is equal to a
certain level p, there is excess demand on the goods market in periods in which state
a is observed, causing the price in these periods to increase) and which is such that
it contains all solutions to (5) and (6) except the autarchy equilibrium pa = pb = 0.
Azariadis and Guesnerie then arrive at the conditions stated in Theorem 2 by em-
ploying the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem17 to show that a suﬃcient condition for
the existence of (at least two) stationary two - state sunspot equilibria is that the
determinant of the Jacobi matrix of (5) and (6) evaluated at the monetary steady
state is negative. Through simple rearrangements of this condition, Azariadis and
Guesnerie demonstrate that it is indeed equivalent to the conditions stated in The-
orem 2, which however allow for a better interpretation.
17Chiappori and Guesnerie (1989) give a very simpliﬁed description of this theorem: under the
conditions stated above, a root of the (vector valued) function F is associated with an index of
+1 (resp. −1) if the determinant of the Jacobi matrix of F evaluated at this root is positive
(resp. negative). In the present case, the sum of these indices must be equal to (−1)2. Hence,
if the index at a root of F is (−1), there must exist at least two other roots of F associated
with an index of (+1).
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This mathematical technique is also used by Woodford (1990) in order to derive
a suﬃcient condition for the existence of sunspot equilibria. However, Woodford
uses a somewhat diﬀerent approach from Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982):
Since money and goods market clearing require that ptnt = 1 and thus determine
a one-to-one relationship between the price level and the labour supply in a certain
period, an equilibrium can either be described by a sequence of prices, as done for
example by Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982) or (1986), or by a sequence of labour
supplies. This latter approach is used by Woodford (1990).
Using this market clearing condition it becomes apparent that the real wage Rt =
pt
pt+1
can also be written as nt+1
nt
. Denoting the market clearing labour supplies in
state a and state b as na and nb, respectively in order to distinguish them from
the labour supply functions z
(
pa
pb
, piaa
)
and z
(
pb
pa
, pibb
)
, the ﬁrst order conditions
for optimal labour supply in a market equilibrium under extrinsic uncertainty can
therefore be written as:
Fa := F (na, nb,Π|St = a) = 1
na
[piaanau
′ (na) + piabnbu′ (nb)]− v′ (na) = 0 (12)
Fb := F (na, nb,Π|Sk = b) = 1
nb
[pibbnbu
′ (nb) + pibanau′ (na)]− v′ (nb) = 0 (13)
These conditions simply state that all markets must clear and that the marginal
utility of a change in the current labour supply given that the economy is in either
state a or state b must be zero, meaning that labour supply is chosen optimally.
Hence, if there exist distinct values for na and nb fulﬁlling these conditions for
transition probabilities lying strictly between zero and one, all requirements for
a stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium stated in the deﬁnition given in the
previous section are fulﬁlled.
In order to prove the existence of such solutions to (12) and (13), Woodford follows
Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982) and shows that there exists a compact set [n, n]2
containing all roots of F = (Fa, Fb)
′, except the possible autarchy equilibrium pa =
pb = 0, and which is such that at its boundary all trajectories of labour supply are
pointing inwards. Hence, like Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982), Woodford can employ
the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem18 to derive a suﬃcient condition for (Fa, Fb)
′
having at least two other roots than the monetary steady state which, as already
18Woodford (1990) notes that the application of the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem does actually
not only require the existence of a compact set as described above, but also that this set has a
smooth boundary. However, he argues that it is possible to smooth out the corners of [n, n]2,
such that indeed all requirements for the application of the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem are
satisﬁed.
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argued for the approach of Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986), implies the existence of
two distinct stationary sunspot equilibria.
Hence, Woodford (1990) arrives at the following theorem, where n∗ := (n∗ n∗)′
denotes the vector of optimal labour supplies for which both components are at the
monetary steady state levels, and where DF (·) denotes the Jacobi matrix of the
vector valued function (Fa, Fb)
′ with respect to (na, nb).19
Theorem 3 If ∆(n∗,Π) := detDF (n∗,Π) < 0, stationary two - state sunspot
equilibria necessarily exist.
As Guesnerie (1986) points out and as can be easily seen from this result, the set
of transition probability matrices which are necessarily associated with stationary
sunspot equilibria might be disconnected. This is necessarily the case if ∆(n∗,Π)
has at least 3 distinct roots and is visualized in Figure 3, where stationary two
- state sunspot equilibria necessarily exist for transition probabilities within the
shaded area, and where the diagonal boundaries correspond to those combinations
of piaa and pibb for which ∆(n∗,Π) is zero.
Figure 3: Disconnected Set of Two - State Sunspot Equilibria
Before extending the concept of a stationary sunspot equilibrium discussed so far
to sunspot processes which can take on mare than two values, I will now brieﬂy
focus on a special class of sunspot equilibria which receives much attention in the
literature on extrinsic uncertainty.
19Actually, this is a special case of Woodford's theorem which applies to sunspot processes with
arbitrarily, but ﬁnitely many states. This more general result will be discussed in greater detail
in a later section.
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2.4. Sunspot Equilibria around the Monetary Steady State
In the previous section it has been shown that if the monetary steady state is locally
asymptotically stable and thus indeterminate under perfect foresight dynamics, it is
possible to construct transition probabilities for which stationary two - state sunspot
equilibria exist. As will be seen in this section, it is then even possible to construct
stationary two - state sunspot equilibria arbitrarily close to the monetary steady
state.
Theorem 4 Stationary two - state sunspot equilibria exist in an arbitrarily small
neighbourhood of the monetary steady state if, and only if, it is indeterminate under
perfect foresight dynamics.
Proof: In a small neighbourhood of the monetary steady state the system (5) -
(6) can be approximated by its ﬁrst order Taylor expansion about this point.
Therefore, consider the ﬁrst order Taylor expansion of excess demand (5) about the
monetary steady state, as done in Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986):
D (pt, pt+1|St = a) ≈ 1
p∗
− z (1, piaa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=s(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
(
− 1
p∗2
− 1
p∗
z1 (1, piaa)
p∗
p∗2
z1 (1, pibb)
)(
pa − p∗
pb − p∗
)
where the partial derivative of z
(
pa
pb
, piaa
)
with respect to its ﬁrst argument evaluated
at the monetary state is denoted as z1 (1, piaa).
Denoting deviations of actual prices from the monetary steady state prices in state
a and b as xa and xb, respectively and using the fact that in an equilibrium excess
demand must be zero yields:(
− 1
p∗2
− 1
p∗
z1 (1, piaa)
)
xa +
1
p∗
z1 (1, piaa)xb = 0
−xa − p∗z1 (1, piaa)xa + p∗z1 (1, piaa)xb = 0
Using the goods market clearing condition at the monetary steady state (i.e. that
p∗ = 1
s(1)
= 1
z(1,piaa)
) and the deﬁnition of the elasticity of labour supply under
extrinsic uncertainty, equation (7), then yields:
−xa − η (1, piaa)xa + η (1, piaa)xb = 0
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In order to establish a connection with the situation under perfect foresight, Lemma
2 can be used to obtain:−1− (1− piaa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=piab
ε (1)
xa + (1− piaa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=piab
ε (1) xb = 0
or equivalently:
(1 + piabε (1))xa − piabε (1) xb = 0 (14)
In a similar manner a Taylor expansion of (6) about the monetary steady state leads
to:
pibaε (1) xa − (1 + pibaε (1))xb = 0 (15)
It is obvious that xa = xb = 0 (the monetary steady state) is a solution to the
system of equations (14) - (15) and that since 1 + piijε (1) 6= piijε (1), there is no
other solution for which pa = pb. Thus, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a
sunspot equilibrium pa 6= pb to exist close to the monetary steady state is that the
coeﬃcient matrix of the linear system of equations (14) - (15) is singular and thus
maps a vector diﬀerent from the zerovector to the zerovector.
Hence, there exist sunspot equilibria arbitrarily close to the monetary steady state
if, and only if:
det
(
1 + piabε (1) −piabε (1)
pibaε (1) − (1 + pibaε (1))
)
= 0
− (1 + piabε (1)) (1 + pibaε (1)) + piabpibaε (1)2 = 0
−1− pibaε (1)− piabε (1) = 0
piab + piba = − 1
ε (1)
Note that this condition requires that the elasticity of labour supply at the mone-
tary state is negative since otherwise piab + piba would be negative, which is however
clearly impossible. In other words, the income eﬀect has to be dominating at the
monetary steady state in order for a stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium to
exist close to it.
Note further that since the deﬁnition of a sunspot equilibrium requires that the di-
agonal elements of the transition probability matrix are positive, piab+piba has to be
strictly smaller than 2. This implies that the condition piab + piba = − 1ε(1)20 reduces
20Note that this condition can only be regarded as an approximation, which is worse the further
away a sunspot equilibrium is from the monetary steady state.
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to − 1
ε(1)
< 2 or ε (1) < −1
2
. Thus, if the monetary steady state is locally asymp-
totically stable and therefore indeterminate, it is possible to construct a transition
probability matrix for which stationary two - state sunspot equilibria exist in an
arbitrarily small neighbourhood of the monetary steady state.
From the previous section it is clear that transition probabilities fulﬁlling the con-
dition piab + piba = − 1ε(1) are roots of the partial derivative of G with respect to w
evaluated at the monetary steady state and lie therefore at the boundary of the set
of transition probabilities depicted in Figure 2.
If the transition probabilities change in such a way that they pass this boundary,
stationary sunspot equilibria do not necessarily exist for (piaa, pibb) lying above it,
whereas two stationary sunspot equilibria necessarily exist for (piaa, pibb) lying below
this boundary.
To study what happens when transition probabilities change from the ﬁrst to the
latter situation it is assumed that they only depend on a real number α and that
there exists a continuous mapping ϕ which is given by:
ϕ : [α1, α2] → (0, 1)2
α 7→ (piaa (α) , pibb (α))
Furthermore it is assumed that there exists a value α∗, which is such that:
piab (α
∗) + piba (α∗) = − 1
ε (1)
and that 21
d
dα
[piaa (α) + pibb (α)] |α=α∗ 6= 0
This means that in a small neighbourhood around the boundary it must hold that
α is smaller than α∗ on one side and greater than α∗ on the other side of this
boundary. Therefore, a passage of the boundary can be regarded as an increase
(or respectively a decrease) of α. Without loss of generality it can be assumed
that d
dα
[piaa (α) + pibb (α)] |α=α∗ < 0, such that changing from a situation without
stationary sunspot equilibria to a situation in which stationary sunspot equilibria
necessarily exist corresponds to an increase of α.
The change of the qualitative behaviour of the dynamical system implied by a change
of α is referred to as a (local) bifurcation, α is then called the bifurcation parameter.
21Guesnerie (1986) refers to these assumptions as "regular crossing"
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Guesnerie (1986) notes that in a neighbourhood around the line piab + piba = − 1ε(1)
stationary sunspot equilibria only depend on the sum of piab and piba and therefore,
as Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) point out, it does not matter whether transition
probabilities cross piaa + pibb = 2 − 1|ε(1)| transversally (i.e. along a line on which
piaa 6= pibb) or diagonally (i.e. along a path for which piaa = pibb) for a qualitative
analysis.
Along this latter path the boundary properties of G and the fact that the partial
derivative of G with respect to w is zero at the monetary state for α∗22 require that
G has a saddle point at w = 1 and α = α∗ (otherwise properties (iii) and (iv) of
Lemma 3 require that the number of roots of G which are diﬀerent from 1 is odd,
however for piaa = pibb both wˆ and 1wˆ must be roots of G (see Lemma 3 (v)) and
thus the number of roots diﬀerent from 1 must necessarily be even). Changes in α
do however result in changes of the shape of G. This is illustrated in the following
ﬁgure, where the broken line corresponds to an α > α∗ and the black line depicts
G (w, α∗).
As pointed out above, for α < α∗, G does not necessarily have any roots other
than the monetary steady state: Since G is continuous with respect to α, it fol-
lows that a small decrease in α below α∗ cannot lead to a big deviation of G (w,α)
from G (w, α∗). This decrease in α however implies that it must be the case that
piaa (α) + pibb (α) > piaa (α
∗) + pibb (α∗) = 2− 1|ε(1)| , implying that G (w,α) is upward
slopping at the monetary steady state. Hence, it follows that G (w, α∗) must rotate
anti-clockwise around the monetary steady state if α decreases.
The following bifurcation diagram shows the steady states (i.e. the roots of G)
as a function of the bifurcation parameter α:
22Note that G can now be expressed as a function of w and α (which determines the transition
probabilities).
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Note that the necessary condition for the existence of stationary sunspot equilib-
ria arbitrarily close to the monetary steady state found in the proof of Theorem 4
approximately characterizes sunspot equilibria which correspond to an α close to
α∗ since for these values it must hold that piaa (α) + pibb (α) ≈ piaa (α∗) + pibb (α∗) =
2− 1|ε(1)| .
More precisely, Guesnerie (1986) shows that a necessary condition for the existence
of sunspot equilibria close to the monetary steady state is the following:
If a sequence of prices (pna , p
n
b ) associated with a sunspot equilibrium converges to
the monetary steady state, it must be the case that the associated transition prob-
abilities converge to values which fulﬁl piab + piba = − 1ε(1) .
This can also be seen from the bifurcation diagram by considering only one branch
of sunspot equilibria, e.g. those for which w > 1. Then clearly, w decreasing toward
the monetary steady state is associated with α converging to α∗, meaning that in
the limit the transition probabilities fulﬁl piab + piba = − 1ε(1) .
After this brief attempt to describe the nature of certain stationary two - state
sunspot equilibria, I will now discuss suﬃcient conditions for the existence of station-
ary sunspot equilibria when the sunspot process capturing the extrinsic uncertainty
in the economy can take on more than two values.
2.5. Sunspot Equilibria of Order k
In many situation it might not seem reasonable to assume that agents perceive the
world around them to be in one of only two possible states. If, as in section 2.2,
sunspot activity is taken as an example for extrinsic uncertainty, agents could very
well believe that not just the occurrence of sunspots, but also the number of observed
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sunspots has an eﬀect on economic outcomes.23
In order to account for situations like this as well, it will be assumed that the sunspot
variable capturing the extrinsic uncertainty in the economy follows a Markov process
(St)t≥0, which can now take on values in a ﬁnite state space I = {1, . . . , k}. The
transition probability matrix is hence given by the k×k matrix Π = (piij)1≤i≤k;1≤j≤k,
where, as above, piij := Prob (St+1 = j|St = i) denotes the probability of the state
of nature in the next period being j given that the state of nature in the current
period is i. It is still assumed that the transition probability matrix is stationary
over time and common knowledge.
Therefore, if in period t state i is observed, the optimization problem of an agent
born in period t who has rational expectations about future economic outcomes is
given by:
max
nt
E
[
u
(
pt
pt+1
nt
)
|St = i
]
− v (nt)
where, as above, the intertemporal budget constraint of an agent born in period t
has been used to express old - age consumption in terms of the real wage and the
labour supply, and where E [·] denotes the (conditional) mathematical expectations
operator.
Since in a sunspot equilibrium the subjective expectations about prices in periods
in which any state j ∈ {1, . . . , k} is observed being pj are self - fulﬁlling, the math-
ematical expectation about future utility, and thus also the maximization problem
of a rational agent born in period t, can be simpliﬁed as24:
max
nt
k∑
j=1
piiju
(
pi
pj
nt
)
− v (nt)
23Guesnerie (1986) mentions that indeed the cyclical ﬂuctuations in the number of sunspots, and
not just the occurrence of them, led Jevons to the hypothesis that business cycles are caused
by sunspot activity.
24The argument used here is analogous to the one presented in section 2.2 and requires again
that a single agents' expectations cannot inﬂuence economic outcomes (otherwise the optimal
expectations for this agent need not necessarily correspond to the mathematical expectations)
and that all agents believe in a perfect correlation between prices and the sunspot process
(otherwise these expectations need not be self - fulﬁlling).
Moreover, if the existence of sunspot equilibria is taken as an indicator for their attainability,
it is implicitly assumed that it is common knowledge that the other agents believe in a perfect
correlation between prices and the sunspot process. Otherwise, it could be that agents coor-
dinate their beliefs on a perfect foresight equilibrium. The issue whether agents can actually
coordinate on the beliefs associated with a given rational expectations equilibrium will however
be discussed in greater detail in the next section.
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Thus, whenever agents observe sunspot state i, the optimal labour supply is, analo-
gously to section 2.2, given as the following function depending on the probabilities
of the state of nature changing from i to any other state j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and the
hypothetic real wages which would be earned by an agent born in a period in which
state i was observed in the case such a change actually occurred:
z
(
pi
p1
, . . . ,
pi
pk
, pii1, . . . , piik
)
= argmax
nt
k∑
j=1
piiju
(
pi
pj
nt
)
− v (nt)
which implies that the optimal labour supply has to fulﬁl the following ﬁrst order
condition:
k∑
j=1
piij
pi
pj
u′
(
pi
pj
z
(
pi
p1
, . . . ,
pi
pk
, pii1, . . . , piik
))
−v′
(
z
(
pi
p1
, . . . ,
pi
pk
, pii1, . . . , piik
))
= 0
In order to analyse the existence of sunspot equilibria, I will proceed as done in
Woodford (1990) by using goods and money market clearing to describe the market
equilibrium by a sequence of labour supplies rather than by a sequence of prices.
As indicated in section 2.3, it is however equivalent to use the latter approach and
employ the techniques used in the following directly on the excess demand functions,
rather than on the ﬁrst order condition for optimal labour supply.
Using the goods and money market clearing condition ptnt = 1, the ﬁrst order
conditions for (n1, . . . , nk)
′25 can be rewritten as:
Fi (n1, . . . , nk,Π) :=
1
ni
k∑
j=1
piijnju
′ (nj)− v′ (ni) = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} (16)
In order to establish a suﬃcient condition for the existence of stationary sunspot
equilibria, Woodford (1990) ﬁrst shows that the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem, in-
troduced in Section 2.3, applies to the present problem. Therefore, he demonstrates
that there exists a compact set [n, n]k, which contains all roots of F (n1, . . . , nk,Π) :=
(F1, . . . , Fk)
′ and which is such that at its boundary the trajectories of the vector
(n1, . . . , nk)
′ are pointing inwards, meaning that if the labour supply in sunspot state
l were equal to n, Fl (n1, . . . , nk,Π), the marginal utility which could be obtained
from increasing nl beyond n, would be positive.
25Note that, as above, ni refers to the equilibrium labour supply associated with state i, i.e. the
speciﬁc value of the labour supply function for state i, z
(
pi
p1
, . . . , pipk , pii1, . . . , piik
)
, for which
markets in periods in which state i is observed clear
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Woodford (1990) formally establishes this in the following two lemmas:
Suppose that nl is the smallest value in the vector (n1, . . . , nk)
′ and that nˆ is deﬁned
as in section 2.1 as agents' endowment of time, then the following lemma holds:
Lemma 4 There exists a n > 0, such that for 0 < nl ≤ n and for nl ≤ nj < nˆ for
all j 6= l it holds that Fl (n1, . . . , nk,Π) > 0.
Proof: Since it is assumed that nˆ > nj ≥ nl for all j 6= l and since u′ (·) is strictly
decreasing, it holds that nju′ (nj) ≥ nlu′ (nˆ) for all j 6= l. Therefore, a lower bound
for the ﬁrst part of the sum Fl (n1, . . . , nk,Π) = n
−1
l
∑
j 6=l piljnju
′ (nj) + pillu′ (nl) −
v′ (nl) can be obtained through the following rearrangements:∑
j 6=l
piljnju
′ (nj) ≥
∑
j 6=l
piljnlu
′ (nˆ)
∑
j 6=l
pilj
nj
nl
u′ (nj) ≥ u′ (nˆ)
∑
j 6=l
pilj
= u′ (nˆ) (1− pill)
Furthermore, since it is assumed that nl ≤ n and since u′′ (·) < 0 and v′′ (·) > 0, it
holds that u′ (nl) ≥ u′ (n) and that −v′ (nl) ≥ −v′ (n). Hence, a lower bound for
Fl (n1, . . . , nk,Π) is given by:
Fl (n1, . . . , nk,Π) ≥ (1− pill)u′ (nˆ) + pillu′ (n)− v′ (n)
Assumption (i) made on the limiting behaviour of the utility function in section 2.1
implies that u′ (n) → ∞ for n → 0. Furthermore, the assumptions on the utility
function imply that v′ (n) is ﬁnite. Therefore, there must exist a value of n small
enough, but strictly greater than zero, such that the following holds:
(1− pill)u′ (nˆ) + pillu′ (n)− v′ (n) > 0
In other words, Fl (n1, . . . , nk,Π) is bounded above zero if the smallest component
of the vector (n1, . . . , nk)
′ is smaller than an appropriately chosen strictly positive
(but possibly very small) constant n.
This immediately implies that roots of F (n1, . . . , nk,Π) can only lie within the
set [n, nˆ]k. Furthermore, it is clear from this lemma that whenever the smallest
component of the vector (n1, . . . , nk)
′ is equal to n and thus the vector of labour
supplies lies on the boundary of the set [n, nˆ]k, the marginal utility from increasing
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the smallest component is positive. In other words, this means that at this boundary
the trajectories of labour supply are pointing inwards.
In order to rule out very high levels of equilibrium labour supply as well, suppose
that nh is the greatest component of the vector of labour supplies (n1, . . . , nk)
′. Then
the following lemma holds:
Lemma 5 There exists a n < nˆ, such that for n ≤ nh < nˆ and for n ≤ nj ≤ nh for
all j 6= h it holds that Fh (n1, . . . , nk,Π) < 0.
The proof of this lemma is analogous to the previous proof and therefore omitted.
Together with the previous lemma this result implies that roots of F (n1, . . . , nk,Π)
can only lie within the compact set [n, n]k. Furthermore, it also holds that whenever
the greatest component of the vector (n1, . . . , nk)
′ is equal to n, the marginal utility
from decreasing this component is positive.
Therefore, it has indeed been shown that the trajectories of prices are pointing in-
ward on every boundary of [n, n]k.
As explained above, Woodford (1990) notes that it follows from this result that all
requirements for the application of the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem are satisﬁed.
According to this theorem the sum of the indices at the roots of F (n1, . . . , nk,Π)
must be equal to (−1)k. Furthermore, as has already been argued for the case of
a two state Markov process, the monetary steady state, which can be expressed as
the vector n∗ := (n∗, . . . , n∗) ∈ Rk, clearly constitutes a root of F (n1, . . . , nk,Π).
If this root is now associated with an index of opposite sign than (−1)k, it follows
therefore that there must exist at least two other roots of F (n1, . . . , nk,Π) which
are associated with an index of (−1)k. Since the monetary steady state is the unique
root of F associated with equal labour supply in all states, it follows that at least
two components of these roots must be diﬀerent from each other and that thus
the extrinsic uncertainty matters for these market equilibria if indeed all transition
probabilities lie strictly between zero and one.26
Therefore, denoting the Jacobi matrix of F (n1, . . . , nk,Π) evaluated at the monetary
steady state as DF (n∗,Π), and supposing that the transition probability matrix Π
fulﬁls this last requirement, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 5 If ∆(n∗,Π) := (−1)k detDF (n∗,Π) < 0, two stationary sunspot equi-
26As in the case of a two - state sunspot process, ruling out transition probabilities which are zero
or one is a matter of taste, but can be justiﬁed by the same arguments used in section 2.2.
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libria associated with an index of (−1)k necessarily exist.
Furthermore, Woodford (1990) and Chiappori and Guesnerie (1989) point out that,
as in the case of a two state Markov process, the indeterminacy of the monetary
steady state under perfect foresight is also in this more general case suﬃcient for the
existence of stationary sunspot equilibria. This means that if the monetary steady
state is indetermined under perfect foresight dynamics, it is also in this more general
case possible to ﬁnd transition probabilities such that the necessary condition stated
in this theorem is fulﬁlled.
However, note that this condition does not per se guarantee that all components of
(n1, . . . , nk)
′ are diﬀerent. This means that if the extrinsic uncertainty is described
by a stochastic process with more than two possible states, it could very well be the
case that in some states prices and therefore labour supplies in a sunspot equilibrium,
i.e. a market equilibrium on which extrinsic uncertainty has some eﬀect, are the
same.
Therefore, it is necessary to make the following distinction, introduced by Chiappori
and Guesnerie (1989):
Deﬁnition: A stationary sunspot equilibrium of cardinality k is given by a k × k
transition probability matrix Π, the elements of which lie strictly between zero and
one, and a vector of labour supplies (n1, . . . , nk)
′, where ni is associated with sunspot
state i, which is such that there exist indices i and j for which ni 6= nj, and which
solves (16), meaning that all markets clear and that rational agents maximize their
expected lifetime utility.
Deﬁnition: A stationary sunspot equilibrium of order k is given by a l × l transi-
tion probability matrix Π, the elements of which lie strictly between zero and one,
and a vector of labour supplies (n1, . . . , nl)
′, which is such that there exist k indices
i1, . . . , ik for which nj 6= nm for all j,m ∈ {i1, . . . , ik} and j 6= m, and which solves
(16).
In other words, the cardinality of a sunspot equilibrium basically describes the num-
ber of states of the sunspot process inﬂuencing agents' expectations, whereas the
order of a sunspot equilibrium describes the number of states which are actually as-
sociated with diﬀerent behaviour by the economic agents. Of course, as is clear from
the deﬁnition of a two state sunspot equilibrium in section 2.2 and as is pointed out
by Chiappori and Guesnerie (1989), both the cardinality and the order of a sunspot
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equilibrium must be at least two, since otherwise extrinsic uncertainty would have
no eﬀect on the economy.
It is also important to note that the probability of a change in the state of nature
only matters for the economic outcome since prices are expected to change with
this probability. Therefore, it might in some cases be justiﬁed to focus on sunspot
equilibria for which each state of nature is associated with a diﬀerent behaviour of
the agents. Hence, the following distinction is necessary:
Deﬁnition: A stationary sunspot equilibria is referred to as nondegenerate if its
cardinality and order are equal. Conversely, it is referred to as degenerate if its order
is smaller than its cardinality.
Chiappori and Guesnerie (1989) argue that any degenerate sunspot equilibrium can
also be expressed as a nondegenerate sunspot equilibrium of smaller cardinality,
which justiﬁes the focus on nondegenerate sunspot equilibria further.
In order to see this, suppose for instance, as done in Chiappori and Guesnerie
(1989), that in a stationary sunspot equilibrium of cardinality k and order k − 1
the states 1 and k are associated with the same labour supply n1. Then, by com-
bining states 1 and k in the new state 1′ this equilibrium can also be expressed
as a certain nondegenerate stationary sunspot equilibrium of cardinality k − 1 by
deﬁning the transition probabilities as follows: The transition probabilities between
any states i and j with i, j 6= 1, k are still given by the old transition probabili-
ties piij, whereas the transition probabilities from any state i to the newly created
state 1′ are given by pii1′ = pii1 + piik. In order to deﬁne the transition probabilities
from state 1′ to any state i there are several possibilities: One possibility is to de-
ﬁne pi1′1′ as 12 (pi11 + pi1k) +
1
2
(pikk + pik1) and accordingly pi1′i as 12pi1i +
1
2
piki for any
i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, where the weights of 1
2
guarantee that the entries in the ﬁrst row
of the new transition probability matrix add up to one. An intuitive argument for
this way to deﬁne the new transition probability matrix is that if the labour supply
choice n1 is observed, it is equally likely that the state of nature is 1 or k. However,
it is clear that any other two weights which add up to one would work as well.27
Chiappori and Guesnerie (1989) use this result in order to show that the set of
nondegenerate sunspot equilibria of cardinality k is an open and dense subset of
the total set of sunspot equilibria of cardinality k. This means that there exists a
nondegenerate sunspot equilibrium in any arbitrarily small neighbourhood around
27Chiappori and Guesnerie (1989) mention the possibilities of either deﬁning pi1′1′ as pi11 + pi1k
and pi1′i as pi1i, or of deﬁning pi1′1′ as pik1 + pikk and pi1′i as piki.
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any (degenerate or nondegenerate) sunspot equilibrium of cardinality k.
Moreover, they argue that this result implies that if an economy allows for sunspot
equilibria of order 2, it also allows for nondegenerate sunspot equilibria of any or-
der. This result was already indicated by Guesnerie (1986), who illustrated how
a sunspot equilibrium of order k − 1 can be transformed into a (nondegenerate)
sunspot equilibrium of order k.
After brieﬂy introducing these more reﬁned concepts of sunspot equilibria, I will
now turn to the question whether sunspot equilibria can actually be regarded as
realistic outcomes. However, before being able to address this question it is ﬁrst
necessary to describe some deﬁciencies of the rational expectations assumption and
to discuss alternative ways to model the process of agents' expectation formation.
3. Adaptive Learning Dynamics
3.1. Introduction and Preliminaries
3.1.1. Coordination on Rational Expectations Equilibria
The previous analysis showed that in a very simple overlapping generations model
extrinsic uncertainty can have an eﬀect on economic outcomes even despite the fact
that agents are fully rational in the sense that they know all relevant characteristics
of the model and form their expectations optimally given this information and the
expectations of the other agents.28
However, this does not at all imply that it is indeed plausible to observe sunspot
equilibria in reality. The ﬁrst and most obvious drawback is that although it is fully
rational to believe that an extrinsic sunspot process aﬀects the economy, it is also
fully rational to believe that it does not aﬀect the economy and that instead prices
and labour supplies are either at their monetary steady state levels or at the levels
corresponding to the autarchic equilibrium (if it exists). Thus, although it is optimal
or rational for one agent to believe that the economic outcome will vary with the
state of nature if all other agents think so, there is no guarantee that this particular
equilibrium will actually be reached.
Following Lucas (1986) rational expectations equilibria can only be regarded as the
description of an economy in the long run revealing that agents have learned the
28As Evans and Honkapohja (2001) brieﬂy note, rational expectations equilibria can be regarded
as Nash equilibria in which agents form their expectations using forecast rules which are best
responses to the forecast rules used by the other agents.
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relevant characteristics of the economy by adaptively updating their expectations as
new observations on actual economic outcomes and thus new information about the
structure of the economy became available. More precisely, Lucas (1986, p. S402)
states the following:
"Technically, I think of economics as studying decision rules that are
steady states of some adaptive process, decision rules that are found to
work over a range of situations and hence are no longer revised as more
experience accumulates."
Most importantly, this interpretation indicates a possibility to reduce the number of
rational expectations equilibria to those which can actually be regarded as realistic
economic outcomes: If there is no adaptive learning process which will eventually
lead to a certain rational expectations equilibrium, this equilibrium is merely a
theoretical concept, but has no practical implications. Evans and Honkapohja (2001)
argue that in many situations it is even possible to select a unique equilibrium which
is stable under adaptive learning rules if it is taken into account that agents might
initially overparametrize the rational expectations equilibrium under consideration.
This particular stability concept for rational expectations equilibria known as strong
expectational stability will be discussed in greater detail in a later section.
However, even despite the potential multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria,
the formation of rational expectations relies on rather strong assumption on agents'
knowledge about the economic environment they live in. For example, it is assumed
that agents perfectly know the numerical values of all parameters of the model
which describes their economy. However, as Evans and Honkapohja (2001) point
out, even economists have to rely on econometric techniques in order to estimate
the correct parameter values and forecast economic variables, and it is in this sense
not realistic, they argue, to assume that agents actually posses greater insight into
economic relationships than economists.
Another problem agents face in the short run, is that they might not know the
stochastic properties of possible random shocks to the economy. To illustrate the
potential complications due to random shocks, consider the overlapping generations
model discussed in the previous sections, but augmented by a random preference
shock, as done in Woodford (1990). It is assumed that the preference shock can
only be observed after agents have decided on their labour supply and can therefore
also be interpreted as a random measurement error. More precisely, the utility of
an agent born in period t is no longer given by u (ct+1) − v (nt), but instead by
u (ct+1)− v (nt)+ntνt, where the νt's are the realizations of random variables which
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are identically and independently distributed over time and have mean zero and a
constant and ﬁnite variance. Using this utility function the maximization problem
(4) an agent born in period t has to solve is given by:
max
nt
E
[
u
(
pt
pt+1
nt
)]
− v (nt) + ntE [νt]
In a rational expectations equilibrium agents are supposed to realize that the ran-
dom shock has mean zero which implies that there is actually no change to problem
(4) and the resulting rational expectations equilibria. However, if the agents for
some reason perceived the disturbance term to contain some structural information
about the economy, their behaviour would of course be diﬀerent. Especially, if agents
do not know the properties of the random disturbances to the economy, but have
to infer them from a limited number of observations, there is no reason to believe
that they will actually obtain the correct estimate for their mean. Instead they will
possibly interpret the disturbance term as a randomly ﬂuctuating, but persistent
measurement error.
This complication also arises in linear rational expectations models such as the
Cobweb model which would allow for a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
This model, has been the subject of extensive research in the literature on adaptive
learning. Already DeCanio (1979) noted that the existence of a unique rational ex-
pectations equilibrium does not imply that it can be attained by agents who form
their expectations adaptively. However, it turns out that if agents form their es-
timates by using ordinary least squares or similar learning rules, the condition for
stability of the rational expectations equilibrium in the Cobweb model is always
satisﬁed when demand and supply curves fulﬁl standard assumptions in economics.
Hence, regarding agents as learning individuals can in many cases actually justify
the prevalent focus on rational expectations equilibria in the long run (as Lucas
(1986) pointed out), but helps to select equilibria which can be attained by real life
people.
Another problem, which will however also have an eﬀect on the attainability of ra-
tional expectations equilibria, is that agents might interpret large random shocks as
recurring structural change to their economic environment. This perception might
lead agents to adopt learning rules which cannot converge to any rational expec-
tations equilibrium. The question of how adaptive learning processes which can at
least under certain circumstances converge to rational expectations equilibria must
be designed will be brieﬂy discussed in a later section.
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The next section will however introduce the univariate Cobweb model which will be
used later to illustrate some results on adaptive learning.
3.1.2. The Cobweb Model
As already indicated in the previous section, it is more realistic to replace the as-
sumption of rational expectations by assuming that agents behave like econometri-
cians and use for example ordinary least squares estimation in order to form their
expectations. The ordinary least squares algorithm is often the central learning al-
gorithm analysed since it constitutes a consistent and unbiased estimator in a well
speciﬁed model, and since it is, due to its simplicity, frequently used for econometric
analysis. Therefore, even if agents were not able to apply this econometric technique
themselves, they might have access to professional forecasts based on it.29
The most prominent model in which expectations formation through ordinary least
squares estimation has been investigated is the Cobweb model.30 In order to illus-
trate how agents can recursively update their forecasts as new data becomes available
and which problems they will face doing so, I will brieﬂy introduce this model, as
done by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), before discussing the ordinary least squares
and other adaptive learning algorithms in greater detail.
The Cobweb model studies the equilibrium of supply and demand on an isolated
goods market. Therefore, it is assumed that consumers can base their demand de-
cisions on the actual price of the good, whereas producers can base their supply
decisions only on the anticipated price since due to a production lag they already
have to decide on their supply for period t in period t− 1. Thus, the demand curve
can be expressed as:
dt = α1 − α2pt + ν1t
where it is usually assumed that α2 is positive, such that the demand curve is
downward sloping, and where ν1t is the realization of a random demand shock at
time t with mean zero.
Whereas the supply curve is given by:
st = β1 + β2p
e
t + wt−1β3 + ν2t
29In this sense, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) argue that a realistic learning rule should not be
based on techniques that were not available at the time which should be described by the model.
30See for example Bray and Savin (1986) or Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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where it is usually assumed that β2 is positive, such that the supply curve is upward
sloping. Furthermore, pet denotes the producers' subjective expectations about the
price in period t formed in period t − 1 and wt−1 denotes a 1 × K vector of ex-
ogenous variables which are observable at the time producers must decide on their
supply and which may inﬂuence their decision. Accordingly, β3 is a K × 1 vector
of coeﬃcients. ν2t is assumed to be the realization of a random supply shock with
mean zero, observed at time t. For later reference, it is also assumed that for each
point in time wt−1 is a realization of a random vector with mean zero and positive
deﬁnite variance - covariance matrix Ω.
Using the market clearing condition the reduced form equation for the equilibrium
price level can be obtained as:
α2pt = α1 − β1 − β2pet − wt−1β3 + ν1t − ν2t
Denoting α1−β1
α2
as µ, −β2
α2
as α, −β3
α2
as δ and ν1t−ν2t
α2
as νt yields that equilibrium
prices are generated by the following law of motion:31
pt = µ+ αp
e
t + wt−1δ + νt
where clearly, νt is the realization of a random variable with mean zero.
Since in a rational expectations equilibrium the subjective expectations about the
price level correspond to the correct mathematical expectations given the available
information, the unique rational expectations solution for prices can be obtained
by using the mathematical expectations operator, conditional on the information
available in period t− 1, on both sides of this equation:
Et−1 [pt] = µ+ αEt−1 [pt] + wt−1δ
Et−1 [pt] =
µ
1− α + wt−1
1
1− αδ
Substituting this expression for the subjective expectations pet in the reduced form
for prices shows that in the unique rational expectations equilibrium of the Cobweb
model prices are actually generated by the following process:
pt =
µ
1− α︸ ︷︷ ︸
=a
+wt−1
1
1− αδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=b
+νt (17)
31Evans and Honkapohja (2001) point out that this reduced form also describes the equilibrium
of other models, such as the Lucas Aggregate Supply Model.
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With these characteristics of the Cobweb model under rational expectations es-
tablished, it is now possible to consider deviations from the rational expectations
assumption. In particular, some deﬁciencies of adaptive learning algorithms become
apparent without even referring to a concrete algorithm. One of these problems will
be discussed in the next section.
3.1.3. Rational vs. Reasonable Learning Algorithms
In order to study whether any rational expectations equilibrium can be attained
under the least squares or other adaptive learning algorithms, it is necessary to
specify which beliefs agents have about the data generating process they face. These
initial beliefs are usually referred to as the perceived law of motion.
In order to illustrate which complications arise for the analysis of the convergence
of some adaptive learning algorithm to a certain rational expectations equilibrium
even if the speciﬁcation of the perceived law of motion is consistent with this given
equilibrium, consider again the simple Cobweb model introduced in the previous
section. For simplicity, it is assumed that although agents cannot actually calculate
the numerical values a and b of the coeﬃcients of the price generating process in the
unique rational expectations equilibrium, they believe that prices are generated by
the following process:
pt = a+ wt−1b+ νt (18)
where a and b are unknown parameters which need to be estimated. In other words,
the functional form of agents' perceived law of motion coincides with the functional
form of the law of motion for prices in the unique rational expectations equilibrium,
meaning that agents are assumed to understand the relevant structural relationships
in their economy, but do not know the concrete parameter values.
Clearly, it is also plausible to assume that agents lack some structural knowledge
of the economy as well and that thus they believe that the law of motion for prices
depends on certain variables in their information set which however do not aﬀect
the rational expectations equilibrium. The issue whether a rational expectations
equilibrium can be attained despite such overparametrized perceived law of motions
will be taken up in a later section. However, since this section only aims at demon-
strating the deﬁciencies of adaptive learning algorithms and the need for a thorough
analysis of the circumstances under which an adaptive learning process will even-
tually lead to a rational expectations equilibrium, I will, for the moment, restrict
attention to situations in which agents only try to estimate the parameter values a
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and b, but know the structural form of the rational expectations equilibrium under
consideration.
As pointed out above, the simplest procedure to obtain these estimates is to use
ordinary least squares estimation which would usually constitute a consistent esti-
mator if each new observation was indeed generated by a process of the form agents
try to estimate. Hence, if producers believe that there exists a true model of the
form of the perceived law of motion (18), i.e. true coeﬃcients a and b, generating
each observation of prices, their expectation formation process can be described as
follows:
At period t − 1 producers will use all available data on past and current prices
and past exogenous variables w to obtain ordinary least squares estimates aˆt−1 and
bˆt−1 for the hypothesized true coeﬃcients a and b of the perceived law of motion.
Since producers' maintained hypothesis is that prices are generated by (18), where
the error term νt is assumed to be white noise (meaning that it fulﬁls the usual
assumptions for ordinary least squares estimation), these parameter estimates will
lead to price expectations pet = aˆt−1 + wt−1bˆt−1. These subjective expectations will
then determine the supply choice of producers for period t and thus the price level
in period t through the reduced form equation pt = µ+ αpet + wt−1δ + νt. Inserting
the subjective expectations of producers formed in period t− 1 in this reduced form
equation shows that the price level in period t is actually generated by the follow-
ing process which is usually referred to as the actual law of motion implied by the
perceived law of motion (18):
pt = (µ+ αaˆt−1) + wt−1
(
δ + αbˆt−1
)
+ νt (19)
From this formulation, it becomes obvious that each observation of prices is actually
generated by a diﬀerent model, or more precisely by a model with time varying pa-
rameters, contradicting producers' maintained hypothesis of a true data generating
process of the from of their perceived law of motion. This means that during the
learning process producers base their estimation on a misspeciﬁed model, implying
that one central assumption needed for the consistency of the ordinary least squares
estimator is violated.
In other words, producers' learning behaviour induces a feedback on the actual data
generating process resulting in time varying parameters. Since agents fail to ac-
count for this feedback in their estimation method, the model they are estimating
during their learning process is misspeciﬁed and thus the ordinary least squares es-
timates for a and b need not necessarily converge to the corresponding coeﬃcients
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of the price generating process under rational expectations although agents could
correctly specify this process.
This deﬁciency of adaptive learning algorithms was ﬁrst discussed by Bray (1982),
who investigated a model of informed and informed traders, and is not restricted to
ordinary least squares learning rules.
Bray and Savin (1986) argue however that although using ordinary least squares
estimation in order to form subjective expectations is not "rational" since agents
do not fully understand the data generating process in the sense that they do not
detect the misspeciﬁcation of their econometric model induced by the feedback of
their own behaviour on the data generating process, it is nevertheless "reasonable".
They justify this expression with the fact that the speciﬁcation of the econometric
model producers use to make their forecasts would be correct if the economy were
already in the rational expectations equilibrium. In order to see this, consider for
example a situation in which producers knew how to form rational expectations,
but in which consumers lacked the knowledge to do so and tried to estimate the
coeﬃcients of the price generating process adaptively from past observations. Since
consumers can nevertheless base their demand decisions on the currently observed
price level, their expectations about the coeﬃcients of their perceived law of motion
for prices do not enter the actual data generating process. Therefore, each period
the price level is indeed generated by equation (17), meaning that if consumers were
using the perceived law of motion (18) as an econometric model to obtain their or-
dinary least squares estimates, these estimates would be consistent estimators for a
and b, the coeﬃcients of the true data generating model. Therefore, these estimates
would eventually converge to the coeﬃcients under rational expectations as more
and more observations can be incorporated into the estimation.
Although it is a fairly intuitive argument that adaptive learning algorithms which
provide consistent estimates at least when agents' maintained hypothesis about the
model speciﬁcation is correct should be preferred, it must also be taken into account
that agents who behave like econometricians will constantly evaluate the model
speciﬁcation using various econometric tests. Therefore, Bray and Savin (1986) use
computer simulations of the ordinary least squares algorithm in the Cobweb model32
to show that at least in certain cases the misspeciﬁcation of the econometric model
cannot be detected by employing standard econometric tests which justiﬁes the
assumption that agents base their forecasts on ordinary least squares estimation
32Note that Bray and Savin (1986) also consider expectation formation based on Bayesian tech-
niques. However, the results are similar to the results obtained through the analysis of the
ordinary least squares algorithm.
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further.
More precisely, they based this conclusion both on the Chow Breakpoint Test and a
more informal argument based on the inspection of the estimates for non-overlapping
subperiods. More precisely, this latter argument can be described as follows: If the
evolution of the estimates for these non-overlapping subperiods showed a signiﬁcant
trend, it should lead agents to the conclusion that the true model had time varying
parameters. If there were no signiﬁcant trend in the subperiod estimates, agents
would probably attribute the variation in the estimates to random ﬂuctuations.
Using this argument, Bray and Savin (1986) found that if agents' initial beliefs about
the coeﬃcients of their perceived law of motion were at the rational expectations
levels and the ordinary least squares estimates for these coeﬃcients converged to
the rational expectations equilibrium, the misspeciﬁcation was not detectable. This
conclusion remained also valid if the analysis was based on the Chow Breakpoint
test rather than on this intuitive argument. However, if the initial beliefs were not
at their rational expectations levels, the evolution of the estimates for consecutive
subperiods showed a systematic trend and thus suggested that the true model had
indeed time - varying coeﬃcients.
Bray and Savin also used the Durbin - Watson statistic to test for a general mis-
speciﬁcation of the econometric model and found that in their simulations, it never
detected the misspeciﬁcation due to the feedback of agents' learning behaviour on
the actual data generating process, except when the exogenous variables inﬂuenc-
ing supply were generated by an AR(1) process and the estimates were converging
slowly to their rational expectations levels. The question how agents will respond
to detecting the misspeciﬁcation of their econometric model will be brieﬂy taken up
in a later section. However, it could lead to unpredictable changes in agents' model
speciﬁcation.
More importantly, the analysis of Bray and Savin (1986) shows that it is indeed
plausible that agents who evaluate their model speciﬁcation using econometric test-
ing stick to using ordinary least squares estimation despite the fact that their model
is misspeciﬁed. It is however also important to note that the analysis of Bray and
Savin (1986) and others showed that convergence of agents' expectations to a ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium is far from obvious. In order to analyse under which
circumstances rational expectations equilibria can actually be attained by adaptive
learning rules, I will next give some examples of so called stochastic recursive al-
gorithms, which are frequently used in order to model adaptive learning processes.
After that, these techniques will be applied to the overlapping generations model
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with taste shocks in order to analyse whether it is realistic that an economy ends
up in a stationary sunspot equilibrium.
3.2. Stochastic Recursive Algorithms
3.2.1. Recursive Least Squares Learning
As has already been pointed out above, due to its simplicity, ordinary least squares
estimation constitutes a widely used example for how agents who are not able to form
rational expectations can nevertheless obtain subjective expectations about future
realizations of economic variables. In order to analyse under which circumstances
the subjective expectations obtained through this technique can converge to rational
expectations, consider again the simple Cobweb model introduced in section 3.1.2.
Denoting the 1 × (K + 1) vector (1 wt−1) as xt−1 and the (1 +K) × 1 coeﬃcient
vector (a b′)′ as β, the ordinary least squares estimates for the coeﬃcients of the
perceived law of motion (18) formed in period t − 1, βˆt−1 =
(
aˆt−1 bˆ′t−1
)′
, can be
obtained through the usual formula:
βˆt−1 =
(
X ′(t−1)X(t−1)
)−1 (
X ′(t−1)p(t−1)
)
where X(t−1) denotes the (t− 1)× (K + 1) matrix whose i'th row is given by xi−1,
and where p(t−1) denotes the (t− 1)× 1 vector whose i'th element is given by pi.
However, a major disadvantage of this so called "oﬀ-line" estimation is that the
amount of data needed to be stored increases each period which, over a long time,
may result in great practical diﬃculties. Therefore, a more eﬃcient calculation of
the estimates would be to use a recursive or "on-line" procedure which only requires
to store the last periods estimates and to use the currently observed data to update
them. Following Ljung and Söderström (1983), it is convenient to rewrite the ordi-
nary least squares estimator in order to obtain a recursive formula for it:
βˆt =
(
t∑
i=1
x′i−1xi−1
)−1( t∑
i=1
x′i−1pi
)
=
(
t∑
i=1
x′i−1xi−1
)−1( t−1∑
i=1
x′i−1pi + x
′
t−1pt
)
Using an analogous deﬁnition for βˆt−1 to express
∑t−1
i=1 x
′
i−1pi as
(∑t−1
i=1 x
′
i−1xi−1
)
βˆt−1
and deﬁning the estimate for the variance - covariance matrix of the random vector
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x, i.e. 1
t
(∑t
i=1 x
′
i−1xi−1
)
, using observations up to period t, as Rt yields:
βˆt =
1
t
R−1t
[(
t−1∑
i=1
x′i−1xi−1
)
βˆt−1 + x′t−1pt
]
=
1
t
R−1t
[(
t∑
i=1
x′i−1xi−1
)
βˆt−1 − x′t−1xt−1βˆt−1 + x′t−1pt
]
=
1
t
R−1t
[
tRtβˆt−1 − x′t−1xt−1βˆt−1 + x′t−1pt
]
= βˆt−1 +
1
t
R−1t x
′
t−1
(
pt − xt−1βˆt−1
)
However, since Rt still depends on all past observations of the exogenous variables
w0, . . . , wt−1, this expression is not yet a recursion for βˆt. Therefore, it is also
necessary to express Rt recursively as:
Rt =
1
t
(
t−1∑
i=1
x′i−1xi−1 + x
′
t−1xt−1
)
=
t− 1
t (t− 1)
t−1∑
i=1
x′i−1xi−1 +
1
t
x′t−1xt−1
=
1
t− 1
t−1∑
i=1
x′i−1xi−1 −
1
t (t− 1)
t−1∑
i=1
x′i−1xi−1 +
1
t
x′t−1xt−1
= Rt−1 +
1
t
(
x′t−1xt−1 −Rt−1
)
Hence, a recursive formulation of the ordinary least squares estimator is given by
the following algorithm:
βˆt = βˆt−1 +
1
t
R−1t x
′
t−1
(
pt − xt−1βˆt−1
)
(20)
Rt = Rt−1 +
1
t
(
x′t−1xt−1 −Rt−1
)
(21)
However, as Evans and Honkapohja (2001) point out, it is necessary to specify ap-
propriate initial conditions for the estimates βˆ and R in order for the recursive
system to be well speciﬁed. The only initial conditions guaranteeing that the esti-
mates calculated according to the recursion (20) - (21) are indeed equivalent to the
ordinary least squares estimates are the following:
βˆK+1 =
(
X ′(K+1)X(K+1)
)−1 (
X ′(K+1)p(K+1)
)
= X(K+1)p(K+1)
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RK+1 =
1
K + 1
K+1∑
i=1
x′ixi
=
1
K + 1
X ′(K+1)X(K+1)
It is clear, that for t < K +1 the matrix X(t) is singular and that thus the ordinary
least squares estimate βˆt is not deﬁned for such t. To deal with this problem, it is
assumed that until agents have observed enough data, their estimates are arbitrary,
but once it is possible to calculate the ordinary least squares estimates they do so.
Another possible problem is, that agents are required to invert the (K + 1)×(K + 1)
matrix Rt in order to calculate their estimates according to the recursive algorithm
(20) - (21). For a large number of explanatory variables this might result in com-
putational diﬃculties. Therefore, Ljung and Söderström (1983) suggest a diﬀerent
form of this algorithm which does only require the inversion of a scalar, however at
the cost of introducing a further variable.
A simpler alternative to avoid the inversion of a potentially very large matrix is the
so called stochastic gradient algorithm, although the estimates calculated according
to this algorithm are less eﬃcient than the ordinary least squares estimates. The
next section will introduce the necessary technique to derive this algorithm. This
technique developed by Robbins and Monro (1951) can in general be a useful learn-
ing rule for agents who are faced with an optimization problem and can thus also
be applied to the overlapping generations model discussed in section 2.
3.2.2. The Robbins - Monro Algorithm
The assumption that agents form their expectations by using ordinary least squares
estimation implies that agents can specify a perceived data generating process (al-
though they do not take the feedback of their learning behaviour into account) and
try to estimate the coeﬃcients of this perceived law of motion.
A more general problem agents might face is that they need to ﬁnd the unique solu-
tion θ∗ to the equation M (θ) = α, where the nature of M (·) is unknown. However,
if agents have an estimate θt for θ∗, they can observe the realization of a random
variable Y (θt) which is an unbiased estimator for M (θt), conditional on θt. This
problem was ﬁrst analysed by Robbins and Monro (1951), who highlighted its rele-
vance for the analysis of a series of experiments in technical applications.
A relevant application of this problem in economics is however pointed out by Ljung
(1977): If agents try to minimize the expected value of a function J (θ, φ) which de-
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pends on some choice variable θ (this variable could for example stand for agents'
labour supply or consumption choice) and the realization of a random variable φ,
they have to solve the problem:
E
[
∂
∂θ
J (θ, φ)
]
= 0
In the notation of Robbins and Monro, M (θ) corresponds to the left hand side of
this equation, α = 0 and Y (θ) = ∂
∂θ
J (θ, φ).
If the distribution function of φ is unknown, then also the functional form ofM (θ) is
not known and thus the optimization problem agents face cannot be solved analyti-
cally. However, given that agents have some initial estimate for the solution θ∗, they
can in any period t observe an estimate yt = ∂∂θJ (θt−1, φt) for the marginal beneﬁt
which could be obtained from changing the estimate made for θ∗ one period ago,
given φt, the currently observed realization of the random variable φ. The agents
can then adjust the estimate made in the previous period in the direction α − yt
given by this observation which is assumed to constitute an unbiased estimator for
the direction of steepest decent of E [J (θt−1, φ)], conditional on the estimate θt−1.
In other words, this implies that agents will on average adjust their estimates, such
that the distance between α and M (θt) is reduced most rapidly. Hence, agents will
be able to ﬁnd the minimum of E [J (θ, φ)] numerically by gradually adjusting their
estimates for this minimum according to the mechanism just described.
More precisely, Robbins and Monro (1951) show that the algorithm
θt = θt−1 + γt (α− yt) (22)
converges in mean square to the correct solution θ∗, i.e. that limt→∞ E
[
(θt − θ∗)2
]
=
0, if certain assumptions are fulﬁlled. In particular, it is required that the sequence
{γt}∞t=1 which determines by how much the previous estimates respond to new obser-
vations converges "slowly" (in a sense which will be discussed in greater detail below)
to zero. Moreover, Robbins and Monro (1951) show that the estimates converge to
θ∗ especially if M (·) is not decreasing. Hence, the Robbins - Monro algorithm can
indeed be applied to ﬁnd the global minimum of a convex function.
However, it is not necessarily the case that the latest observation on the direction
of steepest descent α− yt does indeed constitute a conditionally unbiased estimator
for the direction which decreases the distance between M (θ) and α most rapidly, as
Robbins and Monro (1951) assume. An example for which this is not satisﬁed will
be given in the next section in terms of the Cobweb model discussed above. This
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problem will however also arise when the Robbins - Monro algorithm is applied to
the overlapping generations model discussed in section 2. Nevertheless, if agents'
estimates had already converged to some constant value θ∗, this problem would not
arise. Thus similar to ordinary least squares learning, the Robbins - Monro algo-
rithm can be regarded as a "reasonable", but not a completely "rational" learning
rule. This point will also be illustrated further below. It implies however that the
convergence of this algorithm has to be analysed using a diﬀerent technique.
3.2.3. Stochastic Gradient Learning
Although it is plausible that agents who are confronted with the dynamics of the
Cobweb model base their expectations on ordinary least squares estimation, it is
also possible that they choose another estimator even despite the fact that OLS has,
under certain assumptions, the smallest variance among all linear unbiased estima-
tors. It is especially plausible that instead of choosing the estimates such that past
observations can in a certain way be described best, agents who are only interested in
forming expectations about the future, but not in explaining the economic structure
try to make a forecast error which is as close to zero as possible. In other words, it
is plausible to assume that agents' sole interest is to obtain the best forecasts given
their current information. This can be modelled by assuming that agents try to
minimize the expected squared forecast error.
Evans and Honkapohja (1998b) give a description of this behaviour in terms of a
multivariate Cobweb model which describes the simultaneous equilibrium on several
unrelated goods markets. However, to keep the analysis as simple as possible, I will
stick to the univariate model introduced in Section 3.1.2, where it has been assumed
that market clearing prices are generated through the reduced form equation:
pt = µ+ αp
e
t + wt−1δ + νt
and where the expectation of producers about the price in period t is given by:
pet = xt−1βˆt−1
where xt−1 is, as before, given by the 1× (K + 1) vector (1 wt−1), and where βˆt−1
denotes now the estimate for β chosen in period t − 1 such that it minimizes the
expected squared forecast error in period t which is given by:
E
[
(pt − pet)2
]
= E
[
(pt − xt−1β)2
]
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Hence, in period t − 1 agents try to ﬁnd those values for the coeﬃcients of their
perceived law motion which satisfy the following ﬁrst order condition:
E
[−2x′t−1 (pt − xt−1β)] = 0
⇒ E [−x′t−1 (pt − xt−1β)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=M(β)
= 0︸︷︷︸
=α
Clearly, this problem can be solved using the Robbins - Monro algorithm discussed
in the previous section. However, since agents have not decided on βˆt−1 yet, the
latest observation on the marginal forecast error available in period t − 1 is given
by:
yt−1 = −x′t−2
[
pt−1 − xt−2βˆt−2
]
Inserting this into the Robbins Monro algorithm given by equation (22) yields the
following learning rule:
βˆt−1 = βˆt−2 + γt−1
[
0 + x′t−2
(
pt−1 − xt−2βˆt−2
)]
or equivalently:
βˆt = βˆt−1 + γtx′t−1
(
pt − xt−1βˆt−1
)
(23)
As Evans and Honkapohja (1998b) point out this algorithm is a gradient rule which
adjusts the estimates made in the previous period in the direction in which the
squared forecast error is expected to decline most rapidly. However, due to the
time varying parameter estimates for β, this expectation is biased. This can be
seen by noting that, through the reduced form equation, the expected value of real-
ized prices (conditional on the estimates) in period t + 1 depends on βˆt. However,
when agents try to minimize the expected squared forecast error made in period
t + 1, they only posses information on the forecast error made in period t. The
expected value of the actual prices entering this forecast error however depend on
βˆt−1, and thus x′t−1
(
pt − xt−1βˆt−1
)
does not constitute an unbiased estimator for
E
[
x′t
(
pt+1 − xtβˆt
)]
, the direction of the steepest descent for the expected squared
forecast error made in period t + 1 which should be minimized. Therefore, in any
period, agents adjust their estimates formed in the previous period in a direction
which does not most rapidly decrease the expected squared forecast error made in
the next period, meaning that it is not clear whether the estimates will eventually
converge to a minimum or not without analysing this algorithm further. However,
it is also clear that if the estimates did not vary over time, but were equal to some
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value β∗ in all periods, this problem would not arise since then any observation on
the marginal forecast error would constitute an unbiased estimator for the direction
of steepest ascent of the expected squared forecast error made in any other period.
Comparing the stochastic gradient algorithm (23) with the recursive formulation
of ordinary least squares (20) - (21), it is apparent that this algorithm does not
include an estimator for the variance - covariance matrix of the explanatory vari-
ables, as does the recursive least squares algorithm. This implies that on the one
hand, the estimates according to the stochastic gradient algorithm are easier to
compute than the estimates calculated according to the more complicated recursive
least squares algorithm since only the recursion for one variable has to be considered
and additionally it is not necessary to invert a matrix. On the other hand, it could
also be the case that neglecting this information has negative implications as well.
However, Evans and Honkapohja (1998b) show that this is not the case and that in
a Cobweb model the stochastic gradient algorithm and the recursive least squares
algorithm converge to the unique rational expectations equilibrium under exactly
the same circumstances. This result will be demonstrated in greater detail in a later
section using so called expectational stability conditions. As will be shown below,
expectational stability is in the Cobweb model equivalent to the more complicated,
but direct analysis of the recursive least squares and stochastic gradient algorithms.
As this result does however not hold for all models and all possible adaptive learn-
ing algorithms, I will introduce the direct analysis of stochastic recursive algorithms
ﬁrst. In order to do so, it is convenient to state all recursive algorithms introduced
so far in a general form. This will be done in the next section.
3.2.4. General Form of Stochastic Recursive Algorithms
Following Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) or (2001), a stochastic recursive algorithm
can in general be expressed as:33
θt = θt−1 + γtH (θt−1, Xt) (24)
This algorithm determines the evolution of a d × 1 vector of parameter estimates
θt which, through a function H (θt−1, Xt), depends on an l × 1 vector of exogenous
33Evans and Honkapohja actually allow for an even more general representation. However for the
algorithms considered here this is not necessary, although it should be noted that in some of
the examples discussed here the function used to update the estimates will explicitly depend
on time.
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observable state variables Xt and on the estimates made in previous period. The so
called "gain parameter" γt ∈ R determines how responsive the estimates are with
respect to H (θt−1, Xt).
In order to see that the stochastic gradient algorithm discussed in the previous
section can indeed be written in this form, it is only necessary to note that by in-
serting producers expectations, which are still assumed to be based on the perceived
law of motion (18), into the reduced form equation, the actual prices in period t can
be expressed as:
pt = µ+ α
(
xt−1βˆt−1
)
+ wt−1δ + νt
= xt−1
[
αβˆt−1 + (µ δ)
′
]
+ νt
Inserting this into the stochastic gradient algorithm (23) shows that the estimates
for β are updated as:
βˆt = βˆt−1 + γtx′t−1
(
xt−1
[
αβˆt−1 + (µ δ)
′
]
+ νt − xt−1βˆt−1
)
= βˆt−1 + γtx′t−1
(
xt−1
[
(α− 1) βˆt−1 + (µ δ)′
]
+ νt
)
Clearly, the estimates βˆt correspond to θt in the general notation. The exogenous
state variables are in this case given by Xt = (xt−1 νt)
′, and thus the function
H (θt−1, Xt) is just given by the direction of steepest descent for the squared fore-
cast error observed in period t. For this algorithm the gain parameter γt is not
further speciﬁed. However, in order to allow for the convergence of the estimates it
is necessary to impose certain assumptions which will be stated in the next section.
A usual choice for the sequence of gain parameters is {γt}∞t=1 =
{
1
t
}∞
t=1
, which is
also used in the recursive least squares algorithm and which is therefore also chosen
by Evans and Honkapohja (1998b) for the stochastic gradient algorithm.
As pointed out above, for the recursive least squares algorithm R, the for the vari-
ance - covariance matrix of the explanatory variables, also needs to be estimated.
Therefore, for this algorithm θt is in principal given by vec (βt Rt), where vec (·)
denotes the vectorization of a matrix.
However, as pointed out by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), the recursive algorithm
(20) - (21) for least squares learning is not yet in the general form (24) since it is
the case that the current estimate Rt inﬂuences the current estimate βˆt, which is
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ruled out by the formulation (24) in which only θt−1 can inﬂuence θt. To solve this
problem, it is necessary to deﬁne a new variable St−1 := Rt. From (21) it follows
that a recursion for St is given by:
St = St−1 +
1
t+ 1
(x′txt − St−1)
= St−1 +
1
t
(
t
t+ 1
)
(x′txt − St−1)
Substituting the actual law of motion of prices into the learning algorithm, as done
for the stochastic gradient algorithm, yields the general formulation:
βˆt = βˆt−1 +
1
t
S−1t−1x
′
t−1
(
xt−1
[
(α− 1) βˆt−1 + (µ δ)′
]
+ νt
)
St = St−1 +
1
t
(
t
t+ 1
)
(x′txt − St−1)
where the vector of estimates θt is now given by vec (βt St), the vector of state
variables is given by Xt = (xt−1 xt νt)
′ and the sequence of gain parameters is
given by {γt}∞t=1 =
{
1
t
}∞
t=1
.
After introducing this general formulation of adaptive learning algorithms, the next
section will illustrate the mathematical techniques which are necessary in order to
analyse stochastic recursive algorithms in this general form.
3.3. Stochastic Approximation
Note that since in all applications discussed here the state variables include some
random variable, the general form of a recursive learning algorithm discussed in the
previous section corresponds to a stochastic diﬀerence equation which is in general
very hard to analyse.34 Therefore, the basic idea in order to simplify the analysis is to
replace the stochastic diﬀerence equation with a deterministic diﬀerential equation,
chosen such that the trajectories of the diﬀerence equation are well approximated by
the trajectories of the diﬀerential equation evaluated at discrete points in time. The
advantage of doing so is that the stability of ﬁxed points or steady states under the
dynamics of a deterministic diﬀerential equation is much easier to analyse than under
the dynamics of a stochastic diﬀerence equation, and as Evans and Honkapohja
(1998a) argue, it will under certain assumptions nevertheless be possible to select
plausible equilibria of learning processes based on their stability under the dynamics
34For a direct analysis of the ordinary least squares learning algorithm see for example Bray (1982).
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of the associated diﬀerential equation.
3.3.1. The Associated Diﬀerential Equation
In order to see how it is possible to ﬁnd an associated diﬀerential equation to the
stochastic recursive algorithm (24), consider the following heuristic argument pro-
vided by Evans and Honkapohja (2001):
Suppose that the gain sequence {γt} is such that it is declining to zero and such
that for t large enough the gain parameter is almost constant. Then, θn+N can be
approximated as:
θn+N ≈ θn + γ
N−1∑
i=0
H (θn+i, Xn+1+i)
However, since for n large γ must already be very small, meaning that the estimates
do not change much from one period to the next, it must approximately hold that:
θn+N ≈ θn + γ
N−1∑
i=0
H
(
θn, Xn+1+i
)
= θn +Nγ
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
H
(
θn, Xn+1+i
)
where X indicates that if the state variables in a certain period depend on the
estimates for θ made in the previous period35, they are generated by the constant
value θn.
Since for n large, Xn+1+i will for all i = 0, . . . ,∞ be drawn from distributions
with identical expected value36, the law of large numbers implies that for N large
1
N
∑N−1
i=0 H
(
θn, Xn+1+i
)
is approximately equal to limt→∞ E
[
H
(
θn, X t
)]
which will
be denoted as h (θn). Using this notation, it holds that:
θn+N ≈ θn +Nγh (θn)
Replacing the approximation γ again by the correct gain sequence, it must thus hold
that:
θn+1 ≈ θn + γn+1h (θn)
35A precise assumption on the process generating the state variables will be made below.
36The formal assumption that the process generating Xn is asymptotically stationary will be made
below.
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which can be regarded as the discretization of the ordinary diﬀerential equation:
dθ
dτ
= h (θ) (25)
where the "alternative time" τ is such that for all n = 1, 2, . . . the discrete point in
time τn is given by
∑n
i=1 γi.
In order to see that the approximation for the stochastic recursive algorithm just
derived is then indeed a discretization of this diﬀerential equation, note that such a
discretization is given by:
θτn+1 ≈ θτn + (τn+1 − τn)h (θτn)
= θτn +
(
n+1∑
i=1
γi −
n∑
i=1
γi
)
h (θτn)
= θτn + γn+1h (θτn)
This implies that indeed a trajectory of the stochastic diﬀerence equation can (at
least for large t) be approximated by certain discrete points in a trajectory of the
associated diﬀerential equation (25).
3.3.2. Assumptions on Stochastic Recursive Algorithms
However, in order to analyse how the stability properties of a steady state of the
associated diﬀerential equation translate into stability properties of this steady state
under the dynamics of the stochastic diﬀerence equation, it is necessary to state some
assumptions on the stochastic recursive algorithm itself and on the process gener-
ating the state variables, as done for example in Ljung (1977), Woodford (1990) or
Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) and (2001).
For the following, D is an open subset of Rd containing θ∗, the rational expectations
equilibrium of interest, which is a ﬁxed point both of the stochastic recursive algo-
rithm and the associated diﬀerential equation.
The ﬁrst assumption restricts the gain parameter sequence. Informally, it states
that the gain parameter must decrease to zero as time goes to inﬁnity, but that the
speed of convergence must not be too fast. This assumption has already been made
for the Robbins - Monro algorithm in section 3.2.2. More precisely, it can be stated
as:
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A.1 {γt}∞t=0 is a nonstochastic and nonincreasing sequence such that:
∞∑
t=1
γt =∞ and
∞∑
t=1
γ2t <∞
Ljung (1977) states a less restrictive assumption: instead of assuming that
∑∞
t=1 γ
p
t <
∞ holds for p = 2, he assumes that this holds for some p. Also Evans and Honkapo-
hja (1998a) and (2001) point out that this weaker assumption would actually be
suﬃcient. However, for the usual gain sequence t−1 which is for example used in the
recursive least squares algorithm and the stochastic gradient algorithm discussed by
Evans and Honkapohja (1998b), the stronger assumption is satisﬁed as well.
An example for which the second part of this assumption is violated is a constant
gain sequence, i.e. γt = γ for all t. This would imply that agents take any devia-
tions of the actual outcomes from their previous expectations about these outcomes
into account when forming their new estimates, while for decreasing gain sequences
agents will eventually stop to revise their estimates. Therefore, in stochastic frame-
works in which there will always be random ﬂuctuations a constant gain algorithm
cannot converge to a steady state since it implies that agents will always adjust their
estimates in response to these random ﬂuctuations.37 This problem is discussed in
greater detail by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). However, they also note that since
for a constant gain algorithm the weight put on past observations dies out at a
geometric rate, while for decreasing gain algorithms, such as recursive least squares
learning, all past observations enter with equal weight, a constant gain algorithm
can react better to possible structural change in the economy. Thus, they also sug-
gest that if for some reason agents detect the misspeciﬁcation of their econometric
model due to the feedback of their learning behaviour and misinterpret this ﬁnding
as recurring structural change to the economy, they might change their learning rule
to a constant gain algorithm.
In order to investigate whether expectations formation through a constant gain al-
gorithm is a plausible assumption, Branch and Evans (2006) compare the forecast
performance of recursive least squares learning, a time varying parameter model and
a constant gain algorithm in out-of-sample forecasting of GDP growth and inﬂation.
For this analysis they constructed the constant gain algorithm by replacing the gain
sequence t−1 in the recursive least squares algorithm by a constant. This constant
was chosen such that it minimized the mean squared forecast error in an in-sample
37For non-stochastic frameworks this argument does not hold.
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forecasting period. Therefore, it reﬂected the actual degree of structural change for
the variable under consideration.38
Branch and Evans found that this constant gain algorithm had to be preferred on ba-
sis of the mean squared forecast error for both variables. Furthermore, they showed
that an even simpler model, using the same gain parameter for both variables, re-
sulted in the best ﬁt to the forecasts of the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Therefore, they conclude that if agents are faced with structural change in the econ-
omy and are acting like econometricians, it is indeed plausible to assume that they
use a constant gain algorithm, in which case the second part of this assumption
would be violated. However, since the models discussed here are not subject to
structural change, the assumption of a decreasing gain sequence is justiﬁed. More-
over, in situations with structural change, it is not even desired that agents' estimates
converge to a stationary rational expectations equilibrium since the rational expec-
tations equilibrium would itself be subject to change. Therefore, the only problem
remaining with the assumption of a decreasing gain sequence is that agents might
misinterpret some random ﬂuctuations or the misspeciﬁcation due to learning as
structural change and thus wrongly adopt a constant gain algorithm. However, as
the simulations of Bray and Savin (1986) showed, this is not very likely.
Furthermore, Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) and (2001) note that if the ﬁrst part of
this assumption were not met, i.e. if the gain sequence decreased too fast to zero, the
recursive algorithm might converge to a non - equilibrium point since ﬂuctuations
which still contain information that could lead to better forecasts are not properly
taken into account.
Moreover, Ljung (1977) assumes that the gain sequence satisﬁes:
lim
t→∞
sup
[
1
γt
− 1
γt−1
]
<∞
This is also an unnumbered assumption in Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) and
(2001), and it is in particular satisﬁed for the sequence γt = t−1.
The next assumptions made by Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) and (2001) con-
cern the function H (θ, x). The ﬁrst states that H (θ, x) is bounded by a polynomial
depending on the state variables:
A.2 For any compact subset Q ⊂ D, there exist constants C and q, such that for
38A higher gain parameter implies that past observations are discounted more. Thus, the optimal
constant gain parameter should be higher in economies with a high degree of structural change.
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all θ ∈ Q it holds that:
|H (θ, x)| ≤ C (1 + |x|q)
As Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show, this assumption assures that the right hand
side of the diﬀerential equation (25), h (θ) = limt→∞ E
[
H
(
θ,X t (θ)
)]
, is well deﬁned
which is howeveer directly assumed by Ljung (1977) or Woodford (1990).
Furthermore, Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) and (2001) assume that H (θ, x) is
twice continuously diﬀerentiable and that its derivatives are bounded, which implies
that H (θ, x) and its derivative with respect to x are Lipschitz continuous. More
precisely, they assume the following:
A.3 For any compact subset Q ⊂ D and for all θ and θ′ ∈ Q and x1 and x2 ∈ Rl
there exist constants L1 and L2, such that the function H (θ, x) satisﬁes:
(i) |H (θ, x1)−H (θ, x2)| ≤ L1 |x1 − x2|
(ii) |H (θ, 0)−H (θ′, 0)| ≤ L2 |θ − θ′|
(iii)
∣∣∣∂H(θ,x)∂x − ∂H(θ′,x)∂x ∣∣∣ ≤ L2 |θ − θ′|
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that this assumption, together with one of the
following assumptions, implies that h (θ) is Lipschitz continuous and that therefore
given any initial value, the ordinary diﬀerential equation (25) has a unique solution
which approximates the trajectory of the given stochastic recursive algorithm.
For the evolution of the state variables Ljung (1977), Evans and Honkapohja (1998a)
and (2001) assume that they follow conditionally linear dynamics. Evans and
Honkapohja (1998a) and (2001) argue that this is the relevant case for most economic
applications. Formally, this assumption can be stated as:
B.1 Xt = A (θt−1)Xt−1 +B (θt−1) et
where A (θt−1) and B (θt−1) are matrix valued functions of θt−1, and where et is as
described by the next assumption.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) also discuss a more general case in which the state
variables follow a Markov process. However, assumption B.1 covers all models which
will be discussed here.
Furthermore, Ljung (1977), Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) and (2001) assume the
following on et:
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B.2 et is the realization of a sequence of independent, identically distributed ran-
dom variables with ﬁnite absolute moments, i.e. E [|et|p] <∞ for all p.
Ljung (1977) notes that instead of the second part of this assumption it is also
possible to assume that et is bounded with probability one for all t. Moreover,
Woodford (1990) shows that also the ﬁrst part of this assumption is not necessary if
other assumptions are strengthened. Thus, although this assumption might appear
too restrictive, it is not crucial for the following results.
The last assumption made on the state dynamics by Evans and Honkapohja (1998a)
and (2001) is the following:
B.3 For any compact subset Q ⊂ D and for some matrix norm |·| it holds that:
sup
θ∈Q
|B (θ)| ≤M and sup
θ∈Q
|A (θ)| ≤ ρ < 1
Furthermore, A (θ) and B (θ) satisfy Lipschitz conditions on Q.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) note that this assumption is stronger than asymp-
totic stationarity of the process generating Xt, which assures that if some constant
value θ is used to generate the state variables, their mean will be asymptotically
constant. Therefore, it is indeed possible to approximate 1
N
∑N−1
i=0 H
(
θn, Xn+1+i
)
with limt→∞ E
[
H
(
θn, X t
)]
for N large, as done in the heuristic argument given
above. Furthermore Evans and Honkapohja (2001) use this assumption together
with assumption A.3 to show that h (θ) is Lipschitz continuous.
With these assumptions, it is possible to establish the following theoretical results
on the stability of rational expectations equilibria, or more generally of ﬁxed points,
under the dynamics of adaptive learning rules which can be expressed in the general
form of stochastic recursive algorithms.
3.3.3. Main Results in Stochastic Approximation
The ﬁrst result which will be used in later sections to translate the qualitative
properties of the associated diﬀerential equation into the qualitative properties of the
learning algorithm is due to Ljung (1977) and states to which points the stochastic
recursive algorithm can converge:
Theorem 6 Consider a stochastic recursive algorithm of the general form (24)
which satisﬁes the assumptions stated in the previous section.
Furthermore, suppose that the probability of θt converging to an arbitrarily small
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open ball around θ∗ ∈ D is strictly positive, and assume that the variance - covari-
ance matrix of H
(
θ∗, X t
)
is bounded from below by a strictly positive deﬁnite matrix.
Additionally, assume that in a neighbourhood around θ∗, E
[
H
(
θ,X t
)]
is continu-
ously diﬀerentiable with respect to θ and that this derivative converges uniformly as
t goes to inﬁnity.
Then it must hold that h (θ∗) = 0 and that all eigenvalues of d
dθ
h (θ∗) have negative
(or zero) real part.
In other words, this theorem states that a stochastic recursive algorithm can only
converge to locally asymptotically stable stationary steady states of the associated
ordinary diﬀerential equation (25). Conversely, it also follows from this theorem
that if a certain point is no steady state, an unstable, or only a saddle path stable
steady state of the associated ordinary diﬀerential equation, the stochastic recursive
algorithm cannot converge to this ﬁxed point. Ljung (1977) argues that actually
this contraposition of the theorem is its most important application. This will also
become obvious in the applications of this result in the following sections where this
result will be used to rule out implausible equilibria which cannot be attained by an
adaptive learning process in the case of multiple rational expectations equilibria.
Another important result which will be used in the following sections to show con-
vergence of the trajectories of a stochastic recursive algorithm to some particular
steady state is the following theorem due to Ljung (1977) which is also stated in
Woodford (1990):
Theorem 7 Consider a stochastic recursive algorithm of the general form (24)
which satisﬁes the assumption stated in the previous section.
Furthermore, assume that et is bounded with probability one for all t, that there ex-
ists a compact set Q ⊂ D which is such that θt ∈ Q inﬁnitely often with probability
one, and assume that the associated diﬀerential equation (25) has an invariant set
I whose domain of attraction is DI ⊃ Q.
Then it follows that θt converges with probability one to I as time goes to inﬁnity.
As Ljung (1977) points out, an important special case of this theorem is the fol-
lowing: If the invariant set I were a singleton containing only one steady state of
the associated diﬀerential equation, it would follow from this theorem that the esti-
mates θt converge to this stationary point with probability one provided that indeed
all requirements stated in the theorem (i.e. the "visiting property") are satisﬁed.
This is in particular the case if the associated diﬀerential equation is deﬁned on a
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compact set and if the steady state under consideration is globally stable on this
domain under the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential equation. In order to see
this, note that in this case the compact set Q can be chosen to be the whole domain
of the associated diﬀerential equation, meaning that the "visiting property" is triv-
ially satisﬁed since moreover DI , the domain of attraction of the steady state under
the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential equation, coincides with Q. Note that his
argument, although in a more general form allowing the set I to contain more than
one steady state, will be used in a later section to show convergence of an adaptive
learning algorithm to the set of stationary two - state sunspot equilibria.
However, the assumption that the trajectories visit a subset of the domain of at-
traction of the invariant set I under the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential
equation inﬁnitely often seems rather strong. Therefore, Ljung (1977) shows that
the conclusion of this theorem remains valid if this condition is not satisﬁed, but if
instead a so called projection facility is employed. A projection facility consists of
two sets D1 ⊂ D2 which are such that D2 is a subset of DI . Furthermore, whenever
the estimate θt−1 lies within the interior of D2, θt is calculated according to usual
stochastic recursive algorithm, whereas otherwise it is projected to some point in D1.
Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) note however that also this assumption is very re-
strictive since it might constrain the estimates to lie within a very small neigh-
bourhood of the steady state under consideration. Therefore, they show that even
without this condition, it is possible to determine a lower bound for the probability
of convergence of the estimates calculated according to a stochastic recursive algo-
rithm to a locally asymptotically stable steady state of the associated diﬀerential
equation. More precisely, they state the following theorem:
Theorem 8 Suppose that θ∗ is a locally asymptotically stable steady state of the
associated diﬀerential equation (25) and that the assumptions stated in the previous
section are met. Furthermore, denote the probability distribution of (Xt, θt) for t ≥ n
conditional on Xn = x and θn = a as Pn,x,a.
Then for any compact subset Q of D, there exist constants F and s which are
independent of the gain sequence {γt}∞t=1 and which are such that for all n ≥ 0,
a ∈ Q and for all x it holds that:
Pn,x,a [θt → θ∗] ≥ 1− F (1 + |x|s) J (n)
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where J (n) is a decreasing sequence with limn→∞ J (n) = 0, which is given by
J (n) =
(
1 +
∞∑
k=n+1
γ2k
)( ∞∑
k=n+1
γ2k
)
In other words, this theorem shows that when the "inﬁnitely visiting" property or
Ljung's assumption of a projection facility cannot be justiﬁed, the estimate calcu-
lated according to a stochastic recursive algorithm must lie within a compact neigh-
bourhood of a locally asymptotically stable steady state of the associated diﬀerential
equation at a point in time which is large enough in order to obtain convergence
of the corresponding trajectory of the stochastic recursive algorithm to this steady
state with probability arbitrarily close to one.
Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) explain this result with the fact that the trajectories
of the stochastic recursive algorithm is not very well approximated by trajectories
of the associated diﬀerential equation early in time. Therefore, it might be the case,
they argue, that although the trajectory of the stochastic recursive algorithm is
within the domain of attraction of the steady state θ∗ under the associated diﬀer-
ential equation, large random shocks which are not incorporated into the approx-
imation through the deterministic dynamical system cause the trajectory to leave
this domain of attraction and to diverge from θ∗. However, when a trajectory is
within the domain of attraction under the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential
equation at a point in time large enough, this will not happen (or more precisely,
it will only happen with arbitrarily small probability) since then the trajectory of
the stochastic recursive algorithm is very well approximated by a trajectory of the
associated diﬀerential equation which converges to the steady state.
However, it also follows from this result that since J (n) tends to zero as
∑∞
k=n+1 γ
2
k →
0, it is possible to modify the gain sequence by multiplying it with a small constant
such that even for n = 0, that is even for trajectories starting within a compact set
containing the steady state θ∗, convergence to θ∗ with arbitrarily high probability is
possible. Evans and Honkapohja (1998a) refer to this situation as "slow adaption".
In this case, the rate of adaption to random shocks is suﬃciently small such that
their eﬀect on the trajectories of the stochastic recursive algorithm will never be
strong enough to cause them to leave the domain of attraction under the dynam-
ics of the associated diﬀerential equation. For general gain sequences, Evans and
Honkapohja (1998a) show that convergence to the steady state will take place with
positive probability if the initial estimate for θ lies within a compact set containing
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the steady state θ∗.39
Therefore, they argue that it is indeed possible to select plausible rational expec-
tations equilibria based on conditions which determine whether a given rational
expectations equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable under the associated dif-
ferential equation, as has already been argued in Theorem 6.40
Ljung (1977) shows a similar result: Loosely speaking, he provides an upper bound
for the probability of the largest deviation of the trajectory of the associated diﬀer-
ential equation from the trajectory of the stochastic recursive algorithm exceeding
a given ε. Ljung ﬁnds that this upper bound can be made arbitrarily small if the
gain sequence converges suﬃciently slowly to zero. Therefore, the associated diﬀer-
ential equation is in this case a suitable approximation for the stochastic recursive
algorithm already for small t implying that the problem indicated above cannot arise.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) discuss however also one special case in which con-
vergence to a steady state can be obtained with probability one, although only the
initial conditions for a trajectory of the stochastic recursive algorithm lie within a
compact neighbourhood of this steady state. In order to establish this result con-
cerning globally stable steady states of the associated diﬀerential equation, it is
however necessary to modify the assumptions made in the previous section slightly.
In particular, this is true for the assumptions made on H (θ, x). Since the follow-
ing result will however only be used for illustrative purposes in the next section, I
will not describe these alternative assumptions in detail. Note however that it is
necessary to assume that the process generating the state variables postulated in
assumption B.1 must be independent of the estimates for the following result, due
to Evans and Honkapohja (2001), to hold.
Theorem 9 Consider a stochastic recursive algorithm of the general form (24) and
suppose that instead of assumptions A.2, A.3 and B.1 the modiﬁed assumptions made
by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and all other assumptions made in the previous
section hold. Assume furthermore that the associated diﬀerential equation (25) has
a unique steady state θ∗ ∈ Rd.
Suppose additionally that there exists a twice continuously diﬀerentiable function
U (θ) deﬁned on Rd which has bounded second derivatives and which has the following
39Note that in later sections rational expectations equilibria which were found to be possible
outcomes of a certain stochastic recursive algorithm based on Theorem 8 will be referred to as
locally stable under the dynamics of this learning algorithm.
40Note however that this result is stronger than Theorem 6 since it actually shows convergence to
a locally stable steady state of the associated diﬀerential equation with positive probability.
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properties:
(i) U (θ∗) = 0 and U (θ) > 0 for all θ 6= θ∗
(ii) dU(θ)
dτ
< 0 for all θ 6= θ∗
(iii) U (θ) ≥ α |θ|2 for some α and all θ which are in absolute terms larger than
some ρ0 > 0
Then a trajectory of the stochastic recursive algorithm starting in a compact neigh-
bourhood of the steady state θ∗ converges to θ∗ with probability one.
Note that assumptions (i) and (ii) made in this theorem imply that U (θ) is a so
called Lyaponov function of the associated diﬀerential equation, meaning that under
these assumptions the steady state θ∗ is globally stable under the dynamics of the
associated diﬀerential equation. Moreover, note that convergence of a (stochastic)
trajectory to θ∗ refers to the probability distribution Pn,x,a for n = 0 introduced in
the previous theorem.
3.3.4. Stochastic Approximation in the Cobweb Model
With the technical results introduced in the previous section, it is possible to analyse
whether the adaptive learning algorithms introduced so far will actually converge to
the unique rational expectations equilibrium of the Cobweb model if it is assumed
that agents' perceived law of motion is consistent with the functional form of this
equilibrium.
Consider ﬁrst the simpler stochastic gradient algorithm which, under the assumption
of a correctly speciﬁed perceived law of motion, has been rewritten in section 3.2.4
in the following general form:
βˆt = βˆt−1 + γt x′t−1
(
xt−1
[
(α− 1) βˆt−1 + (µ δ)′
]
+ νt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H(βˆt−1,Xt)
Hence, for this algorithm h
(
βˆ
)
, the right hand side of the associated diﬀerential
equation introduced in section 3.3.1, is given by:
h
(
βˆ
)
= lim
t→∞
E
[
x′t−1
(
xt−1
[
(α− 1) βˆ + (µ δ)′
]
+ νt
)]
=
(
1 0
0 Ω
)[
(α− 1) βˆ + (µ δ)′
]
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where the last line follows from the assumption that xt−1 is given by (1 wt−1)
and that the variance - covariance matrix of the random vector w is given by Ω.
Furthermore, it has been assumed that x and the random shock ν are uncorrelated.
Therefore, the associated ordinary diﬀerential equation for the stochastic gradient
algorithm in the univariate Cobweb model is given by:
dβˆ
dτ
=
(
1 0
0 Ω
)[
(α− 1) βˆ + (µ δ)′
]
Since in section 3.1.2 Ω has assumed to be positive deﬁnite, it can be inverted
implying that the unique steady state of this diﬀerential equation41 is given by the
coeﬃcient vector of the unique rational expectations equilibrium:
β∗ =
1
1− α
(
µ
δ
)
Moreover, this steady state is globally stable under the dynamics of the associated
diﬀerential equation if all eigenvalues of the matrix
dh(βˆ)
dβˆ
|βˆ=β∗ have negative real
part which is the case if α < 1.
Therefore, it can be concluded by Theorem 6 that whenever α > 1, the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium cannot be the outcome of the stochastic gradient algorithm,
and that thus agents' estimates must diverge since there do not exist any other
steady states of the associated diﬀerential equation. Moreover, it can be concluded
by Theorem 9 that whenever α < 1, the stochastic gradient algorithm converges to
the rational expectations equilibrium with probability one regardless of the initial es-
timate since the rational expectations equilibrium β∗ is a globally stable steady state
of the associated diﬀerential equation. Note that Evans and Honkapohja (2001) ex-
plicitly verify the existence of a Lyapunov function satisfying the assumptions made
in this theorem. However, in order to keep the argument as simple as possible, I
will skip this technicality.
As Evans and Honkapohja (2001) point out, α < 1 is a plausible assumption for the
Cobweb model since it requires that the supply curve has a greater slope than the
demand curve which is always satisﬁed for the usually assumed downward sloping
demand and upward sloping supply curves. Therefore, it follows that under eco-
nomically reasonable assumptions agents in the Cobweb model can learn to form
rational expectations by using their observations in order to adaptively update their
41Recall that at a steady state or ﬁxed point dβˆdτ must be zero.
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expectations about future prices using a plausible learning algorithm. As pointed
out above, this result justiﬁes the use of the rational expectations approach to model
expectations formation in the long run.
In a similar manner it can be shown that the stability of the unique rational ex-
pectations equilibrium of the Cobweb model under recursive least squares learning
is determined by the same condition as under stochastic gradient learning. The
argument for this result follows Evans and Honkapohja (2001). As could be seen in
section 3.2.4, the stochastic recursive algorithm for recursive least squares learning
under the assumption that agents' perceptions about the functional form of the law
of motion for prices coincide with the unique rational expectations equilibrium is
given by:
βˆt = βˆt−1 +
1
t
S−1t−1x
′
t−1
(
xt−1
[
(α− 1) βˆt−1 + (µ δ)′
]
+ νt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Hβˆ(θt−1,Xt)
St = St−1 +
1
t
(
t
t+ 1
)
(x′txt − St−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=HS(θt−1,Xt)
Since agents also need to estimate the variance - covariance matrix of the explanatory
variables, the vector of estimates θ consists of two parts, one associated with β, the
estimates for the coeﬃcients of the perceived law of motion, and one associated with
the estimates for this variance - covariance matrix S. Correspondingly, h (θ) can also
be partitioned in this way and is therefore given by the following two components:
hβˆ
(
βˆ, S
)
= lim
t→∞
E
[
S−1x′t−1
(
xt−1
[
(α− 1) βˆ + (µ δ)′
]
+ νt
)]
hS
(
βˆ, S
)
= lim
t→∞
t
t+ 1
E [x′txt − S]
Hence, given the postulated perceived law of motion, the recursive least squares
algorithm in the Cobweb model is associated with the following system of ordinary
diﬀerential equations:
dβˆ
dτ
= S−1
(
1 0
0 Ω
)[
(α− 1) βˆ + (µ δ)′
]
dS
dτ
=
(
1 0
0 Ω
)
− S
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From the diﬀerential equation for S, which is independent of βˆ and can thus be
analysed separately from the subsystem of diﬀerential equations associated with βˆ,
it follows that S converges under all parameter constellations to its steady state
level, the variance - covariance matrix of the explanatory variables. Since the only
question of interest here is under which parameter constellations trajectories of βˆ
asymptotically approach the rational expectations equilibrium, this limit for S can
be inserted into the diﬀerential equation for βˆ which is then given by:
dβˆ
dτ
= (α− 1) βˆ + (µ δ)′
Therefore, the unique rational expectations equilibrium is a globally stable steady
state of the associated diﬀerential equation if all eigenvalues of (α− 1) IK+1, where
IK+1 denotes the (K + 1)×(K + 1) identity matrix, have negative real part which is
the case if α < 1. As for the stochastic gradient algorithm, Theorems 6 and 9 apply,
from which it follows that for α < 1 the unique rational expectations equilibrium is
globally stable under the postulated learning behaviour. In other words, although
the recursive least squares algorithm uses more information in order to update the
estimates, it converges under exactly the same conditions to the unique rational
expectations equilibrium in the univariate Cobweb model as the stochastic gradient
algorithm. This result also holds in the multivariate Cobweb model analysed by
Evans and Honkapohja (1998b).
These two examples illustrate that conditions on the parameters of the model deter-
mine whether a given rational expectations equilibrium can be attained by a certain
learning algorithm, i.e. whether it is stable under the considered learning dynamics.
The next section will focus on a way on how these conditions can be obtained with-
out deriving the sometimes complicated associated diﬀerential equation. Moreover,
it will be discussed how these conditions are aﬀected by changes in agents' perceived
law of motion.
3.4. Alternative Stability Concepts
3.4.1. Expectational Stability
For the Cobweb model, it could already be seen from equation (19) and the discussion
in section 3.1.3 that agents' perceptions about the law of motion for prices inﬂuence
the actual price generating process. Therefore, it is possible to deﬁne the following
mapping from the coeﬃcients of the perceived law of motion (18) to the coeﬃcients
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of the actual law of motion (19):
T
((
a
b
))
=
(
µ+ αa
δ + αb
)
With this notation, the ﬁrst part of the recursive least squares estimator for a and
b discussed in section 3.2.1 can be reformulated as:
βˆt = βˆt−1 +
1
t
R−1t x
′
t−1
(
xt−1
(
T
(
βˆt−1
)
− βˆt−1
)
+ νt
)
which shows that essentially the recursive least squares algorithm adjusts the esti-
mates for the coeﬃcients of the perceived law of motion toward the coeﬃcients of
the actual law of motion for prices which is implied by these estimates.
Similar to this basic mechanism, Evans (1989) proposes an alternative to the direct
analysis of the qualitative behaviour of stochastic recursive algorithms discussed in
the previous section. Instead of basing his analysis on an associated diﬀerential
equation, Evans considers a stylized learning rule which at each point in time re-
duces the diﬀerence between the perceived law of motion and the implied actual law
of motion by a certain amount. This stylized learning rule can thus be expressed as
follows:
θτ+∆τ = θτ + δ∆τ (T (θτ )− θτ )
where δ > 0 determines by how much the estimates are altered each unit of time. By
rearranging this stylized learning rule, Evans (1989) obtains the diﬀerence quotient
for θ with respect to τ . Since δ > 0 does not inﬂuence the qualitative behaviour of
a trajectory for the estimates θ, it can be omitted which makes it possible to obtain
the following diﬀerential equation as ∆τ → 0:
dθ
dτ
= T (θτ )− θτ (26)
Since in a rational expectations equilibrium expectations about the law of motion
for the relevant economic variables correspond to the objective mathematical expec-
tations, it must hold that in a rational expectations equilibrium the coeﬃcients of
the perceived law of motion, i.e. the vector θ and the coeﬃcients of the actual law
of motion, i.e. T (θ), coincide.42 Thus, all rational expectations equilibria clearly
constitute steady states of this diﬀerential equation.
42Note that here it is implicitly used that the functional form of the perceived law of motion
coincides with the functional form of the rational expectations equilibrium.
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Evans (1989) then deﬁnes a given rational expectations equilibrium as expectation-
ally stable (or E - stable) if it is a (locally) asymptotically stable steady state of
this diﬀerential equation, meaning that (small) deviations from the given rational
expectations equilibrium lead to a gradual readjustment of expectations to their
rational expectations levels.
Applying this concept to the Cobweb model with a perceived law of motion of
the form pt = a+ wt−1b+ νt yields:
d
dτ
(
a
b
)
=
(
µ+ αa
δ + αb
)
−
(
a
b
)
Therefore, as for the direct analysis of the recursive least squares and the stochastic
gradient algorithm, the E - stability condition for the unique rational expectations
equilibrium of this model is given by α < 1. In other words, this means that in
this model the analysis of E - stability leads to exactly the same conclusions as the
direct analysis of the speciﬁc recursive algorithm through stochastic approximation.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) argue that for least squares learning this equivalence
holds more generally whenever the recursive least squares algorithm satisﬁes the
assumptions made in section 3.3.2. If these assumptions were violated, the stability
of the real time learning rule could not be analysed through its associated diﬀer-
ential equation. Nevertheless, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) argue that even then
the conditions for E - stability determine the stability of a rational expectations
equilibrium under least squares learning. They base this conclusion on numerical
simulations for a univariate linear expectations model. However, they also indicate
that the correspondence between E - stability conditions and the conditions for sta-
bility of a rational expectations equilibrium obtained from a direct analysis of the
stochastic recursive algorithm need not be identical for all possible learning rules.
More precisely, they indicate that although Evans and Honkapohja (1998b) found
that in the (multivariate) Cobweb model, E - stability of a rational expectations
equilibrium is equivalent to its stability under the stochastic gradient algorithm, it
might in some models be the case that these two stability concepts lead to diﬀerent
conclusions.
3.4.2. Weak vs. Strong E - Stability
As Evans (1989) points out, the concept of E - stability discussed so far depends
strongly on the assumptions made on the perceived law of motion. In particular, it
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has so far always been assumed that agents can correctly specify the functional form
of a rational expectations equilibrium, but need to estimate the relevant parameters
of the model describing their economy.
Another possible assumption would be that agents believe in the inﬂuence of some
variables on the economic outcome which however do not aﬀect the rational expecta-
tions equilibrium under consideration. If a rational expectations equilibrium is also
expectationally stable under such overparametrized perceived laws of motion, it is
referred to as strongly E - stable, whereas it is referred to as weakly E - stable if it
is only expectationally stable under a correctly speciﬁed perceived law of motion.43
The importance of this distinction is stressed by Evans (1985) who argues that
since the initial perceptions of agents about the economic relationships constitute
a random element, only strongly E - stable rational expectations equilibria can be
expected to be persistently observed in reality, whereas weakly E - stable equilibria
should only be observed under special circumstances. Therefore, it is indeed neces-
sary to distinguish these two concepts. In the following I will use univariate linear
expectations models to illustrate the diﬀerent conclusions obtained through a focus
on weak and strong E - stability conditions.
Univariate linear expectations models constitute a prominent framework for the
analysis of the strong E - stability of rational expectations equilibria since if the
reduced form equation determining the evolution of the economic variable of inter-
est depends on expected future realizations of this variable, these models allow for
multiple equilibria which might all be weakly E - stable, i.e. E - stable under a
perceived law of motion coinciding with the functional form of the considered equi-
librium. Therefore, it would not be possible to select a unique rational expectations
equilibrium as a plausible long run outcome in an economy based on the analysis of
weak E - stability discussed so far. Moreover, because of this feature, these models
can also be used to analyse whether expectations will converge to a certain rational
expectations equilibrium although agents' perceived law of motion coincides with
the functional form of a diﬀerent rational expectations equilibrium.
Furthermore, rational expectations equilibria in these models are given by ARMA
processes which makes it indeed plausible that agents who have to decide on an
econometric model based on past observations might misspecify the correct order of
43Clearly, also the direct analysis of stochastic recursive algorithms through stochastic approxi-
mation depends n the perceived law of motion. Therefore, I will use the terms weakly stable
and strongly stable in later sections if the analysis is based on stochastic approximation rather
than on the analysis of E - stability.
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these ARMA processes.44
In order to analyse the diﬀerences between weak and strong E - stability, consider
the following reduced form equation for yt, the economic variable of interest, as done
in Evans and Honkapohja (2001):45
yt = α+ β0y
e
t + β1y
e
t+1 + νt (27)
where νt is the realization of a random variable with mean zero, and where yet and
yet+1 denote the (subjective) expectations formed in period t− 1 about yt and yt+1,
respectively.
Evans (1985) shows that all rational expectations equilibria of this reduced form are
ARMA(1,1) processes46, meaning that they can be expressed as yt = a + byt−1 +
cνt−1 + νt. Since in a rational expectations equilibrium yet and y
e
t+1 correspond to
the mathematical expectations of yt and yt+1, they are given by a+byt−1+cνt−1 and
a (1 + b)+b2yt−1+bcνt−1, respectively. Inserting these expectations into the reduced
form equation shows that the price generating process in a rational expectations
equilibrium is given by:
yt = α+ β0a+ β1a (1 + b) + b (β0 + β1b) yt−1 + (β0c+ β1bc) νt−1 + νt
Comparing the coeﬃcients of this process with the postulated ARMA(1,1) process
then shows that there exist two classes of rational expectations equilibria:
For the ﬁrst one a is given by α (1− β0 − β1)−1 and b and c are zero. This rational
expectations equilibrium is often referred to as the minimal state variable solution
since it depends only on a constant and thus on the smallest set of state variables.47
44In the Cobweb model, which also belongs to the class of univariate linear expectations models,
it might be argued that agents know from experience and by good judgement which variables
aﬀect supply.
45As Evans and Honkapohja (2001) point out, examples of macroeconomic models leading to this
reduced form equation are the real balance model of Taylor (1977) and the "ad hoc" model
of Sargent and Wallace (1975) in which yt denotes the logarithm of the price level. Also note
that if β1 were set to zero, this reduced form equation would coincide with the reduced form
equation of the univariate Cobweb model discussed above.
46Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that there also exist sunspot equilibria which depend on
some variables in the information set of agents which are not correlated with yt. However for
the moment I will concentrate on non - sunspot equilibria in order to avoid confusion with
sunspot equilibria represented by Markov processes as they were discussed in the overlapping
generations model of section 2.
47As indicated by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), it is necessary to employ a subsidiary criterion
in order to select a unique minimal state variable solution in cases in which there exist more
than one solution which depend on the smallest set of state variables.
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The rational expectations equilibria diﬀerent from the minimal state variable so-
lution are usually referred to as bubble solutions.48 In the model considered here,
these are given by a continuum of equilibria for which a is given by −αβ−11 , b is
given by (1− β0) β−11 and c is arbitrary.
However, it is often argued that the minimal state variable solution is the most plau-
sible rational expectations equilibrium since all other solutions depend on variables
which only aﬀect the equilibrium because they are expected to do so (in the model
considered here, these variables are yt−1 and νt−1). However, as Evans (1985) points
out, it is not clear how this argument based on simplicity can actually be enforced
by economic mechanisms. Therefore, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and others ﬁll
this gap by showing that in many situations the minimal state variable solution is
indeed the unique strongly E - stable rational expectations equilibrium.
In order to see this, consider however ﬁrst the weak E - stability of the minimal
state variable solution. Therefore, it is assumed that agents' perceived law of mo-
tion coincides with the functional form of this rational expectations equilibrium,
meaning that it is given by yt = a+νt. This implies that agents' expectations about
both yt and yt+1 are given by the constant a and that thus the implied actual law
of motion can be expressed as yt = α + (β0 + β1) a + νt. Hence, the mapping from
the coeﬃcients of the perceived law of motion to the coeﬃcients of the actual law
of motion is given by T (a) = α + (β0 + β1) a. Accordingly, weak E - stability of
the minimal state variable solution is determined through the following diﬀerential
equation:
da
dτ
= α+ (β0 + β1) a− a
From this, it can be seen that the minimal state variable solution is a locally asymp-
totically stable steady state of this diﬀerential equation and thus weakly E - stable
if β0 + β1 < 1.
In order to analyse the strong E - stability of this solution, it is taken into ac-
count that agents' perceived law of motion might be given by an ARMA process of
arbitrary order, meaning that the perceived law of motion for yt is given by:
yt = a+
s∑
i=1
biyt−i +
r∑
i=1
ciνt−i + νt (28)
48See for example Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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which implies that agents' subjective expectations based on these perceptions are
given by:
yet = a+
s∑
i=1
biyt−i +
r∑
i=1
ciνt−i
and accordingly by:
yet+1 = a+ b1y
e
t +
s∑
i=2
biyt+1−i +
r∑
i=2
ciνt+1−i
Inserting these expectations into the reduced form equation for yt shows that the
implied actual law of motion is given by the following process:
yt = α+ (β0 + β1 + β1b1) a+
s−1∑
i=1
[(β0 + β1b1) bi + β1bi+1] yt−i + (β0 + β1b1) bsyt−s +
+
r−1∑
i=1
[(β0 + β1b1) ci + β1ci+1] νt−i + (β0 + β1b1) crνt−r + νt
which results in the following non-linear system of ordinary diﬀerential equations
based on the mapping from the perceived to the implied actual law of motion for yt:
da
dτ
= α+ (β0 + β1 + β1b1) a− a
dbi
dτ
= (β0 + β1b1) bi + β1bi+1 − bi ∀i = 1, . . . , s− 1
dbs
dτ
= (β0 + β1b1) bs − bs
dci
dτ
= (β0 + β1b1) ci + β1ci+1 − ci ∀i = 1, . . . , r − 1
dcr
dτ
= (β0 + β1b1) cr − cr
The minimal state variable solution still constitutes a steady state of this larger
system of diﬀerential equations and can be expressed as a∗ = α (1− β0 − β1)−1,
b∗1 = . . . = b
∗
s = 0 and c
∗
1 = . . . = c
∗
r = 0. Stability of this steady state under the
dynamics of this larger system of diﬀerential equations and therefore also strong E -
stability of the minimal state variable solution can be analysed by linearising these
diﬀerential equations about this steady state:
Since the diﬀerential equations for b1, . . . , bs constitute an independent subsystem,
they can be analysed separately by linearising these diﬀerential equations about
b∗1 = . . . = b
∗
s = 0, which corresponds the rational expectations equilibrium under
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consideration. Denoting the vector (b1 − b∗1, . . . , bs − b∗s)′ as
(
b1, . . . , bs
)′
=: b, this
linearisation can be obtained as:
dbi
dτ
= β1b
∗
i b1 + (β0 + β1b
∗
1 − 1) bi + β1bi+1 ∀i = 1, . . . , s− 1 (29)
dbs
dτ
= β1b
∗
sb1 + (β0 + β1b
∗
1 − 1) bs (30)
Inserting b∗1 = . . . = b
∗
s = 0 and rewriting the linearised system of diﬀerential
equations in matrix notation yields:
db
dτ
=

β0 − 1 β1 0 . . . 0
0 β0 − 1 . . . . . . ...
...
. . . . . . 0
...
. . . β1
0 . . . . . . 0 β0 − 1

b
From this formulation of the linearised system of diﬀerential equations it is apparent
that all eigenvalues of the coeﬃcient matrix are given by β0 − 1 implying that one
condition for the strong E - stability of the minimal state variable solution is given
by β0 < 1.
Furthermore, the linearisation of the diﬀerential equation for a is given by:
da
dτ
= (β0 + β1 + β1b
∗
1 − 1) a+ β1a∗b1
where, as above, a is deﬁned as a − a∗, and where a∗ is given by the value corre-
sponding to the minimal state variable solution.
Since for β0 < 1 b1 converges to b∗1 = 0 and thus b1 converges to zero as τ goes
to inﬁnity, the term β1a∗b1 vanishes asymptotically. Therefore, the minimal state
variable solution a∗ = α (1− β0 − β1)−1 is locally asymptotically stable under the
diﬀerential equation stated above if β0 + β1 < 1.
Similarly, the subsystem of diﬀerential equations for c1, . . . , cr can be analysed
through the following linearised system of diﬀerential equations:
dci
dτ
= β1c
∗
i b1 + (β0 + β1b
∗
1 − 1) ci + β1ci+1 ∀i = 1, . . . , r − 1
dcr
dτ
= β1c
∗
rb1 + (β0 + β1b
∗
1 − 1) cr
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where, as above, ci is deﬁned as ci − c∗i , and where c∗i is given by the level corre-
sponding to the minimal state variable solution, i.e. by c∗1 = . . . = c
∗
r = 0. As argued
above, β1c∗1b1 and β1c
∗
rb1 vanish asymptotically if β0 < 1 implying that asymptoti-
cally the only diﬀerence between the coeﬃcient matrix of this linearised system and
that of the linearisation of the diﬀerential equations for b1, . . . , bs is the dimension
of the matrix. Hence, also the last r eigenvalues must all be equal to β0 − 1 and
correspondingly no new requirements for the strong E - stability of the minimal
state variable solution are necessary.
To summarize, it has been shown that if β0 + β1 < 1 is fulﬁlled, the minimal state
variable solution of the simple univariate linear expectations model under consid-
eration is weakly E - stable, whereas if additionally β0 < 1 were satisﬁed, it would
also be strongly E - stable and thus robust with respect to overparametrizations of
the perceived law of motion. Especially, it would hold that even if agents tried to
estimate a law of motion consistent with the so called bubble solutions, expectations
would eventually converge to the minimal state variable solution.
However, it could still be possible that under diﬀerent parameter constellations
the bubble solutions were weakly or even strongly E - stable. Therefore, consider
ﬁrst a perceived law of motion coinciding with the functional form of the set of
bubble solutions, i.e. yt = a + byt−1 + cνt−1 + νt. As already indicated above,
this perceived law of motion leads to the expectations yet = a + byt−1 + cνt−1 and
yet+1 = a (1 + b)+ b
2yt−1+ bcνt−1 and accordingly to the following implied actual law
of motion:
yt = α+ β0a+ β1a (1 + b) + b (β0 + β1b) yt−1 + (β0c+ β1bc) νt−1 + νt
Therefore, the mapping from the coeﬃcients of the perceived law of motion to the
coeﬃcients of the actual law of motion can be expressed as:
T

ab
c

 =
α+ β0a+ β1a (1 + b)b (β0 + β1b)
(β0 + β1b) c

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Hence, the linearisation of the resulting non-linear system of diﬀerential equations
about the set of bubble solutions can be written as:
d
dτ
ab
c
 =
β0 + β1 (1 + b
∗)− 1 β1a∗ 0
0 β0 + 2β1b
∗ − 1 0
0 β1c
∗ β0 + β1b∗ − 1

ab
c

where the notation is as above, but where a∗ is now given by −αβ−11 , b∗ is given by
(1− β0) β−11 and c∗ is arbitrary.
As before, the weak E -stability of the set of bubble solutions is determined through
the sign of the eigenvalues of the coeﬃcient matrix of this linearised system, which
are given by β0 + β1 (1 + b∗) − 1, β0 + 2β1b∗ − 1 and β0 + β1b∗ − 1. Therefore, the
set of bubble solutions is weakly E -stable if β1 < 0 and if 1 − β0 < 0. Techni-
cally, the third eigenvalue corresponding to the diﬀerential equation for c is zero.
However, following Evans and Honkapohja (1992), this diﬀerential equation can be
solved explicitly in order to show that whenever b converges to b∗, which is the case
if 1− β0 < 0 as could already be seen from the linearisation, c must also converge.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) note however that the value to which c converges
will depend on the initial conditions. This means that if the economy is initially at
a rational expectations equilibrium corresponding to one particular member of the
set of bubble solutions and that due to some shock expectations about a, b and c
suddenly deviate from their rational expectations levels, they will again converge
to a member of the set of bubble solutions, but they need not necessarily converge
to the initial equilibrium. This point was also made by Evans (1985) who however
used a diﬀerent stability concept for his analysis.
The analysis of strong E - stability of the set of bubble solution is technically more
demanding: As for the minimal state variable solution, the overparametrized per-
ceived law of motion is assumed to be given by (28). Therefore, the system of
ordinary diﬀerential equations is not aﬀected. However, if b∗1 = (1− β0) β−11 and
b∗2 = . . . = b
∗
s = 0, i.e. the values for b1, . . . , bs corresponding to the set of bubble
solutions, are inserted into the linearised subsystem (29) - (30), it is given by:
db
dτ
=

1− β0 β1 0 . . . 0
0 0
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 0
...
. . . β1
0 . . . . . . 0 0

b
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From this, it can easily be seen that s − 1 eigenvalues of the coeﬃcient matrix are
equal to zero, meaning that it is not possible to decide on the stability of the steady
state under consideration based on this linearisation. However, Evans and Honkapo-
hja (1992) show in a similar model that by employing the centre manifold technique
it follows that the set of bubble solution cannot be stable under the diﬀerential
equation considered here and that thus it can never be strongly E - stable. There-
fore, although bubble solutions might sometimes be observed, it is more realistic to
expect to observe the minimal state variable solution or to observe divergence of the
estimates.
Clearly, this result is however only valid for models of the speciﬁc form discussed
here. There are indeed more general univariate linear expectations models, as for ex-
ample the model considered by Evans and Honkapohja (1992) which also allows for
a direct dependence of yt on yt−1.49 However, the main conclusions obtained from an
analysis of this model do not change compared to the model considered here. Also
in this more general model, the set of bubble solutions can under certain circum-
stances be weakly E - stable, but can never be strongly E - stable. One diﬀerence
to the model discussed here is however that the more general model allows for two
rational expectations equilibria which both depend on a minimum set of explanatory
variables. Evans and Honkapohja (1992) show that either one of these solutions can
be strongly E - stable. In particular they argue that also the equilibrium which is
not selected by a subsidiary criterion as the minimal state variable solution can be
strongly E - stable, thus contradicting the opinion that the minimal state variable
solution is in each case the most plausible rational expectations equilibrium.
Finally, it should be noted that the models discussed in this section also illustrate
the advantage of using E - stability conditions compared to the direct analysis of
the learning algorithm through stochastic approximation. As Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001) point out, the techniques discussed in section 3.3 cannot be applied in
cases in which there is a continuum of rational expectations equilibria, as for ex-
ample the set of bubble solutions in the model considered here. However, based on
simulations they argue that even in this case E - stability seems to determine the
circumstances under which recursive least squares learning converges to a certain
rational expectations equilibrium. Hence, it becomes clear that since the analysis of
E - stability does not rely on any assumptions it can be even applied in situations
in which stochastic approximation fails and that it will even in these cases yield the
49As Evans and Honkapohja (2001) point out, one example for a macroeconomic model which is
of this form is the overlapping contract model of Taylor in which it is assumed that each period
one part of the ﬁrms in the economy set their wages for the two consecutive periods.
84
correct conclusions concerning the qualitative behaviour of recursive least squares
algorithms.
After illustrating the analysis of various adaptive learning algorithms in rather sim-
pliﬁed models, I will now return to the more complicated overlapping generations
model discussed in section 2 and address whether sunspot equilibria can actually be
realistic economic outcomes.
4. The Stability of Sunspot Equilibria under
Adaptive Learning Rules
4.1. Possible Speciﬁcations of the Learning Process
With the methods introduced in the previous sections, it is ﬁnally possible to analyse
whether stationary sunspot equilibria can actually be expected to be observed as
long run phenomena in an economy. As explained above, this requires to take into
account that in the short run agents will not be able to form rational expectations
as has been assumed in section 2.2. Instead they must base their labour supply
decision on their subjective expectations about the utility they will receive from
their old - age consumption. This means that agents who are young in period t try
to choose their labour supply such that it solves the following problem corresponding
to (4), but where the mathematical expectations operator has been replaced by the
subjective expectations:
max
nt
ue
(
pt
pt+1
nt
)
− v (nt)
In other words, this means that when agents try to decide on their labour supply
in period t, they would like to base this decision on the utility obtained through
old - age consumption implied by the real wage Rt =
pt
pt+1
. But since neither pt+1
nor pt (which through market clearing depends on the labour supply decision made
by agents in period t) are known at the time agents have to decide on their labour
supply in period t, agents need to ﬁnd a way in which they can still decide optimally
given this lack of knowledge.
In particular, there are two possible and equally plausible descriptions of how agents
decide on their labour supply when faced with uncertainty regarding their real wage:
The ﬁrst possibility introduced by Woodford (1990) is based on the Robbins - Monro
algorithm which has been discussed in section 3.2.2. Woodford (1990) basically as-
sumes that agents believe that each new observation of the real wage is drawn from
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a certain, but unknown distribution function, meaning that they cannot explicitly
calculate the labour supply maximizing their subjectively expected lifetime utility.
Instead, Woodford assumes that the labour supply choice of agents who are young in
period t−1 results in an observation on the marginal utility which could be obtained
by increasing this labour supply. This observation can then be used by agents who
are young in period t to improve the labour supply choice of their predecessors. In
other words, agents do not estimate prices or labour supplies in order to obtain an
estimate for the real wages they could possibly face and accordingly also subjective
expectations about u
(
pt
pt+1
nt
)
, the utility obtained through old - age consumption,
as assumed in the speciﬁcation which will be discussed next, but they rather use
past observations on the real wage and on labour supplies in order to adjust the
labour supply of their predecessors gradually toward the level maximizing their sub-
jectively expected utility.
Another approach discussed by Evans and Honkapohja (2003) and implicitly as-
sumed by Evans (1989) is probably more intuitive: They assume that agents who
are young in any period t − 1 simply estimate the possible real wages they could
face during their lifetime and, together with the probability attributed to each of
these possible outcomes, obtain a subjective expectation about the utility they will
receive from their old - age consumption. Therefore, they can then decide optimally
on their labour supply in period t − 1 given these subjective expectations. This
observed decision can then be used by agents born in period t in order to update
the forecast for the possible real wages they could face.
The diﬀerence between these two approaches is thus clear: While in Woodford's set-
ting agents do not act optimally during the transition to the equilibrium, but rather
try to ﬁnd the optimum by numerical considerations, agents in the latter setting also
act optimally during the learning process given the subjective expectations about
their lifetime utility.
Both speciﬁcations have advantages and disadvantages, depending on the partic-
ular question which should be analysed. For example, the speciﬁcation of Woodford
(1990) results in a very simple associated diﬀerential equation which for the case of
a two - state sunspot process immediately allows to establish a direct link between
the suﬃcient condition for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria noted in
Theorem 5 and their stability under the dynamics of adaptive learning algorithms.
However, it does not allow to draw conclusions for the stability of sunspot equilibria
whenever the extrinsic sunspot process describing the state of nature has more than
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two states.50 Another disadvantage of Woodford's formulation is that even in the
case of two - state sunspot processes it is only possible to show convergence to some
sunspot equilibrium and that it is not possible to obtain more precise information
like the location of this equilibrium. This problem can however be solved partly by
focusing on the local stability of certain sunspot equilibria, as already indicated by
Woodford (1990).
By contrast, the approach of Evans and Honkapohja (2003) which is based on least
squares learning and thus on the E - stability of sunspot equilibria also allows to
investigate the circumstances under which expectationally stable sunspot equilibria
exist arbitrarily close to the monetary steady state. Unfortunately, in order to use
this approach it is necessary to specify a particular form for the utility function
since for the analysis of the learning algorithm it is necessary to explicitly solve
agents' utility maximization problem. Therefore, it was for example pointed out
by Woodford (1990) that the results on strong expectational stability obtained by
Evans (1989) strongly depend on the particular utility function which has been as-
sumed.
In order to address all the issues brought up so far, it is however necessary to for-
mally deﬁne both possible speciﬁcations of agents' learning algorithms. After that,
I will proceed by addressing the more general question raised by Woodford (1990).
After that I will move on to discuss the results obtained by Evans (1989) and Evans
and Honkapohja (2003) for a particular class of utility functions.
4.1.1. The Robbins - Monro Algorithm in an OLG Model
In order to motivate his analysis, Woodford (1990) considers the basic overlapping
generations model discussed in section 2, but augmented by random preferences
shocks. More precisely, Woodford assumes that the utility of a representative agent
born in period t is given by u (ct+1) − v (nt) + ntνt, where νt captures the random
disturbance to preferences which can only be observed by agents after they have
decided on their labour supply in period t and which is assumed to be a realization
of a random variable with mean zero and bounded support. Therefore, as already
pointed out in section 3.1.1, this modiﬁcation to the basic model discussed in section
2 has no eﬀect on the analysis of sunspot equilibria under the assumption of rational
expectations, meaning that all results discussed in section 2 remain valid.
However, Woodford (1990) notes that this modiﬁcation can actually justify the
50More precisely, in this situation conclusions are only possible in special cases which will be
discussed in a later section.
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assumption of agents believing in an inﬂuence of the extrinsic sunspot process on
economic outcomes: He motivates this with the fact that at the beginning of time
it will not be obvious to agents that the disturbances have mean zero. Instead,
agents who try to learn the characteristics of the distribution of these disturbances
adaptively from past observations will alter their estimates for the mean of the
disturbances each period which (given the real wage) will result in changes of their
optimal behaviour. Moreover, Woodford argues that these ﬂuctuations in agents'
labour supply will show a weak and accidental sample correlation with the observed
sunspot process which might be enough for agents to believe that the extrinsic
sunspot variable is responsible for the observed ﬂuctuations in economic outcomes.51
More precisely, he argues that agents will believe that the distribution function of
the disturbances and thus also of the real wage depends on the observed state of
nature. Therefore, under this hypothesis, the optimal labour supply in any period
t in which state i is observed is given by the following expression corresponding
to the solution of (4), where preference shocks are taken into account and where
the expectation is calculated according to the subjective belief that Rt and νt are
distributed according to some unknown function Gi:
ni = argmax
nt
∫
[u (Rtnt)− v (nt) + νtnt] dGi (Rt, νt)
where Rt is the market clearing real wage
nt+1
nt
, and where Gi denotes the unknown
common distribution function of the real wage and the disturbances when the current
state of nature is i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Thus, ni, the optimal labour supply of an agent
born in period t associated with state i52, has to fulﬁl the ﬁrst order condition:∫
[Rtu
′ (Rtni)− v′ (ni) + νt] dGi (Rt, νt) = 0
which simply says that if labour supply is chosen optimally, the expected marginal
utility from increasing it must be zero.
However, since agents do not know the distribution function Gi, it is impossible
for them to solve this ﬁrst order condition analytically for ni. Instead, Woodford
51As Woodford notes, it would be enough if some inﬂuential media broadcast an accidental but
striking relationship between economic outcomes and the extrinsic process for this belief to
arise among agents.
52Note that since the market clearing real wage has already been inserted into the optimization
problem, ni denotes, as in section 2.3, the labour supply in the market equilibrium and not
just the optimal labour supply function. However, for brevity I will in the following only use
the term optimal labour supply for ni.
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(1990) assumes that each period agents revise their estimate or approximation for the
optimal labour supply in any state of nature using the Robbins - Monro algorithm
discussed in section 3.2.2 and hence solve the problem of ﬁnding their optimal labour
supply numerically. That is, if in period t− 1 state i has been observed, agents use
the corresponding observed marginal utility in order to update their estimate for
ni in period t. The estimates for the optimal labour supply in the other states of
nature are left unchanged since no new observation from the distribution of the real
wage depending on this state of nature which could be used to improve the estimate
has been made from period t−1 to period t. Finally, if the state of nature in period
t is i, agents choose the estimate for ni which has been formed in period t as their
labour supply.
Since the Robbins - Monro algorithm is designed to ﬁnd the (global) minimum
of a function, it is necessary to rewrite the maximization problem of agents as a
minimization problem, i.e. as:
ni = argmin
nt
∫
− [u (Rtnt)− v (nt) + νtnt] dGi (Rt, νt)
which in turn results in the ﬁrst order condition:∫
− [Rtu′ (Rtni)− v′ (ni) + νt] dGi (Rt, νt) = 0 (31)
where, in the notation from section 3.2.2, θ∗ is given by (n1, . . . , nk)
′, the integral∫ − [Rtu′ (Rtni)− v′ (ni) + νt] dGi (Rt, νt) corresponds to M (θ∗), and where α = 0.
Denoting the estimate for ni made at time t − 1 as nˆit−1, the Robbins - Monro
algorithm (22) for this problem is given by:
nˆit = nˆit−1+1{St−1=i}
h
Mit
[0 +Rt−1u′ (Rt−1nˆit−1)− v′ (nˆit−1) + νt−1] ∀i = 1, . . . , k
where Mit denotes the number of times state i has been observed up to period
t and h is a positive constant determining the rate of adaption of the estimates
to newly observed data.53. Furthermore, 1{St−1=i} denotes the indicator function
which is needed to describe that the last observation on the marginal utility is only
taken into account for the estimate of optimal labour supply associated with the
particular state of nature which has been observed in period t − 1. Formally, the
53In other words, the term hMit replaces the gain parameter γt =
1
t used throughout section 3.
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indicator function is deﬁned as:
1{St−1=i} =
1 if St−1 = i0 otherwise
Unfortunately, there are however several problems with the learning algorithm for-
mulated above:
As already discussed in section 3.2.2, this estimation technique for ni would be con-
sistent provided that Rt−1u′ (Rt−1nˆit−1) − v′ (nˆit−1) + νt−1, the observation on the
direction of steepest decent made in period t − 1, is unbiased for the direction of
steepest decent of the subjectively expected lifetime utility of an agent born in pe-
riod t, conditional on the estimated parameters, that is on Rt−1 and nˆit−1. Since
however, due to the learning process, these estimates change from one period to
the next this observation from period t − 1 is a biased estimator for the expected
direction of steepest descent in period t. In other words, agents on average ad-
just their estimates in the "wrong" way, that is in a direction which does not most
rapidly decrease the value of the objective function. However, as discussed earlier,
the learning process is still reasonable since in a given rational expectations equi-
librium the parameter estimates do not change and thus the observed direction of
steepest decent in one period is of course an unbiased estimator for the expected
direction of steepest decent in any other period. Therefore, the circumstances un-
der which such a rational expectations equilibrium can be attained by this learning
algorithm despite the misspeciﬁcation during the learning process must be analysed
using stochastic approximation.
Another complication for the analysis, although it is not apparent from the formu-
lation of the learning algorithm given above, is that in certain cases a problem of
simultaneity will arise. To see this, note that the real wage agents born in period
t − 1 face can be expressed as Rt−1 = ntnt−1 . Thus, if state i is observed both in
period t− 1 and in period t, Rt−1 not only determines nˆit, but also depends on this
estimate since agents will choose it as their actual labour supply nt in period t. In
order to solve this problem which would complicate the analysis, Woodford (1990)
does not use the correct value for Rt−1 in his analysis, but rather assumes that not
the latest estimates for the labour supply enter the real wage. More precisely, he
assumes that the real wage in the learning rule of agents is given by:
Rt−1 =
∑k
j=1 1{St=j}nˆjt−1∑k
j=1 1{St−1=j}nˆjt−2
(32)
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In other words, if in period t − 1 state i and in period t state l are observed, the
real wage agents born in period t − 1 would face is not as usually calculated by
Rt−1 = ntnt−1 =
nˆlt
nˆit−1
, but instead estimates for nl and ni which are one period older
are used for the analysis of the learning algorithm. If the states of nature changed
from one period to the next and thus the problem of simultaneity did not arise,
there would be no diﬀerence to the correct form of the real wage since then also
the estimate for nl could not be updated from period t to period t − 1. If however
the states of nature did not change from period t to period t − 1, the problem of
simultaneity between nˆjt and Rt−1 would be solved. Moreover, since the estimates
converge, there is no big diﬀerence between the correct form and the simpliﬁcation
for t suﬃciently large. Since it will anyhow be necessary to analyse the recursive
algorithm in terms of an associated diﬀerential equation which only approximates
the learning algorithm for large points in time, this simpliﬁcation can therefore not
aﬀect the results concerning the qualitative behaviour of the learning rule.
Another problem for the analysis of this learning algorithm is that Mit, the number
of times state i has been observed until period t, depends on the whole history of
the sunspot process. Thus, the learning algorithm stated above is clearly not in the
general form of a stochastic recursive algorithm which could be analysed using the
techniques introduced in section 3.3. In order to solve this problem it is necessary
to determine a recursion for Mit. Therefore, it is convenient to rewrite this quantity
as tqit, where qit denotes the proportion of periods up to t in which sunspot state i
has been observed, which will also make the formulation of the learning algorithm
in the general form of a stochastic recursive algorithm possible. Multiplying this
fraction by the total number of periods up to t clearly results in the total number of
times state i has been observed. Nevertheless, also qit depends on the entire history
of the sunspot process. However, it is possible to determine the following recursion
for qit, as done in Woodford (1990):
qit :=
Mit
t
=
Mit−1 + 1{St=i}
t
=
tMit−1 −Mit−1
t (t− 1) +
1
t
1{St=i}
=
Mit−1
t− 1 +
1
t
(
1{St=i} −
Mit−1
t− 1
)
= qit−1 +
1
t
(
1{St=i} − qit−1
)
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where it has been used that the number of times state i has been observed up to
period t can be decomposed into the number of times state i has been observed up
to period t − 1 and an indicator describing whether state i has also been observed
in period t.
Thus, the recursive learning algorithm for agents using the Robbins - Monro al-
gorithm in order to ﬁnd the labour supply maximizing their subjectively expected
utility numerically is given by:
nˆit = nˆit−1 +
h
t
q−1it 1{St−1=i} [Rt−1u
′ (Rt−1nˆit−1)− v′ (nˆit−1) + νt−1] ∀i = 1, . . . , k
qit = qit−1 +
1
t
(
1{St=i} − qit−1
) ∀i = 1, . . . , k
Another problem which becomes apparent from this formulation of the algorithm,
is that qit, which is determined in period t, inﬂuences the estimate for ni made
in period t. Since such a simultaneity has been ruled out by the general form of
a stochastic recursive algorithm described in section 3.2.4, it is necessary to alter
the algorithm slightly in order to make the approximation through an associated
diﬀerential equation possible. Therefore, Woodford (1990) argues that for t large qit
and qit−1 are approximately equal, meaning that it is possible to replace qit by qit−1
in the recursive equation for the labour supply without aﬀecting the results of the
qualitative analysis of the associated diﬀerential equation.
Furthermore, Woodford (1990) assumes that although agents misspecify the model
during their learning process in the sense that they believe in a unique optimum,
they nevertheless believe that this optimal labour supply lies within the compact set
[n, n]k, for which it has been shown in section 2.5 that it indeed contains all rational
expectations equilibria of the model except the autarchy equilibrium. Thus, no
possible rational expectations equilibrium is ruled out per se as the outcome of the
learning algorithm by this assumption54, but it will ensure that Theorem 7 can be
used in order to analyse the stability of rational expectations equilibria under the
dynamics of this adaptive learning process.
Hence, when the estimate for the labour supply associated with state i formed in
period t lies within the compact set [n, n], the stochastic recursive algorithm can
54The autarchy steady state which is ruled out by this assumption cannot be stable under adaptive
learning, as will be shown further below.
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ﬁnally be written as:
nˆit = nˆit−1 +
h
t
q−1it−11{St−1=i} [Rt−1u
′ (Rt−1nˆit−1)− v′ (nˆit−1) + νt−1] (33)
qit = qit−1 +
1
t
(
1{St=i} − qit−1
)
(34)
where Rt−1 is deﬁned as in (32). Whereas if the estimate for the labour supply
calculated according to this algorithm lies outside this set, equation (33) is replaced
by:
nˆit =
n if nˆ
alg
it < n
n if nˆalgit > n
(35)
where nˆalgit denotes the estimate calculated according to the recursive algorithm (33)
- (34).
Before answering the question whether there exist circumstances under which ex-
trinsic uncertainty has an eﬀect on the economy although agents try to ﬁnd their
optimal labour supply numerically through this algorithm, I will ﬁrst discuss the
second possible speciﬁcation of agents' learning behaviour in greater detail.
4.1.2. Recursive Least Squares Learning in an OLG Model
In order to analyse the implications of the assumption that agents use a recursive
least squares algorithm to form their expectations, Evans and Honkapohja (2003)
assume that agents believe in a perfect correlation between the sunspot process and
economic outcomes. It is however assumed that despite this inﬂuence agents do not
believe in the dependence of prices on any other variable. Hence, in period t agents
will estimate prices associated with state i as the average price in periods in which
state i has been observed. In order to avoid simultaneity, it is assumed that in
doing so agents only use observations on prices until period t− 1. This is necessary
since the price in period t will be determined through goods market clearing after
agents have decided on their optimal labour supply which however depends on the
expectations about prices formed in period t.
Moreover, the speciﬁcation of Evans and Honkapohja (2003) diﬀers from Wood-
ford's (1990) assumptions in the sense that Evans and Honkapohja assume that the
random disturbances do not enter the utility function, but that these shocks enter
directly the learning rule of agents in the sense that the data available to agents is
subject to a random measurement error. Evans and Honkapohja argue further that
these disturbances are only necessary in order to make an analysis of the learning
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algorithm, as discussed in section 3.3, possible.55
Since markets are assumed to clear in all periods, meaning that there is a one-to-
one relationship between prices and labour supply, it is also possible to express the
learning algorithm agents use in order to form expectations about their potential
real wages not in terms of prices, but in terms of labour supplies. Thus, agents'
expectations about labour supply in any state of nature i are given by the ordinary
least squares estimate for ni in the following regression equation:
nt = ni if St = i
In period t agents can thus use (t− 1) qit−1 observations on labour supplies from
periods in which sunspot state i has been observed, where the fraction qit−1 is
deﬁned as above. Therefore, the recursive least squares estimates (20) - (21) are in
this case given by:
nˆit = nˆit−1 +
1
t− 11{St−1=i}q
−1
it−1 (nt−1 + νt−1 − nˆit−1) (36)
where it is assumed that instead of the correct data on the realized labour supply
nt−1, agents only have access to noisy data, meaning that they only observe nt−1 +
νt−1, where the νt's are assumed to be realizations of random variables which are
identically and independently distributed over time and have mean zero and bounded
support.
Note that in this case
(∑t
i=1 x
′
ixi
)−1
is simply given by t−1 since the only explanatory
variable used by agents is equal to the number one. Thus, it is not necessary to
provide a recursion for Rt, as done for the Cobweb model analysed in the previous
sections.
Given these estimate for i = 1, . . . , k and the belief that economic outcomes are
perfectly correlated with the extrinsic sunspot process, the subjective expectation
agents born in any period t in which state i is observed have about the utility
obtained through old - age consumption is given by:
ue (ct+1) = u
e
(
pt
pt+1
nt
)
=
k∑
j=1
piiju
(
nˆjt
nˆit
nt
)
(37)
Clearly, since agents have not decided yet on their labour supply in period t, they
cannot use nt for their expectations about the price in period t, but since they
55In particular, they argue that this disturbance term is only necessary for the instability result,
i.e. the contraposition of Theorem 6.
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already know that the state of nature in period t is i, they can simply replace it
by their expectation nˆit and condition their subjective expectations on the state in
period t being i. Since agents do however not know which state of nature will prevail
in period t+ 1, they must also take the corresponding transition probabilities from
state i to any other state of nature into account when forming their expectation
about utility obtained through old - age consumption in period t+ 1.
The actual labour supply in period t, nt, is then chosen such that it maximizes the
subjective expectations about lifetime utility of an agent born in period t. Therefore,
although the learning process described here can in principal be analysed using the
simple E - stability conditions discussed in section 3.4.1, the analysis requires the
knowledge of the result of this maximization problem since otherwise, the learning
algorithm which depends through nt−1 on this solution could not be correctly de-
termined. Hence, it is necessary to specify a precise form for the utility function, as
done for example in Evans (1989). However, this implies that the results obtained
from the analysis of this algorithm strongly depend on this choice and that thus
no general statements are possible if it is assumed that agents in an overlapping
generations model use a recursive least squares algorithm in order to form their ex-
pectations.
Therefore, I will ﬁrst show that if agents use the Robbins - Monro algorithm de-
scribed in the previous section, extrinsic uncertainty has an eﬀect on long run eco-
nomic outcomes whenever stationary sunspot equilibria necessarily exist and when-
ever agents condition their subjective expectations on a two - state sunspot process.
After that, I will discuss the strong E - stability of stationary sunspot equilibria us-
ing the recursive least squares formulation of agents' learning process in an example
given by Evans (1989).
4.2. Weak Stability of Rational Expectations Equilibria in an
OLG Model
This section will analyse the circumstances under which rational expectations equi-
libria of an overlapping generations model with extrinsic uncertainty can be asymp-
totically attained through some adaptive learning algorithm if it is assumed that
agents can correctly specify the number of states which are associated with diﬀerent
behaviour in these equilibria.
As pointed out above, it is convenient to model agents' learning process through the
Robbins - Monro algorithm discussed in section 4.1.1 which can be easily analysed
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using stochastic approximation techniques. However, note that the analysis of the
recursive least squares algorithm discussed above would lead to the same conclusions
as will also be seen in a later section. Moreover, it is only necessary to show that
stationary sunspot equilibria can be attained by some plausible adaptive learning
process in order to demonstrate that they are, at least under certain circumstances,
realistic economic outcomes. Hence, it is for now indeed suﬃcient to concentrate
on the Robbins - Monro algorithm which has already been found to be a plausible
description of agents' learning behaviour.
Therefore, I will ﬁrst discuss the associated diﬀerential equation of this particular
algorithm, before analysing the stability of both the monetary steady state and the
class of stationary two - state sunspot equilibria if agents initially believe that the
extrinsic uncertainty has no eﬀect on the equilibrium outcomes and if they initially
believe that economic outcomes are perfectly correlated with a two - state sunspot
process.
4.2.1. Stochastic Approximation of the Robbins - Monro Algorithm
In order to analyse the Robbins - Monro algorithm discussed in section 4.1.1 using
the techniques introduced in section 3.3, it is necessary to verify that the algorithm
is indeed expressed in the general form for a stochastic recursive algorithm and that
moreover all assumptions stated in section 3.3.2 are satisﬁed.
In order to see that the learning algorithm given by the recursive equations (33)
- (34) is already in the general form (24), note that these equations can also be
expressed as:
nˆit = nˆit−1 +
h
t
q−1it−11{St−1=i} [Rt−1u
′ (Rt−1nˆit−1)− v′ (nˆit−1) + νt−1]
qit = qit−1 +
h
t
h−1
(
1{St=i} − qit−1
)
From this formulation it is obvious that this recursive algorithm is in the gen-
eral form (24), where the vector of estimates θt is given by the 2k × 1 vector
(nˆ1t . . . nˆkt q1t . . . qkt)
′, where the sequence of gain parameters is given by
γt = ht
−1, and where the state variables are given by Rt−1, 1{St=i} for i = 1, . . . , k,
1{St−1=i} for i = 1, . . . , k, and by νt−1. Moreover, it can be seen that the function
H (θt−1, Xt) which is used to update the estimates is given by the following vector
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valued function:
Hnˆ1 (θt−1, Xt)
...
Hnˆk (θt−1, Xt)
Hq1 (θt−1, Xt)
...
Hqk (θt−1, Xt)

=

q−11t 1{St−1=1} [Rt−1u
′ (Rt−1nˆ1t−1)− v′ (nˆ1t−1) + νt−1]
...
q−1kt 1{St−1=k} [Rt−1u
′ (Rt−1nˆkt−1)− v′ (nˆkt−1) + νt−1]
h−1
(
1{St=1} − q1t−1
)
...
h−1
(
1{St=k} − qkt−1
)

where the subscript nˆi refers to the expression which is used to update the labour
supply associated with state i and correspondingly the subscript qi refers to the
expression which is used to update the relative number of times state i has been
observed.
However, in order to apply the results stated in section 3.3.3 to analyse the stability
of rational expectations equilibria under the dynamics of the system of stochastic
diﬀerence equations given by the postulated learning algorithm, it is still necessary
to verify the assumptions made in section 3.3.2.
Therefore, ﬁrst note that it has already been argued above that the gain sequence
γt = t
−1 satisﬁes assumption A.1. Hence, it must still hold that
∑∞
t=1 γt = ∞ and
that
∑∞
t=1 γ
2
t <∞ if this gain sequence is multiplied by a positive (and ﬁnite) con-
stant h, meaning that assumption A.1 is also satisﬁed for the modiﬁed gain sequence
used here.
Moreover, since the utility functions u (·) and v (·) have been assumed to be twice
continuously diﬀerentiable and since the labour supply estimates calculated accord-
ing to the postulated stochastic recursive algorithm are bounded on [n, n], it follows
immediately that H (θ, x) is continuously diﬀerentiable with bounded derivatives
and thus Lipschitz continuous, meaning that assumption A.3 is satisﬁed.
Next, it has to be veriﬁed that the state variables are indeed generated by a process of
the form postulated in assumption B.1. In order to do this, Woodford (1990) decom-
poses the state variable Rt−1, which has been deﬁned by (32) as
Pk
j=1 1{St=h}nˆjt−1Pk
j=1 1{St−1=j}nˆjt−2
,
into the two components n˜t :=
∑k
j=1 1{St=j}nˆjt−1 and n˜t−1 :=
∑k
j=1 1{St−1=j}nˆjt−2
which capture the estimates for labour supply associated with the state of nature
observed in periods t and t−1 made one period earlier. Thus, denoting the vector of
state variables asXt =
(
n˜t n˜t−1 νt−1 1{St=1} . . . 1{St=k} 1{St−1=1} . . . 1{St−1=k}
)′
it can be seen that they follow the following process of the form postulated in as-
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sumption B.1:
Xt =

0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A(θt−1)
Xt−1 +

0 0 nˆt−1
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 Ik 0
0 0 Ik

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=B(θt−1)
et
where et must be chosen as the (2k + 1)×1 vector
(
νt−1
(
1{St=i}
)k
i=1
(
1{St−1=i}
)k
i=1
)′
,
and where accordingly the coeﬃcient matrix B (θt−1) is a (2k + 3)× (2k + 1) matrix
whose entry Ik denotes the k × k identity matrix and whose entry nˆt−1 denotes a
1× k vector whose entries are given by nˆ1t−1, . . . , nˆkt−1.
Although this assumption could be veriﬁed, the particular form of et used in this
argument results in the problem that assumption B.2 is not satisﬁed. In order to see
this, note that the assumption of the et's being realization of random vectors which
are independently distributed over time is clearly violated since by the assumption
of the extrinsic uncertainty being captured by a Markov process the states of nature
in two consecutive periods are correlated implying that also the indicator functions
signalling the state of nature in period t− 1 and period t must be correlated. Nev-
ertheless, Woodford (1990) argues that all results given in section 3.3.3 hold since
other assumptions can be strengthened in the present application.
Moreover, as Woodford argues also the last assumption postulated in section 3.3.2 is
satisﬁed, meaning that it is indeed possible to approximate the stochastic recursive
algorithm (33) - (34) by the following associated diﬀerential equation56:
dθ
dτ
= lim
t→∞
E
[
H
(
θ,X t
)]
=: h (θ)
where, following the heuristic argument presented in section 3.3.1, it is necessary to
ﬁx certain estimates θ = (nˆ1 . . . nˆk q1 . . . qk)
′ and to calculate X t, the state
variables which would be generated by these constant estimates through the law of
motion postulated in assumption B.1, in order to derive this associated diﬀerential
equation.57 As could be seen above the only state variables depending on estimates
56Note that assumption A.2 which has not been discussed is only necessary to guarantee the exis-
tence of the right hand side of this diﬀerential equation. However, as will be seen immediately,
this expression is well deﬁned.
57Recall that in section 3.3.1 it has been argued that for t suﬃciently large the estimates calculated
according to the stochastic recursive algorithm are approximately constant, meaning that the
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are n˜t and thus also n˜t−1, or in other words the real wage Rt−1, which is then given
by:
Rt−1 =
∑k
j=1 1{St=j}nˆj∑k
j=1 1{St−1=j}nˆj
Using this notation, the right hand side of the system of associated ordinary diﬀer-
ential equations is given by:
hnˆi (θ) = lim
t→∞
E
[
q−1i 1{St−1=i}
[∑k
j=1 1{St=j}nˆj
nˆi
u′
(∑k
j=1 1{St=j}nˆj
nˆi
nˆi
)
− v′ (nˆi) + νt−1
]]
hqi (θ) = lim
t→∞
E
[
h−1
(
1{St=i} − qi
)]
where the subscripts of h (θ) have the same interpretation as above, and where it has
been used in the deﬁnition of the real wage that in period t− 1 state i is observed.
Since
∑k
j=1 1{St=j}nˆj is just the labour supply estimate for the particular state of
nature which is observed in period t, it follows that its expected value is given by∑k
j=1 piijnˆj.
58 Moreover, by the deﬁnition of the indicator function, E
[
1{St−1=i}
]
is
given by Prob (St−1 = i), i.e. by the probability of observing state i in period t− 1.
Letting time go to inﬁnity, this probability is given by the fraction of times state i
has been observed. This long run proportion will be denoted as q∗i . Furthermore, it
is assumed that E [νt−1] is zero.
Therefore, it follows that hnˆi (θ) can be written as:
hnˆi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk, q1, . . . , qk) =
q∗i
qi
[
k∑
j=1
piij
nˆj
nˆi
u′ (nˆj)− v′ (nˆi)
]
Correspondingly, by using again that limt→∞ E
[
1{St=i}
]
is given by q∗i , the compo-
nent of h (θ) associated with qi can be written as:
hqi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk, q1, . . . , qk) = h
−1 (q∗i − qi)
correct estimates inﬂuencing the law of motion of the state variables can be replaced by a
constant value.
58More formally, this can also be seen by noting that the expected value of the indicator function
1{St=j} conditional on the state of nature in period t − 1 being i is given by piij , i.e. the
probability of reaching state j from state i. Since the expression is multiplied by the indicator
function for the state of nature in period t−1 being i, the expectation can indeed be conditioned
on this event (in the case any other state of nature is observed in period t− 1 the expression is
multiplied by zero).
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meaning that the qualitative behaviour of agents' labour supply choice can be anal-
ysed through the following system of diﬀerential equations:
dnˆ1
dτ
=
q∗1
q1
[
k∑
j=1
pi1j
nˆj
nˆ1
u′ (nˆj)− v′ (nˆ1)
]
...
dnˆk
dτ
=
q∗k
qk
[
k∑
j=1
pikj
nˆj
nˆk
u′ (nˆj)− v′ (nˆk)
]
dq1
dτ
= h−1 (q∗1 − q1)
...
dqk
dτ
= h−1 (q∗k − qk)
From this formulation of the system of associated diﬀerential equations, it is obvious
that each of the last k diﬀerential equations of this system can be analysed sepa-
rately and that moreover the relative number of times any state i has been observed
up to a certain period converges globally to its long run equivalent59
Next consider the ﬁrst k diﬀerential equations of this system: Comparing these asso-
ciated diﬀerential equations with equation (16) shows that the subsystem consisting
of these diﬀerential equations can also be written as:
d
dτ

nˆ1
...
nˆk
 = diag(q∗1q1 . . . q
∗
k
qk
)
F (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π) (38)
where, as above, F (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π) denotes the k × 1 vector whose i's component is
given by (16), and where diag
(
q∗1
q1
. . .
q∗k
qk
)
is a k×k diagonal matrix with diagonal
elements q
∗
1
q1
, . . . ,
q∗k
qk
. Since however a qualitative analysis of a system of diﬀerential
equations is only concerned with the asymptotic behaviour of the trajectories for
nˆ1, . . . , nˆk and since it has already been shown that
q∗i
qi
converges globally to one,
it is suﬃcient to analyse only the system of associated diﬀerential equation (38),
where the vector F is premultiplied by the k × k identity matrix.
Note that through the formulation of the associated diﬀerential equations for nˆ1, . . . , nˆk
59This can be seen by noting that the derivative of h−1 (q∗i − qi) with respect to qi is equal to
−h−1 which is by assumption smaller than zero regardless of the value of qi.
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given above, it also becomes apparent that the monetary steady state and all station-
ary sunspot equilibria found under the hypothesis of rational expectations constitute
steady states of this system of associated diﬀerential equations.
Moreover, by the contraposition of Theorem 6 it can be concluded that only locally
asymptotically stable steady states of this system of associated diﬀerential equations
are possible outcomes of the adjustment process (33) - (34) used by agents to deter-
mine their labour supply. As usually, a given steady state is locally asymptotically
stable under the dynamics of a certain diﬀerential equation if all eigenvalues of the
Jacobi matrix of the right hand side of this diﬀerential equation evaluated at this
particular steady state have negative real part.
Therefore, Woodford (1990) arrives at the conclusion that the labour supply calcu-
lated according to the learning algorithm (33) - (34) converges to some arbitrarily
small neighbourhood of a certain rational expectations equilibrium n = (n1, . . . , nk)
′
associated with the transition probability matrix Π with probability zero, unless all
eigenvalues of DF (n,Π) have negative real part, where, as above, DF (n,Π) de-
notes the Jacobi matrix of F evaluated at the rational expectations equilibrium n.
Since the determinant of a matrix is given by the product of its eigenvalues, it
must hold that for a rational expectations equilibrium satisfying this condition,
(−1)k detDF (n,Π), which has been deﬁned as ∆(n,Π) in Theorem 5, is posi-
tive. By contraposition it follows that if for some rational expectations equilibrium
n ∆(n,Π) is negative, this equilibrium cannot constitute an outcome of the ad-
justment process for labour supply. In particular, it follows that if the suﬃcient
condition for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria given in Theorem 5 is
fulﬁlled, labour supply cannot be at the monetary steady state level in the long run
if in the short run agents adjust their labour supply according to the algorithm (33)
- (34).
However, even if the monetary steady state is not stable under the adjustment pro-
cess for labour supply when agents believe in the inﬂuence of an extrinsic sunspot
process60, it could be the case that it is stable when agents do not believe in this
inﬂuence, i.e. when they, due to the lack of knowledge on how to form rational
expectations, simply try to ﬁnd the labour supply maximizing their expected life-
time utility (given their subjective perceptions about the structure of the economy)
numerically by observing the "errors" made by their predecessors. Formally, such
a situation can be analysed by setting the number of possible states agents believe
60Note that it has so far been assumed that agents believe in the dependence of economic outcomes
on an extrinsic k - state Markov process.
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to be associated with diﬀerent prices to one. After discussing the implications of
these perceptions, I will increase the number of states to two and will discuss in
greater detail how the results on the stability of the monetary steady state obtained
from a correct speciﬁcation of this equilibrium are aﬀected by this change in agents'
perceptions about the structure of the economy they live in.
4.2.2. Weak Stability of the Monetary Steady State
In order to analyse the weak stability of any rational expectations equilibrium under
the dynamics of an adaptive learning algorithm, it must, as already pointed out
above, be assumed that agents' subjective perceptions about the data generating
process coincide with the functional form of the process actually generating the data
in this equilibrium. Since in the monetary steady state each observation on prices is
drawn from the same distribution (or more precisely, since prices are constant over
time), it must be assumed that agents do not believe that the distribution of the real
wage varies with the realization of an extrinsic stochastic process, or in other words
that only one possible state of nature inﬂuences this distribution which is such that
the price level is constant over time, in order to investigate the weak stability of
this rational expectations equilibrium under the postulated adjustment process for
labour supply.
However, for k = 1 the variable qi clearly has no meaning since in this case only one
possible state of nature exists, meaning that the fraction of times this unique state
is observed must be one. Moreover, since states of nature cannot change and since
as argued above agents are assumed to believe in a constant price level, the real
wage calculated for a ﬁxed estimate nˆ for labour supply associated with the unique
state of nature is always one.
Therefore, the system of associated diﬀerential equations (38) reduces to:
dnˆ
dτ
= u′ (nˆ)− v′ (nˆ)
Hence, the monetary steady state n∗ is locally asymptotically stable under the dy-
namics of this associated diﬀerential equation if u′′ (n∗)− v′′ (n∗) is negative.
Moreover, since it has been assumed that u (·) is strictly concave and v (·) is strictly
convex on their entire domain, it is even the case that u′ (nˆ) − v′ (nˆ) is decreasing
for all nˆ ∈ [n, n], meaning that the monetary steady state is even globally stable
under the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential equation. In order to see that any
trajectory of the learning algorithm must then converge to this rational expectations
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equilibrium, note that [n, n] is a compact set61 which is inﬁnitely often visited by the
trajectories of the postulated stochastic recursive algorithm describing agents' learn-
ing behaviour62 and which is contained in the domain of attraction of the monetary
steady state under the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential equation. Moreover,
note that by assumption the random shock to preferences has bounded support im-
plying that et is bounded with probability one for all t. Therefore, all assumptions
stated in Theorem 7 are satisﬁed provided that the invariant set I is chosen to
consist just of the monetary steady state. Hence, it can indeed be concluded by
this theorem that the labour supply calculated according to the adjustment process
(33) - (34) converges to its monetary steady state level. In other words, this means
that the monetary steady state will always be attained asymptotically if agents do
not believe in the inﬂuence of an extrinsic sunspot process and gradually adjust the
labour supply of their predecessors in order to ﬁnd the labour supply maximizing
their subjectively expected lifetime utility.
What might at ﬁrst glance seem to weaken this result is that the possibility of
the autarchy equilibrium which would also be consistent with the belief that the
sunspot process did not matter was a priori ruled out as an outcome of the adjust-
ment process by assuming that agents constrain their labour supply to lie within a
compact set which is bounded above zero. However, the autarchy equilibrium does
not constitute a ﬁxed point of the associated diﬀerential equation analysed above
since by assumption it holds that limnˆ→0 u′ (nˆ) =∞ and that v′ (0) is ﬁnite. This is
due to the fact that the belief of prices or labour supply being equal in all periods
automatically results in the belief that the real wage is equal to one, which is how-
ever no longer consistent with the autarchy equilibrium since the real wage in this
particular rational expectations equilibrium is equal to 0
0
which is not deﬁned, but
certainly diﬀerent from one. Therefore, the monetary steady state would be weakly
stable even if the constraint that the labour supply is bounded above zero is not
taken into account. In other word, this means that the monetary steady state is the
unique outcome which can be expected to be observed in the long run when agents
are not able to form rational expectations in the short run, but are adjusting their
labour supply adaptively using the postulated Robbins - Monro algorithm based on
the perception that prices are constant over time. This result has also been demon-
strated for other learning rules by Lucas (1986) and Evans (1989).
61Note that in a metric space a bounded and closed set is also compact.
62Recall that the labour supply calculated according to agents learning rule is by construction
constrained to lie within this set.
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However, as indicated above, the monetary steady state looses its stability if agents
believe based on observations for the random disturbances to preferences that prices
vary with the state of nature captured by some extrinsic sunspot process and if the
suﬃcient condition for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria is satisﬁed. It
is however not clear per se whether in such a case the adjustment algorithm (33) -
(34) will instead converge to one of the stationary sunspot equilibria, or whether it
will show a completely diﬀerent qualitative behaviour. This issue will be discussed
in the next section for a case in which agents believe in the inﬂuence of a two - state
sunspot process.
4.2.3. Weak Stability of Stationary Two - State Sunspot Equilibria
In order to discuss the weak stability of stationary two - state sunspot equilibria
under the postulated Robbins - Monro learning algorithm, consider a situation in
which agents believe that the state of nature determining the perceived distribution
function of the real wage can be described by the realization of a two - state Markov
process. More precisely, it will be assumed in this section that agents believe that
prices are perfectly correlated with an observable two - state Markov process, mean-
ing that their perceptions coincide with the class of stationary two - state sunspot
equilibria, but that they need to ﬁnd the concrete values for prices (i.e. the unknown
parameter in the distribution function Gi) numerically through the Robbins - Monro
algorithm discussed in section 4.1.1.
As argued above, this learning algorithm can be analysed by stochastic approxi-
mation through the associated diﬀerential equation given by (38), where since qi
converges globally to q∗i , it is only necessary to consider the following system of
diﬀerential equations for a qualitative analysis:
d
dτ
(
nˆ1
nˆ2
)
= F (nˆ1, nˆ2,Π)
In order to apply the results introduced in section 3.3.3, Woodford (1990) assumes
that for any ﬁxed point n = (n1 n2)
′ of this associated diﬀerential equation the
eigenvalues ofDF (n,Π), i.e. of the Jacobi matrix of F evaluated at this steady state,
are diﬀerent from zero, meaning that the ﬁxed point is referred to as hyperbolic. As
Woodford argues, this assumption guarantees that the steady states of the associated
diﬀerential equation are isolated which also implies that there only exist ﬁnitely
many of these ﬁxed points. As Woodford furthermore notes, it follows then that
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any trajectory of the diﬀerential equation must converge to a ﬁxed point, a periodic
orbit, or to a set consisting of ﬁnitely many steady states and ﬁnitely or inﬁnitely
many trajectories which converge to a ﬁxed point both as time goes to minus and
to plus inﬁnity, but which do not pass through one of the ﬁxed points.
In order to see that in the present example periodic orbits can however be ruled
out as a possible qualitative behaviour of a trajectory of the associated diﬀerential
equation, note that it follows from (16) that the derivative of Fi (nˆ1, nˆ2,Π) with
respect to nˆi, i.e. the i'th diagonal element of the Jacobi matrix of F , can be
written as:
[DF (nˆ1, nˆ2,Π)]ii = piiiu
′′ (nˆi)− piij nˆj
nˆ2i
u′ (nˆj)− v′′ (nˆi) for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j
which is strictly negative since u′′ (·) is assumed to be strictly negative, u′ (·) and
v′′ (·) are assumed to be positive and since piij, nj and ni are strictly positive con-
stants. Hence, Woodford (1990) argues that in particular ∂F1(nˆ1,nˆ2,Π)
∂nˆ1
+ ∂F2(nˆ1,nˆ2,Π)
∂nˆ2
,
evaluated at any point within the set [n, n]2, must be negative. Since this also im-
plies that this term cannot change its sign on [n, n]2 and that it is not identical
to zero, Woodford concludes by applying Bendixson's criterion that the associated
diﬀerential equation cannot have a periodic orbit.63
Moreover, Woodford also notes that it can be ruled out by the same technique that
a trajectory of the associated diﬀerential equation converges to a set containing a
so called Jordan curve64 which is made up of trajectories and ﬁxed points. Under
this condition and the assumption that all ﬁxed points of the associated diﬀeren-
tial equation are hyperbolic, Woodford can show that also the third possibility for
the asymptotic behaviour of a trajectory of the associated diﬀerential equation can
be ruled out. In order to obtain this result, he demonstrates that if there existed
only ﬁnitely many ﬁxed points of the associated diﬀerential equation and if the
trajectories of labour supply were inward pointing on the boundary of [n, n]2, this
63Bendixson's criterion states that if a two dimensional diﬀerential equation given by dxdt = H (x, y)
and dydt = G (x, y) is such that
∂H
∂x +
∂G
∂y is not identical to zero and does not change its sign on
a certain domain, it cannot have periodic orbits which are entirely contained in this domain.
In the present application, (x, y) is given by (nˆ1, nˆ2), H corresponds to F1 and G corresponds
to F2. Furthermore, the set under consideration is given by [n, n]
2
. Since it has been shown in
Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 that all trajectories of F are inward pointing at the boundary of this
set, it can be indeed concluded that no trajectory in this set can converge to a periodic orbit.
64A Jordan curve is deﬁned as a bijective mapping from the unit circle, meaning that each point
on the Jordan curve is the image of a point on the unit circle and distinct points on the unit
circle are mapped into distinct points on the Jordan curve. Moreover, both the mapping from
the unit circle and the inverse of this mapping are continuous, meaning that the Jordan curve
is homeomorphic to the unit circle.
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asymptotic behaviour would eventually result in the existence of a Jordan curve
made up of some of the ﬁxed points and the trajectories which converge to one of
these ﬁxed points as time goes to minus inﬁnity and to another one as time goes to
plus inﬁnity which would, by the result stated above, yield a contradiction.
Therefore, Woodford (1990) concludes that if the associated diﬀerential equation
is two dimensional, meaning that the argument given above can be applied, any
trajectory in [n, n]2 must indeed converge to a ﬁxed point.
Since the set of all steady states of the associated diﬀerential equation clearly con-
stitutes an invariant set and since, by the result of Woodford just indicated, the
domain of attraction of this set includes all of the compact set [n, n]2 in which the
trajectories of the stochastic recursive algorithm must lie for all t (and thus of course
inﬁnitely often), all requirements stated in Theorem 7 are fulﬁlled. Hence, this the-
orem can be used to conclude that the trajectories of the learning algorithm (33)
- (34) must converge with probability one to the set I × {(q∗1 q∗2)′}, where I de-
notes the invariant set just described, and where the symbol × denotes the cartesian
product of two sets. Furthermore, as argued above, it must be the case that if the
trajectories converge to a certain steady state or ﬁxed point n, ∆(n,Π) is positive.
Therefore, Woodford (1990) arrives at the following result:
Theorem 10 Suppose k = 2. Then the learning algorithm (33) - (34) converges
with probability one to a rational expectations equilibrium n for which labour supply
in both states of nature is strictly positive and for which ∆(n,Π) > 0.
In other words, this means that if agents condition their labour supply on an extrinsic
two - state Markov process and the suﬃcient condition for the existence of station-
ary sunspot equilibria is satisﬁed, the adjustment process for labour supply must
converge with probability one to one of the stationary two - state sunspot equilibria.
In particular, it must converge to a sunspot equilibrium for which ∆(n,Π) > 0, i.e.
which is associated with an index of +1. As outlined in section 2.5, it follows from
the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem that in this case at least two such stationary
two - state sunspot equilibria exist. This also implies that in this case the monetary
steady state cannot be reached by the postulated learning algorithm, meaning that
it can only be weakly stable, that is stable under a correctly speciﬁed perceived
law of motion for prices. Therefore, it can only be observed as an outcome of the
adjustment process for labour supply if agents do not believe that the distribution of
the preference shocks and the real wage depends on some extrinsic variable although
past observations might indicate this.
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If however the suﬃcient condition for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria
is not satisﬁed, i.e. if ∆(n∗,Π) > 0, the monetary steady state is again the unique
possible outcome of the adjustment process for labour supply, provided that there
indeed do not exist any stationary sunspot equilibria.
As Woodford (1990) points out, this analysis shows however that extrinsic uncer-
tainty can even matter for the economic allocation if agents only condition their
labour supply on the realization of an extrinsic stochastic process since they believe,
based on past observations, that by doing so they can approximate the labour sup-
ply maximizing their subjectively expected lifetime utility better than by not taking
this process into account.
However, it is not possible to discuss the plausibility of any particular sunspot
equilibrium by means of this theorem since it only refers to the whole set of rational
expectations equilibria for which ∆(n,Π) > 0 holds.
In order to address this issue nevertheless, it is necessary to use a local approach as
done in Theorem 8 introduced in section 3.3.3. This theorem however only refers
to locally asymptotically stable ﬁxed points of the associated diﬀerential equation.
Therefore, it is necessary to show that stationary two - state sunspot equilibria can
indeed be locally asymptotically stable under the dynamics of the associated diﬀer-
ential equation.
In order to see that if the suﬃcient condition for the existence of stationary sunspot
equilibria is satisﬁed, there must also exist stationary two - state sunspot equilibria
at which Theorem 8 can be applied, note that, as argued above, there must in this
case necessarily exist two sunspot equilibria with ∆(n,Π) > 0. Unfortunately, it
has so far only been argued that ∆(n,Π) must be positive for locally asymptotically
stable ﬁxed points of the associated diﬀerential equation, but not that conversely any
rational expectations equilibrium with ∆(n,Π) > 0 is indeed locally asymptotically
stable. As demonstrated by Woodford (1990) this converse result holds however as
well provided the extrinsic uncertainty is described by a two - state Markov process
as assumed here.
In order to see this, consider a sunspot equilibrium n = (n1, n2)
′ with ∆(n,Π) > 0
and recall that all diagonal elements of the Jacobi matrix of F evaluated at any
rational expectations equilibrium n = (n1, n2)
′ must be negative. Therefore, also
the trace of DF (n1, n2,Π) must be negative, and since the eigenvalues of a 2 × 2
matrix A are calculated as λ1,2 =
tr[A]
2
±
√
tr[A]2
4
− det [A], where tr [A] denotes the
trace of the matrix A, it follows that at least one eigenvalue of DF (n1, n2,Π) is
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negative. Knowing this, ∆(n1, n2,Π) := (−1)2 λ1λ2 > 065 implies however that also
the second eigenvalue of DF (n1, n2,Π) must be negative, meaning that the sunspot
equilibrium under consideration is indeed a locally asymptotically steady state of
the associated diﬀerential equation.
Hence, if the suﬃcient condition for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria
stated in Theorem 3 is satisﬁed, there must exist at least two stationary two - state
sunspot equilibria at which Theorem 8 can be applied and for which it must thus
hold that if a trajectory of labour supply enters a compact neighbourhood of such an
equilibrium at a point in time suﬃciently large, the adjustment process converges to
this particular sunspot equilibrium with probability arbitrarily close to one. More-
over, it follows from what has been noted in the discussion of this theorem that if
the rate of adaption to newly observed data, which is for the learning algorithm
under consideration controlled by the positive parameter h, were suﬃciently small,
a trajectory of the adjustment process would converge to any of these two - state
sunspot equilibria with probability arbitrarily close to one even if just the initial
conditions for labour supply lied within a compact neighbourhood of this particular
steady state.
Therefore, contrasting the conjecture of Woodford (1990) that it is often not possible
to single out a unique rational expectations equilibrium which can be attained by
the postulated adaptive learning algorithm, it is possible to do so, at least if a two -
state sunspot process is used in agents' learning algorithm and if initial conditions
for nˆ1t, . . . , nˆkt are also taken into account.
Clearly, it is however also of interest to analyse the qualitative behaviour of the
postulated learning algorithm if agents conditioned their subjective expectations on
a sunspot process with an arbitrary, but ﬁnite number of states. The results ob-
tained through such an analysis could also be used as conditions for strong stability
of the two - state sunspot equilibria considered so far since, as will be explained
further below, increasing the number of states is basically equivalent to assuming
that agents included additional extrinsic stochastic processes which are independent
of each other in their learning algorithm.
Unfortunately, as already indicated above, it is not possible to make precise state-
ments for this more general case by using the present speciﬁcation of agents' learning
behaviour. As Woodford (1990) argues, this is due to the fact that for k > 2 it is
not possible to employ Bendixson's criterion to show that indeed all trajectories in
65Note that the determinant of a matrix is equal to the product of its eigenvalues.
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[n, n]k will converge to a ﬁxed point, i.e. to the invariant set I introduced above.
Therefore, it can no longer be veriﬁed that all trajectories of the stochastic recursive
algorithm visit a compact subset of the domain of attraction of I under the dynam-
ics of the associated diﬀerential equation inﬁnitely often which is however required
for the application of Theorem 7.
Moreover, although Theorem 8 could in principal still be used to show that locally
asymptotically stable steady states of the associated diﬀerential equation can be
attained through the postulated learning process, it is not any longer possible to
show that there exist stationary sunspot equilibria which are indeed locally asymp-
totically stable under the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential equation even if
the suﬃcient condition for the existence of sunspot equilibria is met. In order to
see this, note that the only property known of the stationary sunspot equilibria,
which must necessarily exist in this case is that at least for two of them ∆(n,Π) is
positive. However, if ∆(n,Π) := (−1)k∏kj=1 λj > 0 and k were even, it could be
the case that the number of negative eigenvalues is even, but that there also exist
positive eigenvalues. Conversely, if k were odd, it could be the case that the number
of negative eigenvalues is odd, but that there also exist positive eigenvalues. In
other words, for k > 2 ∆ (n,Π) > 0 does not any longer imply that all eigenvalues
of DF (n,Π) are negative and that thus the rational expectations equilibrium under
consideration is locally asymptotically stable under the dynamics of the associated
diﬀerential equation. Therefore, it is in the more general case not clear whether
there exist stationary sunspot equilibria at which Theorem 8 can be applied and
which must thus be considered as possible outcomes of the learning process (33) -
(34) at least for appropriate initial conditions.
Hence, the only possibility to demonstrate convegence to a sunspot equilibrium in
this more general case is to simulate the mode and thus explicitly determine the
rational expectations equilibria and their properties under the associated diﬀeren-
tial equation. However, results obtained from this analysis would, as the analysis of
the recursive least squares algorithm, depend on the postulated functional form of
agents' utility.
Unlike the stability results, instability results for rational expectations equilibria
under the dynamics of adaptive learning algorithms can however, as already noted
in section 4.2.1, be extended to this more general case. In other words, this means
that also if agents condition their expectations on a sunspot process with arbitrarily,
but ﬁnitely many states, it must still hold that the monetary steady state cannot be
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reached through the learning algorithm considered here provided that the suﬃcient
condition for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria is violated. This means
that the instability of the monetary steady state found for k = 2 in this situation
cannot be overturned by the perceptions that even more states of nature are associ-
ated with diﬀerent prices. The next section will demonstrate more generally that an
instability result for a certain rational expectations equilibrium can never be altered
by overparametrized beliefs of agents.
Moreover, it will be demonstrated that under special circumstances it is possible to
show that the monetary steady state is strongly stable, i.e. that it is also stable
under the dynamics of the considered learning algorithm if agents believe that the
distribution of the preference shocks and the real wage depends on the realization of
an extrinsic sunspot process with arbitrarily many states. After that, I will give an
example by Evans (1989) for an economy in which agents use recursive least squares
estimation to forecast the real wage, which will in particular allow conclusions about
the strong stability of two - state sunspot equilibria.
4.3. Strong Stability of Rational Expectations Equilibria in an
OLG Model
4.3.1. Instability Results
In the previous section it could already be seen that if stationary sunspot equilibria
necessarily exist, the monetary steady state cannot be reached asymptotically by
the learning algorithm (33) - (34) regardless of the number of states agents use to
sort their observations. Also intuitively it seems plausible that an equilibrium which
was found to be unstable under a certain set of explanatory variables, which is here
given by the states of nature agents believe to be associated with diﬀerent prices
or alternatively by the diﬀerent extrinsic processes agents use in their learning al-
gorithm, should also be unstable when a larger set of explanatory variables is used.
This result is formally demonstrated by Woodford (1990):
Therefore, he assumes that a certain rational expectations equilibrium n = (n1 . . . nk)
′
is unstable under the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential equation if agents con-
dition their expectations only on the sunspot process (St) which can take on values
in the state space {1, . . . , k} and which, as usually, is associated with the transitions
probability matrix Π = (piij)1≤i≤k;1≤j≤k, meaning that by Theorem 7 this equilib-
rium cannot be attained by the considered learning algorithm under the postulated
law of motion.
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If agents only used this sunspot process in order to adjust the labour supply of their
predecessors, it follows from rewriting (16) as
Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π) =
1
nˆi
[
k∑
j=1
piijnˆju
′ (nˆj)− nˆiv′ (nˆi)
]
(39)
that the derivative of Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π) with respect to nˆj for j 6= i is given by:
∂Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π)
∂nˆj
=
1
nˆi
piijU
′ (nˆj)
where, as in section 2, U ′ (nˆj) is given by nˆju′′ (nˆj) + u′ (nˆj).
Furthermore, it follows from (39) that the derivative of Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π) with respect
to nˆi is given by:
∂Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π)
∂nˆi
= − 1
nˆ2j
[
k∑
j=1
piijnˆju
′ (nˆj)− nˆiv′ (nˆi)
]
+
piii
nˆi
[nˆiu
′′ (nˆi) + u′ (nˆi)]−
− 1
nˆi
[nˆiv
′′ (nˆi) + v′ (nˆi)]
Since the rational expectations equilibrium under consideration must be a root of F,∑k
j=1 piijnju
′ (nj)−niv′ (ni) must be zero. Evaluating the derivative stated above at
the given rational expectations equilibrium therefore yields the following expression:
∂Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π)
∂nˆi
|(nˆ1,...,nˆk)′=n = piii
1
ni
U ′ (ni)− 1
ni
V ′ (ni)
where U ′ (·) is deﬁned as above and where, as in section 2, V ′ (ni) is deﬁned as
niv
′′ (ni) + v′ (ni).
Furthermore, for an eigenvector e = (e1, . . . , ek)
′ ∈ Rk corresponding to any eigen-
value λ of the matrix DF (n1, . . . , nk,Π), it must hold that DF (n1, . . . , nk,Π) e =
λe. In particular, this equality must of course also hold for the i'th component of
these vectors. Since for the left hand side of this equation the i'th component is
obtained by multiplying the i'th row of the matrix DF , i.e.
(
∂Fi
∂nˆ1
. . . ∂Fi
∂nˆk
)
, by the
vector e, it must therefore hold that:[
1
ni
piiiU
′ (ni)− 1
ni
V ′ (ni)
]
ei +
∑
j 6=i
1
ni
piijU
′ (nj) ej = λei
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Multiplying this equation by ni and rearranging then yields:
k∑
j=1
piijU
′ (nj) ej = [V ′ (ni) + λni] ei
which must of course hold for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Woodford (1990) then assumes that agents can also observe a second sunspot process
(Wt) which is independent of (St) and which can take on values in the state space
{1, . . . , p}.66 The transitions probability matrix of this second sunspot process is
assumed to be given by Ψ = (ψab)1≤a≤p;1≤b≤p. If agents now used both extrinsic
processes as an indicator for the distribution of the preference shocks and the real
wage, there would be k· possible states of nature which can be depicted as ai for
0 ≤ i ≤ k and 0 ≤ a ≤ p.67 Since the two sunspot processes are assumed to be
independent, the transition probability from state ai to any other state bj is given
by the product piij · ψab.
Furthermore, the sunspot equilibrium (n1, . . . , nk)
′ considered above can now be
expressed as a degenerate sunspot equilibrium of cardinality p · k and order k for
which nai, i.e. the labour supply associated with state ai, is given by ni for all
a = 1, . . . , p and all i = 1, . . . , k.
Hence, the marginal utility resulting from an increase of the labour supply estimate
for state ai is now given by:
F˜ai
(
Nˆ ,Π,Ψ
)
=
1
nˆai
[
p∑
b=1
k∑
j=1
ψabpiijnˆbju
′ (nˆbj)− nˆaiv′ (nˆai)
]
where the p×k matrix Nˆ is such that the element in its a'th row and its i'th column
is given by nˆai, i.e. by the labour supply estimate for state ai.
Calculating as above the partial derivatives of F˜ai with respect to nˆai and with
respect to the labour supply estimate for any other state of nature, nˆbj, where
either b 6= a or j 6= i, and evaluating these derivatives at the degenerate sunspot
66In the terminology of Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982) such a second extrinsic variable is some-
times referred to as a "moonspot" process.
67Therefore, as indicated above, introducing an additional sunspot process, which is independent
of the original process, is equivalent to increasing the possible number of states.
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equilibrium described above, gives:
∂F˜ai
(
Nˆ ,Π,Ψ
)
∂nˆai
|Nˆ=N =
1
ni
ψaapiiiU
′ (ni)− 1
ni
V ′ (ni)
∂F˜ai
(
Nˆ ,Π,Ψ
)
∂nˆbj
|Nˆ=N =
1
ni
ψabpiijU
′ (nj)
where N is the p × k matrix for which for all i = 1, . . . , k all entries in the i'th
column are equal to ni, i.e. the labour supply associated with state i in the rational
expectations equilibrium under consideration.
Next, Woodford (1990) deﬁnes the vector e˜ ∈ Rkp such that e˜ai = ei for all a =
1, . . . , p and all i = 1, . . . , k, where ei is the i'th component of the eigenvector e
found above. Then, he considers the component of the product DF˜ (N,Π,Ψ) e˜
associated with state ai:
(
DF˜ (N,Π,Ψ) e˜
)
ai
=
p∑
b=1
k∑
j=1
1
ni
ψabpiijU
′ (nj) ej − 1
ni
V ′ (ni) ei
=
[
p∑
b=1
ψab
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
1
ni
[
k∑
j=1
piijU
′ (nj) ej
]
− 1
ni
V ′ (ni) ei
Since it has been shown above that if e is an eigenvector of DF (n1, . . . , nk,Π) corre-
sponding to the eigenvalue λ, it must hold that
∑k
j=1 piijU
′ (nj) ej = [V ′ (ni) + λni] ei,
this expression can be rearranged further to yield:(
DF˜ (N,Π,Ψ) e˜
)
ai
=
1
ni
V ′ (ni) ei + λei − 1
ni
V ′ (ni) ei
= λei
= λe˜aj
meaning that since ai was chosen arbitrarily, λ must also be an eigenvalue of this
larger dimensional Jacobi matrix.
Since this relationship must moreover hold for all eigenvalues λ ofDF (n1, . . . , nk,Π),
it follows that all eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix of F evaluated at a certain
(non - degenerate) rational expectations equilibrium must also be eigenvalues of
DF˜ (N,Π,Ψ), i.e. of the Jacobi matrix determining the local stability of this ra-
tional expectations equilibrium under the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential
equation if agents condition their expectations additionally on a second sunspot
113
process. Note that by induction it follows that this must hold for any arbitrary
ﬁnite number of extrinsic stochastic processes used in the learning algorithm.
Since it has been assumed that the given rational expectations equilibrium n =
(n1, . . . , nk)
′ is unstable when agents base their adjustment process for labour sup-
ply only on the original sunspot process, at least one λ must be positive. Therefore,
it follows by the argument presented above that also at least one eigenvalue of
DF˜ (N,Π,Ψ) must be positive, meaning that the rational expectations equilibrium
under consideration is also unstable if agents use a more sophisticated way to sort
the observations they consider relevant for their behaviour.
As already pointed out above, this result is consistent with the results obtained
in the previous section about the monetary steady state if the suﬃcient condition
for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria is satisﬁed. However, it also follows
from this result that in general rational expectations equilibria with ∆(n,Π) < 0 in
the case the adjustment process for labour supply is based on a two - state sunspot
process, i.e. rational expectations equilibria which cannot be stable in this context,
can also not become stable when additional extrinsic variables are taken into ac-
count in the learning algorithm.
Since in general DF˜ has however also eigenvalues diﬀerent from the k eigenvalues of
the smaller dimensional matrixDF (n1, . . . , nk,Π), it does not follow from this result
that the weak stability of certain rational expectations equilibria also automatically
translates into strong stability results for these equilibria. The next section will
however discuss a special case for which this is true at the monetary steady state.
4.3.2. Strong Stability of the Monetary Steady State
In section 4.2 it has already been demonstrated that if the suﬃcient condition for the
existence of stationary sunspot equilibria were not met, the monetary steady state
would be stable under the dynamics of the considered learning algorithm provided
that agents' perceptions were only consistent with prices being constant over time
or with the class of two - state sunspot equilibria.
As already pointed out above, this suﬃcient condition for the existence of stationary
sunspot equilibria is however always satisﬁed if the monetary steady state is inde-
terminate under perfect foresight dynamics, i.e. if the negative income eﬀect of an
increase in the real wage outweighs the positive substitution eﬀect on labour supply
by a suﬃcient margin.
In this section it will moreover be shown based on Theorem 8 that if the suﬃcient
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condition for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria is not satisﬁed and if
instead the positive substitution eﬀect dominates at the monetary steady state, it
is locally stable under the dynamics of the Robbins - Monro learning algorithm
discussed in section 4.1.1 even if agents condition their expectations on a Markov
process with arbitrarily many states. In other words, this means that a trajectory
of this stochastic recursive algorithm converges to the monetary steady state with
probability arbitrarily close to one provided that it visits a compact neighbourhood
of this equilibrium and provided that the parameter h controlling the rate of adap-
tion to newly observed data is small enough.
More precisely, Woodford (1990) states the following result:
Theorem 11 If u′ (n∗) + n∗u′′ (n∗) > 068, i.e. if at the monetary steady state an
increase in the real wage results in a substitution away from leisure to old - age
consumption, the monetary steady state is locally strongly stable under the dynamics
of the learning algorithm (33) - (34).
Proof: In order to show this, it is only necessary to show that all eigenvalues of
the Jacobi matrix of the associated diﬀerential equation evaluated at the monetary
steady state have negative real part regardless of the number of states of the sunspot
process used in the learning algorithm. This is suﬃcient since then Theorem 8 can
be applied to show that for the case of slow adaption, i.e. for h suﬃciently small,
a trajectory of the learning algorithm converges to the monetary steady state with
probability arbitrarily close to one if it started in a compact neighbourhood of this
equilibrium, meaning that it is locally stable in this situation. Moreover, it has been
argued above that conditioning the adjustment process on more than one extrinsic
stochastic process can also be modelled by increasing the number of possible states
of the original process. Hence, if the monetary steady state is found to be locally
stable under the postulated learning algorithm for any ﬁnite number of states, it
must also be locally stable if agents condition their expectations on any ﬁnite number
of independent sunspot processes and thus also locally strongly stable.
In order to show that the monetary steady state is indeed locally asymptotically
stable under the dynamics of the associated diﬀerential equation, Woodford (1990)
ﬁrst shows that the Jacobi matrix DF (n∗,Π) is diagonally dominated, meaning
that
∣∣∣∂Fi(n∗,Π)∂nˆi ∣∣∣ >∑j 6=i ∣∣∣∂Fi(n∗,Π)∂nˆj ∣∣∣ for any i = 1, . . . , k:
68Recall, that the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage is positive at the
monetary steady state if and only if this condition holds.
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From (16) it follows that the partial derivative of Fi with respect to nˆj is given by:
∂Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π)
∂nj
= piij
1
nˆi
[u′ (nˆj) + nˆju′′ (nˆj)]
Evaluating this partial derivative at the monetary steady state, i.e. at n∗ = (n∗, . . . , n∗)′ ∈
Rk yields:
∂Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π)
∂nˆj
|(nˆ1,...,nˆk)′=n∗ = piij
1
n∗
[u′ (n∗) + n∗u′′ (n∗)]
from which it follows that
k∑
j=1
j 6=i
∂Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π)
∂nˆj
|(nˆ1,...,nˆk)′=n∗ = (1− piii)
[
1
n∗
u′ (n∗) + u′′ (n∗)
]
Moreover, as has already been shown above, the partial derivative of Fi with respect
to nˆi is given by:
∂Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π)
∂nˆi
= piiiu
′′ (nˆi)− 1
nˆ2i
∑
j 6=i
piijnˆju
′ (nˆj)− v′′ (nˆi)
Evaluating this partial derivative at the monetary steady state yields:
∂Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π)
∂nˆi
|(nˆ1,...,nˆk)′=n∗ = piiiu′′ (n∗)− (1− piii)
1
n∗
u′ (n∗)− v′′ (n∗)
Therefore, it follows that the sum over any row of the Jacobi matrix DF (n∗,Π) is
given by:
k∑
j=1
∂Fi (nˆ1, . . . , nˆk,Π)
∂nˆj
|(nˆ1,...,nˆk)=n∗ = u′′ (n∗)− v′′ (n∗)
which, by the assumptions on preferences made in section 2.1, is strictly negative.
Moreover, the partial derivative of Fi with respect to nˆi is strictly negative, whereas
all the partial derivatives of Fi with respect to the labour supply estimates associ-
ated with any other state of nature are strictly positive. Since this holds for any
i = 1, . . . , k, it follows that the Jabobi matrix DF (n∗,Π) is indeed diagonally dom-
inated. In order to see this, note that if this were not the case, meaning that a
negative diagonal element were in absolute terms smaller than the positive sum over
the other elements in its row, it could not hold that the sum over all elements in
this row is negative, which must however hold as just demonstrated.
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Since in the present case, in particular all diagonal elements of the matrixDF (n∗,Π)
are negative, a theorem due to McKenzie (1960) applies, which basically states that
if a matrix is diagonally dominated and all its diagonal elements are negative, all its
eigenvalues have negative real part.
Therefore, Theorem 8 can indeed be applied at the monetary steady state, meaning
that this rational expectations equilibrium is in the present context locally stable
under the dynamics of the considered Robbins - Monro algorithm based on an ex-
trinsic process with arbitrarily many states in the sense described above. Thus, by
the argument given above, it must also be locally stable if agents used more than
one sunspot process in order to sort their observations, meaning that the monetary
steady state must be locally strongly stable under the learning algorithm (33) - (34).
However, it must be emphasized that this result on the strong stability of one partic-
ular rational expectations equilibrium under the dynamics of the Robbins - Monro
algorithm could only be obtained since it has been assumed that leisure and con-
sumption are at the monetary steady state gross substitutes. As already pointed
out above, it is not in general possible to discuss strong stability results for rational
expectations equilibria if agents' learning behaviour is characterized by the stochas-
tic recursive algorithm (33) - (34). Therefore, I will next turn to an example of an
economy for which Evans (1989) showed based on the analysis of E - stability that
although two - state sunspot equilibria can be weakly E - stable, they can never be
strongly E - stable.
4.3.3. Strong Stability of Two - State Sunspot Equilibria - An Example
Although in section 4.2.3 the set of two - state sunspot equilibria has been found
to be weakly stable under the dynamics of a Robbins - Monro algorithm, it has
not been possible to analyse whether this stability result would remain unchanged if
agents slightly altered their perceptions. In order to address this remaining question,
consider an economy in which agents do not recursively update the labour supply
choice of their predecessors through the Robbins - Monro algorithm, but instead use
the recursive least squares algorithm described in section 4.1.2 in order to obtain
subjective expectations about the real wages they could possibly face and thus also
about their lifetime utility.
One advantage of this speciﬁcation of agents' learning behaviour is that, as has al-
ready been argued in section 3.4.1, it becomes possible to focus on the corresponding
E - stability conditions which are determined through a mapping from agents' per-
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ceived law of motion to the induced actual law of motion instead of conducting a
direct analysis of the stochastic recursive algorithm using stochastic approximation
techniques. Note that Evans (1989) uses this simpler approach without even refer-
ring to the real time learning process behind his analysis.
In the present application the perceived law of motion is clearly given by the belief
that labour supply in any period t will be determined solely by the state of nature
prevailing in this period. The mapping form these perceptions to the actual law of
motion for labour supply is then given by the solution to the utility maximization
problem given these perceptions, that is given the subjectively expected utility as-
sociated with old - age consumption expressed by (37). In order to determine this
mapping it is thus necessary to explicitly solve agents' utility maximization problem.
Therefore, it is also necessary to assume a speciﬁc form for the utility associated
with old - age consumption, u (ct+1), and the disutility associated with work, v (nt).
This however also implies that, as pointed out by Woodford (1990), the following
results cannot be extended to other speciﬁcations for preferences.
Evans (1989) however considers the following speciﬁcation of agents' utility function:
u (ct+1) =
1
1− σc
1−σ
t+1 σ ≥ 0, σ 6= 1
and
v (nt) =
1
1 + κ
n1+κt κ ≥ 0
Clearly, the speciﬁcation of the disutility associated with working does not impose
a natural upper bound on labour supply, as assumed in section 2.1. However, it
has already been shown in section 2.5 that the optimal labour supply will anyhow
be bounded above zero and below the upper bound for the feasible labour supply.
Therefore, it must still hold that agents will never want to choose an inﬁnitely high
labour supply, meaning that this modiﬁcation to the assumptions made in section
2 is not crucial. This was also pointed out by Woodford (1990).
Using this utility functions, the labour supply at the monetary steady state can be
explicitly calculated as:
n∗ = argmax
n
1
1− σn
1−σ − 1
1 + κ
n1+κ
from which it follows that the monetary steady state is characterized by n∗ = 1.
Moreover, it follows from (3) that the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the
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real wage evaluated at the monetary steady is given by:
ε (1) =
(n∗)−σ − σ (n∗)−1−σ
σ (n∗)−1−σ + κ (n∗)κ−1
=
1− σ
σ + κ
Recall that in section 2.3 it has been shown that the condition ε (1) < −1
2
is suﬃ-
cient for the existence of two - state sunspot equilibria. Evans (1989) however argues
that in his example this condition is even necessary: More precisely, he shows that if
σ < 2+κ, i.e. if ε (1) were greater than −1
2
, each rational expectations equilibrium,
i.e. each root of (12) - (13), would be associated with an index of +1. Since however,
by the Poincaré - Hopf Index Theorem the sum of the indices at these roots must
be +1, there can only exist one root of (12) - (13), meaning that in this case the
monetary steady state must be the unique perfect foresight equilibrium provided
that the state of nature can be described by a two - state Markov process.
With this background, it is now possible to show that the requirement for the weak
stability of the set of two - state sunspot equilibria under the dynamics of the re-
cursive least squares learning algorithm are in this example exactly the same as the
conditions found in section 4.2.3. In order to see this, note that in any period in
which state i is observed labour supply is chosen as:
ni = argmax
nt
ue
(
pt
pt+1
nt
)
− v (nt)
where the subjective expectation about the utility obtained through old - age con-
sumption is given by (37), and where it is additionally assumed that k = 2.
Using the market clearing condition and the perceived law of motion nt = nˆi, the
labour supply choice in period t can hence be written as:
ni = argmax
nt
2∑
j=1
piij
1
1− σ
(
nˆj
nˆi
nt
)1−σ
− 1
1 + κ
n1+κt
meaning that the labour supply maximizing the subjectively expected utility in any
period t in which state i is observed must satisfy the following ﬁrst order condition:
2∑
j=1
piij
nˆj
nˆi
(
nˆj
nˆi
ni
)−σ
− nκi = 0
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which can be rearranged in order to obtain the labour supply maximizing the lifetime
utility of an agent born in a period in which state i is observed implied by the
perceived law of motion for prices and labour supply, as:
nκi =
2∑
j=1
piij
nˆj
nˆi
(
nˆj
nˆi
ni
)−σ
nκ+σi =
2∑
j=1
piij
nˆj
nˆi
(
nˆj
nˆi
)−σ
ni =
[
2∑
j=1
piij
(
nˆj
nˆi
)1−σ] 1κ+σ
Therefore, the non-linear mapping from agents' perceptions (nˆ1 nˆ2)
′ to the actual
labour supplies (n1 n2)
′ is given by:
T1 (nˆ1, nˆ2) =

[
pi11 + pi12
(
nˆ2
nˆ1
)1−σ] 1κ+σ
[
pi22 + pi21
(
nˆ1
nˆ2
)1−σ] 1κ+σ

where the subscript of T indicates that only one extrinsic sunspot process has been
used in the learning algorithm.
E - stability of any rational expectations equilibrium under the considered perceived
law of motion is then determined through the following ordinary diﬀerential equa-
tion:
d
dτ
(
nˆ1
nˆ2
)
= T1 (nˆ1, nˆ2)−
(
nˆ1
nˆ2
)
(40)
implying that any given stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium is weakly E -
stable if all eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix of the right hand side of this equation
evaluated at this sunspot equilibrium have negative real part, or if equivalently all
eigenvalues of DT1 evaluated at the sunspot equilibrium under consideration have
real part less than 1.
In order to see whether this condition can be satisﬁed, consider ﬁrst the partial
derivative of T1 with respect to its ﬁrst argument, which is given by the following
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expression:
∂T1 (nˆ1, nˆ2)
∂nˆ1
=

− 1−σ
κ+σ
[
pi11 + pi12
(
nˆ2
nˆ1
)1−σ] 1−κ−σκ+σ
pi12
(
nˆ2
nˆ1
)1−σ
1
nˆ1
1−σ
κ+σ
[
pi22 + pi21
(
nˆ1
nˆ2
)1−σ] 1−κ−σκ+σ
pi21
(
nˆ1
nˆ2
)−σ
1
nˆ2

Moreover, it follows from the ﬁrst order condition for optimal labour supply that at
a rational expectations equilibrium pi11+pi12
(
nˆ2
nˆ1
)1−σ
and pi22+pi21
(
nˆ1
nˆ2
)1−σ
are given
by nκ+σ1 and by n
κ+σ
2 , respectively. Since furthermore the partial derivative of T1 with
respect to its second argument is symmetric to the computation above, it follows that
the Jacobi matrix DT1 evaluated at any rational expectations equilibrium (n1 n2)
′
is given by:
DT1 (n1, n2) =
(
−ε (1) pi12n−(1+κ)1 n1−σ2 ε (1) pi12n−κ1 n−σ2
ε (1) pi21n
−σ
1 n
−κ
2 −ε (1) pi21n1−σ1 n−(1+κ)2
)
From which it can easily be seen that the determinant of DT1 (n1, n2) is equal to
zero, implying that the eigenvalues of this Jacobi matrix are given by zero and the
trace of the matrix. Since zero is clearly smaller than one, the only requirement for
the weak E - stability of any stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium is that the
trace of DT1 evaluated at this particular equilibrium is smaller than one. Moreover,
Evans (1989) shows that if the suﬃcient condition for the existence of sunspot equi-
libria is fulﬁlled, i.e. if ε (1) < −1
2
, this requirement is satisﬁed if and only if the
rational expectations equilibrium under consideration is associated with an index of
+1. Since there must exist at least two stationary two - state sunspot equilibria as-
sociated with an index of +1 if the suﬃcient condition for the existence of stationary
sunspot equilibria is satisﬁed, the results obtained by Evans (1989) concerning the
weak stability of the set of two - state sunspot equilibria are consistent with those
obtained by Woodford (1990) and discussed in section 4.2.3, i.e. the weak stability
of the class of two - state sunspot equilibria under the dynamics of the Robbins -
Monro algorithm.
Moreover, similar to the result obtained in section 4.2.3, the monetary steady state
is also in this example E - stable if agents use a two - state Markov process, pro-
vided that ε (1) > −1
2
and that thus the suﬃcient condition for the existence of
sunspot equilibria is violated. In order to see this, note that for ε (1) > −1
2
,
tr [DT1 (n
∗, n∗)] = −ε (1) (pi12 + pi21) is smaller than one for all transition proba-
bilities which lie strictly between zero and one, meaning that the monetary steady
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state indeed satisﬁes the condition for E - stability under the given perceived law
of motion coinciding with the functional form of the class of stationary two - state
sunspot equilibria.
However, as for the analysis of Woodford (1990), it is not possible to obtain any
information on the location of the two - state sunspot equilibria which have been
found to be (locally) E - stable. Therefore, Evans and Honkapohja (1994) and (2003)
follow a diﬀerent approach: They investigate the weak E - stability of certain classes
of two - state sunspot equilibria, as for example the stationary two - state sunspot
equilibria located in a neighbourhood of two distinct stationary perfect foresight
equilibria. Evans and Honkapohja (1994) ﬁnd that this class of sunspot equilibria
is weakly E - stable if and only if both perfect foresight equilibria are weakly E -
stable. Nevertheless, since in the model considered here the only weakly E - stable
stationary perfect foresight equilibrium is the monetary steady state, this case is not
relevant for the present application. In particular, it must be concluded that it is
not possible for agents to adaptively learn a sunspot equilibrium for which one state
of nature is associated with almost valueless money, whereas in the other state of
nature prices are almost at their monetary steady state levels.
However, Evans and Honkapohja (1994) were not able to show a similar result for
the more interesting case in the model considered here, namely for the class of two -
state sunspot equilibria located near a single steady state, as for example the mon-
etary steady state. As has already been noted in section 2.4, stationary two - state
sunspot equilibria exist arbitrarily close to the monetary steady state if and only
if it is indeterminate under perfect foresight dynamics which, as has been shown
in the proof of Theorem 1 in section 2.1, is the case if
∣∣∣1+ε(1)ε(1) ∣∣∣ < 1. Based on this
result, Evans and Honkapohja (1994) only showed that the class of stationary two
- state sunspot equilibria located in a neighbourhood around the monetary steady
state is never weakly E - stable if 0 < 1+ε(1)
ε(1)
< 1. Since in the present example
ε (1) is given by 1−σ
σ+κ
this condition would however require that κ < −σ which is a
contradiction to the assumptions made on the utility function69. Therefore, this case
cannot arise in the present example and is thus also not relevant here. The relevant
question whether the class of stationary two - state sunspot equilibria located near
the monetary steady state can be weakly E - stable for −1− < 1+ε(1)
ε(1)
< 0 could
however not be answered through the approach of Evans and Honkapohja (1994).
Using a diﬀerent technique, Evans and Honkapohja (2003) however ﬁnally show that
69Recall that it has been assumed that both κ and σ are positive.
122
for 0 > 1+ε(1)
ε(1)
> −1, i.e. for σ > 2+κ, weakly E - stable two - state sunspot equilibria
exist in any neighbourhood around the monetary steady state. In order to establish
this result Evans and Honkapohja rely on a bifurcation analysis: Therefore, they
deﬁne the transition probability pi11 such that tr [DT1 (n∗, n∗)] is one, i.e. such that
pi11 = 2 +
1
ε(1)
− pi22 = 1 + 1+κ1−σ − pi22. Holding pi22 ﬁxed, Evans and Honkapohja
then vary pi11 about pi11 and analyse the change in the qualitative behaviour of the
dynamical system (40). Using the central manifold technique, they ﬁnd that the
qualitative change occurring at pi11 = pi11 is characterized by a so called transcritical
bifurcation, meaning that for pi11 > pi11 the monetary steady state is stable under
the considered dynamics, whereas for pi11 < pi11 the monetary steady state looses its
stability to a stationary two - state sunspot equilibrium located close to the mone-
tary steady state.
As already noted above, all the results just indicated only show that agents' learn-
ing process will necessarily converge to a two - state sunspot equilibrium if both the
necessary and the suﬃcient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium are
fulﬁlled and if agents can correctly specify the extrinsic stochastic process associ-
ated with this class of equilibria. It might however very well be the case that agents
can also observe the evolution of a second extrinsic variable and believe that this
variable also has an inﬂuence on the economy.
Let this second extrinsic variable be given by the two - state Markov process (Wt)
which can take on values in the state space {1, 2}, and denote, as above, the proba-
bility of reaching state b from state a for this additional process as ψab. As already
pointed out above, agents who condition their expectations also on this process be-
lieve then that nature is in one of four possible states, denoted as ai, where i refers
to the realization of the original sunspot process and a refers to the realization of the
additional process which is assumed to be independent from the original process.
A two - state sunspot equilibrium which has been found to be weakly E - stable can
then be written as a degenerate sunspot equilibrium of cardinality four and order
two by setting nai = ni for all a = 1, 2 and all i = 1, 2. If this degenerate sunspot
equilibrium is weakly E - stable, regardless of the additional process used in the
expectations formation process, the original two - state sunspot equilibrium is said
to be strongly E - stable, meaning that its stability under learning is robust with
respect to changes in agents' perceptions about the number of relevant explanatory
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variables.70
Evans (1989) however argues that in his example a two - state sunspot equilibrium
can never be strongly E - stable. In order to see this, note that, analogously to
above, the mapping from agents perceptions (nˆ11, nˆ21, nˆ12, nˆ22)
′ to the actual law of
motion for nai, the optimal labour supply associated with state of nature ai, is given
by:
[T2 (nˆ11, nˆ21, nˆ12, nˆ22)]ai =
[
2∑
b=1
2∑
j=1
piijψab
(
nˆbj
nˆai
)1−σ] 1κ+σ
∀a, i ∈ {1, 2}
As above, a rational expectations equilibrium (n11, n21, n12, n22)
′ is said to be E -
stable under the considered perceived law of motion if all eigenvalues of the Jacobi
matrix of T2 evaluated at this equilibrium have real part less than one.
In order to show that there exist extrinsic processes for which this matrix has however
at least one eigenvalue with real part greater than one, Evans (1989) ﬁrst shows that
this is the case if the transition probability matrix of the additional process were
such that ψ11 = ψ22 = 0. He then argues by continuity of the eigenvalues that this
result must also hold for transition probabilities which are suﬃciently close to zero
but which do not violate the requirement for the transition probabilities stated in
the deﬁnition of stationary sunspot equilibria given in section 2.
Thus, consider the partial derivative of [T2]ai with respect to nˆai:
∂ [T2]ai
∂nˆai
= −1− σ
κ+ σ
nˆ−2+σai
∑
(j,b) 6=(i,a)
piijψabnˆ
1−σ
bj
[
2∑
b=1
2∑
j=1
piijψab
(
nˆbj
nˆai
)1−σ] 1−κ−σκ+σ
Using the ﬁrst order condition for nai, the optimal labour supply associated with
state ai, in order to replace
∑2
j=1
∑2
b=1 piijψab
(
nˆbj
nˆai
)1−σ
by nκ+σai and evaluating this
partial derivative at the degenerate sunspot equilibrium under consideration yields
that the diagonal elements of the Jacobi matrix of T2 evaluated at this equilibrium
70Note that, unlike in the previous sections, only a very speciﬁc overparametrization, namely the
inclusion of one additional sunspot process with two (and not arbitrarily many) states is taken
into account here. Therefore, the concept of strong E - stability used here would actually
be weaker than the concept discussed in earlier sections. However, since it is the aim of this
analysis to show that the sunspot equilibrium under consideration cannot be strongly E - stable
it is enough to ﬁnd just one overparametrized perceived law of motion under which it is not E
- stable.
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are given by:
DT2 (n1, n2, n1, n2)ai,ai = −
1− σ
κ+ σ
n
−(1+κ)
i
piij ψab︸︷︷︸
=1
n1−σj + piij ψaa︸︷︷︸
=0
n1−σj + piii ψab︸︷︷︸
=1
n1−σi

= −1− σ
κ+ σ
n
−(1+κ)
i
(
piijn
1−σ
j + piiin
1−σ
i
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=n1+κi
= −1− σ
κ+ σ
where the last equality holds since it must be the case that niv′ (ni) = piiiniu′ (ni) +
piijnju
′ (nj), where j 6= i and i ∈ {1, 2}, if ni is chosen optimally when only the
original sunspot process is used.
Furthermore, the partial derivative of [T2]ai with respect to any nˆbj, where either
j 6= i or b 6= a, is given by:
∂ [T2 (nˆ11, nˆ21, nˆ12, nˆ22)]ai
∂nˆbj
=
1− σ
κ+ σ
[
2∑
m=1
2∑
l=1
piilψam
(
nˆml
nˆai
)1−σ] 1−κ−σκ+σ
piijψab
nˆ−σbj
nˆ1−σai
As above, the ﬁrst order condition for optimal labour supply can be used to sub-
stitute nκ+σai for
∑2
l=1
∑2
m=1 piilψam
(
nˆml
nˆai
)1−σ
. Evaluating this partial derivative at
the degenerate sunspot equilibrium under consideration yields that the entry in the
row corresponding the actual law of motion for nai and the column corresponding
to the partial derivative with respect to nˆbj of the Jacobi matrix DT2 evaluated at
this equilibrium, is given by:
DT2 (n1, n2, n1, n2)ai,bj =
1− σ
κ+ σ
n−κi n
−σ
b piijψab
Since it is assumed that ψaa = 0 for a = 1, 2, it automatically follows from this that
[DT2 (n1, n2, n1, n2)]r,c = 0 for (r, c) ∈ {(1, 2) , (2, 1) , (3, 4) , (4, 3)}, where r refers to
the row and c refers to the column of the Jacobi matrix the given element is in, since
for these entries it holds that b = a, meaning that the additional sunspot process
does not change its state. Furthermore, it also follows for a 6= b and i, a ∈ {1, 2},
that:
DT2 (n1, n2, n1, n2)ai,bi =
1− σ
κ+ σ
n−κi n
−σ
i piii ψab︸︷︷︸
=1
Since ni has been chosen optimally in the presence of the original two - state
sunspot process, it must, as already noted above, hold that niv′ (ni) = piiiniu′ (ni)+
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piijnju
′ (nj). This can in the present example be rearranged to show that n−κi n
−σ
i piii
can also be expressed as 1−piijn1−σj n−(1+κ)i , implying that the expression above can
be rewritten as:
DT2 (n1, n2, n1, n2)ai,bj = −
1− σ
κ+ σ
n1−σj n
−(1+κ)
i +
1− σ
κ+ σ
Moreover, since ψab = 1 for a 6= b, it immediately follows that the derivative of the
mapping for optimal labour supply in state ai with respect to nˆbj for j 6= i and b 6= a
is given by:
DT2 (n1, n2, n1, n2)ai,bj =
1− σ
κ+ σ
n−κi n
−σ
j piij
Collecting all these partial derivatives in the Jacobi matrix and comparing the last
two results with the Jacobi matrix DT1 evaluated at the stationary two - state
sunspot equilibrium under consideration shows that the larger dimensional Jacobi
matrix DT2 evaluated at the corresponding degenerate sunspot equilibrium can be
written as the following block matrix:
DT2 (n1, n2, n1, n2) =
(
−ε (1) I2 DT1 (n1, n2) + ε (1) I2
DT1 (n1, n2) + ε (1) I2 −ε (1) I2
)
where I2 denotes the two dimensional identity matrix.
As usually, the eigenvalues of this matrix are given by the roots of the characteristic
polynomial, i.e. by the roots of the determinant of DT2 (n1, n2, n1, n2)− λI4, which
can also be written as:∣∣∣∣∣ −ε (1) I2 − λI2 DT1 (n1, n2) + ε (1) I2DT1 (n1, n2) + ε (1) I2 −ε (1) I2 − λI2
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
Since the determinant of a matrix does not change when one row (resp. column) is
added to another row (resp. column), it is possible to make the following transfor-
mations, without altering the roots of the characteristic polynomial:∣∣∣∣∣ −ε (1) I2 − λI2 DT1 (n1, n2) + ε (1) I2DT1 (n1, n2)− λI2 DT1 (n1, n2)− λI2
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0∣∣∣∣∣−DT1 (n1, n2)− 2ε (1) I2 − λI2 DT1 (n1, n2) + ε (1) I20 DT1 (n1, n2)− λI2
∣∣∣∣∣ = 0
Since this matrix is block - diagonal, the solutions for λ are given by the eigenval-
ues of −DT1 (n1, n2)− 2ε (1) I2 and the eigenvalues of DT1 (n1, n2), which, as noted
126
above, are given by 0 and tr [DT1 (n1, n2)]. Therefore, this example also illustrates
a result obtained in section 4.3.1, namely that all eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix
evaluated at a certain rational expectations equilibrium must also be eigenvalues of
the Jacobi matrix when agents use additional extrinsic sunspot processes in their
learning rules.
In order to calculate the two remaining eigenvalues of DT2 (n1, n2, n1, n2), note that
the trace of −DT1 (n1, n2)−2ε (1) I2 is given by −tr [DT1 (n1, n2)]−4ε (1). Further-
more, since the determinant of DT1 (n1, n2) is zero, it follows that the determinant of
this matrix can be written as 2ε (1) tr [DT1 (n1, n2)] + 4ε (1)
2. Since the eigenvalues
of any 2 × 2 matrix A can be computed as the roots of λ2 − tr [A]λ + det [A] = 0,
the missing two eigenvalues are given by:
λ1,2 =
−tr [DT1 (n1, n2)]− 4ε (1)
2
±
±
√
(−tr [DT1 (n1, n2)]− 4ε (1))2
4
− 2ε (1) tr [DT1 (n1, n2)]− 4ε (1)2
=
−tr [DT1 (n1, n2)]− 4ε (1)
2
± tr [DT1 (n1, n2)]
2
In particular, it can be seen from this that one eigenvalue of DT2 evaluated at the
degenerate sunspot equilibrium under consideration must be equal to −2ε (1). If
this eigenvalue were smaller than one so that the sunspot equilibrium under consid-
eration could be strongly E - stable, it would be the case that ε (1) > −1
2
. However,
as argued above, it is in this case not possible that stationary sunspot equilibria
exist since in the model discussed here ε (1) < −1
2
is not just suﬃcient, but indeed
necessary for the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria.
Therefore, if ψ11 = ψ22 = 0, one eigenvalue of DT2 must be greater than one, mean-
ing that in this case the two - state sunspot equilibrium under consideration cannot
be E - stable under the considered overparametrized perceived law of motion. As
already indicated above, this must continue to hold if ψ11 and ψ22 are small, but
strictly greater than zero.
Therefore, Evans (1989) concludes that although the class of stationary two - state
sunspot equilibria is weakly stable if sunspot equilibria exist, there also exist sunspot
processes which if included in the learning algorithm render this class of equilibria
unstable. This has in particular been shown for two - state Markov processes for
which the probability that states change from period to the next is high. Therefore,
the class of two - state sunspot equilibria can never be strongly E - stable and thus
it can be argued that although two - state sunspot equilibria might be observed
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under certain circumstances, they will not be persistently observed, when agents
use a recursive least squares learning rule as described here.
However, since it has been shown above that in the presence of sunspot equilib-
ria the monetary steady state can also not be attained by the learning algorithm
when any number of extrinsic processes are used, the question which equilibria are
plausible outcomes of agents' learning behaviour remains. Evans (1989) tries to an-
swer this question by simulating his model. In doing so, he can ﬁrst conﬁrm that a
weakly E - stable two - state sunspot equilibrium is indeed not stable when another
extrinsic stochastic process is used in the learning algorithm. Moreover, in his simu-
lations, trajectories starting close to the given sunspot equilibrium, but allowing for
a dependence on the realization of the additionally used process, converge to a de-
generate sunspot equilibrium of higher order. Furthermore, Evans (1989) shows with
his simulation that the distance between the smallest and the largest labour sup-
ply associated with a sunspot equilibrium which is attained by the learning process
increases with the number of sunspot processes used in the learning algorithm. In
other words, Evans (1989) demonstrates that if agents condition their expectations
about prices on many diﬀerent extrinsic variables, they are led to rather "extreme"
actions.
However, what is more important about these results is that they indicate that
the possibility of agents conditioning their expectations on the realization of cer-
tain extrinsic variables results in great diﬃculties for predicting on which, or even
on which type of, rational expectations equilibrium an economy will asymptotically
settle. In order to do this, it would be necessary to have precise information on
agents' perceived law of motion. Moreover, slight changes in the parametrization
of agents' perceived law of motion and small perturbations from a given class of
rational expectations equilibria might lead the economy to a sunspot equilibrium of
completely diﬀerent order.
5. Conclusion
The previous analysis for the Samuelson overlapping generations model showed that
if the monetary steady state is locally asymptotically stable under perfect foresight
dynamics, i.e. if small deviations from the monetary steady state price level result in
prices converging back to the monetary steady state, stationary sunspot equilibria
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will necessarily exist under the hypothesis of rational expectations. Moreover, for
two plausible learning rules, the results given in section 4 show that in this case the
monetary steady state cannot be attained by agents who adjust their expectations
adaptively and use the evolution of an extrinsic variable in doing so. Furthermore,
it was demonstrated that at least for some special cases extrinsic uncertainty will
even asymptotically have an eﬀect on economic outcomes.
However, the analysis undertaken here is based on a very simple model which can
only be regarded as a rather stylized description of real economies. For example, it
has been assumed that all agents are identical and that thus all agents base their
expectations on the same learning algorithm. It might however also be the case
that only one part of the population believes in an inﬂuence of the extrinsic sunspot
process on economic outcomes. Nevertheless, Woodford (1990) demonstrates that if
the number of agents who use the extrinsic sunspot process in their learning algo-
rithm is suﬃciently large, the economy will still converge to a sunspot equilibrium,
meaning that the results described above remain unchanged.
However, it seems in general justiﬁed to analyse the eﬀect of extrinsic uncertainty
in a simpliﬁed model such as the Samuelson overlapping generations model since
modiﬁcations to the model which would allow for a better description of reality
should make it even easier for stationary sunspot equilibria to exist: One possible
modiﬁcation discussed by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) is to assume that the pro-
duction of one agent does not only depend on his speciﬁc labour input, as it has
been assumed here, but also on the aggregate labour input in the economy. This
concept of increasing social returns is based on the observation that a larger popu-
lation can create more ideas implying that the individual worker can refer back to
a greater range of solutions to potential problems occurring during his production
process and can thus be more productive. As Evans and Honkapohja show, incorpo-
rating this modiﬁed production technology into the simple overlapping generations
model discussed here can yield three stationary perfect foresight equilibria, in all of
which money has a positive value and where two of them are (locally) stable under
the dynamics of a learning algorithm provided that agents do not use any extrinsic
process in their learning algorithm. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) then argue by
a result due to Evans and Honkapohja (1994) that a sunspot equilibrium located
in any neighbourhood of two perfect foresight equilibria is stable under learning if
and only if the respective perfect foresight equilibria are both weakly E - stable.
Therefore, they conclude that even if the simple model discussed here is augmented
by a more realistic production technology the basic result that extrinsic uncertainty
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can have an impact on economic outcomes remains unchanged.
A diﬀerent restriction imposed by the Samuelson overlapping generations model is
that agents can only consume in the second part of their lives. A diﬀerent assump-
tion, made for example by the Diamond overlapping generations model, namely that
agents can also consume in the ﬁrst part of their lives, would not change the results
obtained through the present analysis, but would make it necessary to focus on the
saving decision of young agents instead of the labour supply decision as done here.
This is the case, since under the latter assumption the relevant economic decision is
not how much time agents spend on production, but which part of their production
they consume themselves when young and which part they save for their old age
consumption, i.e. which part they sell on the goods market.
Another restriction which has been imposed by the present analysis is that agents
who are not able to form rational expectations adjust their expectations adaptively.
However, this is not the only possibility to model learning behaviour. Another
way is to assume that agents base their expectations on so called eductive learning,
i.e. that they solely adjust their expectations by a process of reasoning based on
some initial common knowledge about the aggregate expectations in the economy,
as described for example in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). The advantage of this
approach is that coordination on a rational expectations equilibrium could occur
instantaneously, while for adaptive learning this coordination can only be expected
to occur asymptotically. However, the use of eductive learning rests on rather strong
common knowledge assumptions and furthermore it also results in stricter stability
conditions for some rational expectations equilibria.
Moreover, the aim of this thesis was to demonstrate that there exist plausible sit-
uations in which extrinsic uncertainty has an aﬀect on economic outcomes. Since
both learning algorithms introduced here seem to be a plausible description for the
behaviour of agents, this could be accomplished.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Abstract (English)
This thesis aims at describing the circumstances under which economic outcomes can
be inﬂuenced by the evolution of a purely extrinsic variable within the framework of
a simple overlapping generations model. This question will be both addressed under
the assumption of rational expectations and under the more realistic assumption of
agents adjusting their expectations about economic variables adaptively from past
observations by using econometric techniques. Therefore, this thesis will also provide
a brief overview of the literature on learning in macroeconomic models and introduce
the basic techniques which are employed to analyse diﬀerent learning algorithms.
A.2. Abstract (German)
Das Ziel dieser Diplomarbeit ist es die Umstände zu beschreiben unter denen ökonomis-
che Ereignisse in einem einfachen OLG Modell durch den Verlauf einer extrinsischen
Variable beeinﬂusst werden können. Diese Frage wird sowohl unter der Annahme
von rationalen Erwartungen als auch unter der realistischeren Annahme, dass Agen-
ten ihre Erwartungen über die für sie relevanten ökonomischen Variablen adaptiv
durch ökonometrische Methoden aus vergangen Beobachtungen bilden, untersucht.
Daher wird diese Diplomarbeit auch einen kurzen Überblick über die Literatur über
Lernen in makroökonomischen Modellen geben und die grundlegenden Methoden
die zu einer Analyse von unterschiedlichen Lernalgorithmen dienen vorstellen.
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